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What explains why ethnoracial identity is of low salience in elections in Latin 
America, particularly in Afro-Latin America? Marginalized individuals in ethnoracially 
diverse societies, especially stratified ones, would seem most likely to mobilize 
politically along ethnoracial lines. I argue that, under certain conditions, individuals will 
deal with ethnoracial discrimination and stratification through exit rather than voice. That 
is, they will reclassify their way out of marginalized ethnosomatic categories instead of 
voting for candidates and parties that share their ethnoracial identities. This tends to be 
the case where ethnoracial group identity is inchoate and group boundaries are 
permeable. High levels of stratification combined with low degrees of ethnoracial group 
consolidation will typically prevent the activation of ethnoracial identity in elections. 
Whereas ethnoracial stratification provides the incentive structure for individuals to 
switch ethnoracial categories, inchoate ethnoracial group identity and permeable 
ethnoracial boundaries lower the transaction costs to doing so. I also argue that 
individuals may emphasize national origin over race or ethnicity where ethnoracial group 
loyalties are weak and immigration is widespread. 
 I test my argument against competing approaches using quantitative, qualitative, 
and experimental evidence from the Dominican Republic. The evidence suggests that the 
confluence of stratification and inchoate ethnoracial group identity indeed has prevented 
the activation of ethnoracial cleavages in elections in the DR. This same combination, 
however, has not impeded the activation of national origin in elections. Rather than 
 viii 
strengthening the salience of ethnoracial cleavages in elections, nationalism has helped to 
redirect those cleavages.  
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Chapter 1: Exit Over Voice 
 
The absence of ethnoracially-based voting behavior in Latin America, especially 
in predominantly Afro-descendant countries, poses an interesting puzzle. Much of the 
literature on race and ethnicity outside of Latin America would expect ethnoracial 
diversity in the region to generate electoral behavior based on ethnoracial identity — and 
with good reason. Ethnoracial identity plays an important role in elections in many 
ethnoracially diverse and stratified societies, including South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and in parts of Eastern and Western Europe.  
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, ethnoracial identity has been 
historically of low salience in elections in Latin America. Afro-descendants and 
indigenous peoples remain woefully underrepresented in legislatures across the region, 
even in countries that have passed constitutional reforms to reserve legislative seats, such 
as Colombia. Moreover, few ethnic parties have emerged in the region and those that 
have emerged have typically fared poorly. The success of the Movimiento Al Socialismo 
(MAS) in Bolivia since 2002 and its victories in the 2005, 2009, and 2014 presidential 
elections has been exceptional among political parties that have made explicit ethnoracial 
appeals, even within Bolivia. Since 1979, only the MAS and (for a short time) the 
Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik in Ecuador have won more than ten 
percent of the vote. Outside of Bolivia and Ecuador, ethnoracial-based parties have not 




Ethnoracial identity has been especially of low salience in elections in Afro-Latin 
America. Afro-descendant voters in countries such as the Dominican Republic have not 
supported candidates or mobilized politically on the basis of ethnoracial identity. And 
candidates seldom have appealed to their own ethnoracial identity during campaigns. 
Moreover, Afro-descendant-based political parties have been almost entirely absent. 
Afro-descendant-based parties emerged at the national level in Cuba, Brazil, and 
Uruguay in 1908, 1931, and 1936, respectively, but perished relatively soon thereafter. 
Internal factions, split support among Afro-descendants, and repressive laws that either 
prohibited race-based political organization or banned all political parties crippled those 
parties (Andrews 2004). 
Contemporary Afro-descendant based parties, similarly to indigenous based 
political parties, have struggled to overcome resource deficits and low ethnoracial 
consciousness (Madrid forthcoming). The few Afro-descendant based parties that have 
emerged have had little success in mobilizing and competing in elections outside of the 
regional level. The Alianza Social Afrocolombiana, for example, received only 0.1 
percent of the national vote in the 2010 presidential elections in Colombia (Madrid 2012, 
160). 
Although Afro-descendants in major political parties have secured important 
internal positions, they have typically not fared well as candidates. In Costa Rica, for 
example, Epsy Campell reached the vice-presidency and presidency of the Citizens 




elections. Despite her popularity, she did not secure her party’s nomination in the 2014 
primaries.  
What explains the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in Latin 
America? Why have Afro-descendant candidates typically eschewed ethnoracial-based 
appeals and why have Afro-descendant voters on the whole declined to vote for them 
when they have made such appeals? 
I argue that inchoate ethnoracial group identity and ethnoracial stratification help 
to explain the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in Latin America. Weak 
ethnoracial group identity and high levels of stratification have encouraged individuals to 
“exit” or reclassify their ethnoracial identification rather than contest or give “voice” to 
their marginalized condition in elections.   
In what follows, I briefly discuss my “exit over voice” argument and its 
theoretical contributions, define key concepts, and introduce existing theoretical 
approaches. I then expound on my argument and consider the case of the Dominican 
Republic. I conclude this chapter by discussing the research design and methods and 
presenting an overview of the dissertation.   
THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
 
Studies on the effect of ethnoracial cleavages in elections often assume that 
individuals who share ethnoracial attributes also share a group identity and formulate 
collective interests (Loveman 1999). If so, ethnoracial voting would seem most probable 




from mobilizing politically along ethnoracial lines. I define ethnoracial-based voting 
behavior as the practice of routinely voting for a party or candidate that is perceived as 
representing an individual’s ethnoracial identification (Ferree 2006). 
Ethnoracial identity, however, is not automatically salient in elections in 
ethnoracially diverse societies, even those with high levels of stratification. I argue that 
stratification may, in fact, impede the activation of ethnoracial cleavages. Where 
ethnoracial group identities are inchoate and ethnoracial boundaries are porous, 
individuals may shun identification with marginalized ethnosomatic categories and seek 
to identify with more privileged categories. In Hirschman’s (1970) terms, incentives to 
“exit” reduce the possibility that individuals will “voice” ethnoracial grievances and 
decrease the likelihood that entrepreneurs activate ethnoracial cleavages in elections. The 
literature has not considered this possibility because it has not sufficiently relaxed the 
assumption of groupism (Brubaker 2004). That is, it presumes that individuals who share 
an ethnoracial category based on common ethnoracial attributes also form part of a 
bounded, unitary group with collective preferences and political consciousness (ibid).  
Ethnoracial identities are inchoate and ethnoracial boundaries are fluid in Latin 
America in large part because of widespread mestizaje (ethnoracial mixing). At the same 
time, however, the region is characterized by significant ethnoracial stratification and 
discrimination. Individuals who are predominantly of indigenous and/or African descent 
tend to be much poorer and less educated than individuals who are mostly of European 




to switch ethnoracial categories, inchoate ethnoracial group identity and fluid ethnoracial 
boundaries lower the transaction costs to doing so. Moreover, nation-building efforts may 
obstruct the formation of strong ethnoracial identities and suppress ethnoracial political 
behavior. The confluence of stratification, weak ethnoracial group identity, and nation-
building efforts helps to explain why ethnoracial identity has not been salient in elections 
in Latin America.  
My “exit over voice” argument challenges the assumption that ethnoracial 
identities are necessarily politically salient in ethnoracially diverse societies, especially in 
ones that are highly stratified. It also provides a more dynamic understanding of 
ethnoracial electoral politics in the region than prevailing approaches. Much of the 
literature on race and ethnicity has emphasized institutional and structural constraints to 
explain the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections. My argument, however, 
considers how subaltern sectors strategize to overcome those constraints.  
Categorical switching among subaltern sectors accounts for much of the low 
salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in the Dominican Republic. Dominicans are 
of mixed descent and tend to identify with multiple and ambiguous ethnoracial 
categories. Rather than express electoral preferences based on strong ethnoracial group 
affinities, they tend to identify with lighter-skinned ethnoracial categories as a way to 
avoid ethnoracial prejudice. This explains the low demand for ethnoracial candidates and 








Throughout the dissertation, I employ the terms “ethnoracial” or “ethnosomatic” 
rather than race or ethnicity, except when referring to those literatures specifically. 
Typically, race has been understood in the literature on the basis of biological 
characteristics or somatic features, whereas ethnicity has been associated with a shared 
bundle of cultural characteristics, including language, history, ancestry, and territory 
(Hale 2004, Chandra 2006). In practice, however, racial and ethnic classifications are 
often based on a combination of physical and cultural characteristics. 
Although some scholars acknowledge that there are overlaps between race and 
ethnicity as categories of practice (Wade 1997; Hooker 2012; Paschel 2013), others 
remain divided over whether it is useful to retain a distinction between race and ethnicity 
as categories of analysis.1  
In the Dominican Republic, retaining a strict distinction between race and 
ethnicity as categories of analysis is inappropriate. Roth (2012, 27) correctly notes that 
race in the DR is understood closer to what the literature has conceived as ethnicity and is 
often evoked synonymously with ethnicity and nationality. As is the case with much of 
Latin America, ethnoracial classification in the DR is not necessarily determined by 
cultural characteristics, or by visible or ethnoracial attributes (Flores and Telles 2012). 
                                                 
1 See Brubaker (1996) for a distinction between categories of analysis and categories of practice. For 
contrasting viewpoints on studying race and ethnicity under a singular category of analysis, see the 




Social class, nationality, age, education, popular culture, social movements, and 
occupation may also shape ethnoracial classification.2  
I define national origin as the perceived homeland of an individual—that is, the 
country that an individual and his or her recent ancestors feel most affinity with. National 
origin has more rigid criteria and transmission of membership than race, ethnicity, and 
even nationality. Nationality can be acquired and relinquished in most cases, though it 
may be difficult to do.3 And although national origin shares a family resemblance to 
ancestry, it may be stickier and more socio-politically consequential than ancestry, which 
may be unknown even to individuals themselves. National origin is more temporally 
proximate and retains a greater degree of “unassimilatedness” than ancestry.  
Lastly, I define ethnoracial stratification as the uneven access to resources and 
institutions among members of different ethnoracial groups. The extent and meaning of 
ethnoracial stratification in the DR is slippery (Howard 2001). High levels of intermixing 
and elastic ethnoracial boundaries complicate discrete understandings of “white” and 
“black” social categories. Likewise, treating race or ethnicity in the Dominican Republic 
as a white-black binary or even a white-mixed-black schema obscures how stratification 
takes place in a plural ethnoracial order (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Such a white-black binary 
also risks essentializing or reifying distinctions between “blacks” and “whites” (Loveman 
1999). Moreover, it is unclear how varying kinds (i.e. vertical, horizontal) and degrees of 
                                                 
2 See Yashar (2005); Schwartzman (2007); Bailey (2009); Flores and Telles (2012); Paschel (2013). 
3 Brubaker (2004, 81) suggests that differences across these dimensions do not necessarily inscribe race, 




stratification should be weighed against each other (Bonilla-Silva 2009). Although 
stratification in the region constitutes an entire ethnoracial spectrum, I evaluate 
stratification mostly at the ethnoracial poles. Intermediate ethnoracial categories are more 
fluid and less reliable markers of stratification.4 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Most studies of ethnoracial identity in Latin America have not directly addressed 
the extent to which ethnoracial identity might affect elections. The few studies that have 
done so have focused mostly on indigenous electoral mobilization and party politics in 
the Andes.5 It is unclear, however, whether findings based on indigenous politics can 
speak to Afro-Latin America. A few studies of ethnoracial identity and elections have 
been conducted in Brazil (Mitchell 2009; Dunning 2010; Aguilar-Pariente et al. 2015), 
but their findings are contradictory.6  
Studies of the Dominican Republic, meanwhile, seldom engage the intersection 
between ethnoracial identity and electoral behavior. The literature on elections, 
institutions, and state formation in the DR has paid greater attention to social class than 
race,7 and the vast literature on race in the DR has not primarily focused on electoral 
                                                 
4 For different understandings of stratification in Latin America see the exchange between Sue (2009) and 
Bonilla Silva (2009). 
5 See Yashar (2005); Van Cott (2002; 2005); Rice and Van Cott (2006); Madrid (2005a; 2005b; 2008; 
2011; 2012) 
6 Aguilar-Pariente (2011) has also carried experimental research in Mexico on this subject. 





behavior.8 An important study by Sagás (2000) is one of the few works in political 
science to examine the effect of race on politics in the DR, but it does not specifically 
address electoral behavior. As Mayes (2014, 2-3) states, contemporary scholarship on 
race in the DR has privileged “the origins of anti-Haitian and anti-black nationalist 
ideologies…and how (or whether) Dominican elites have managed to impose their 
ideology beyond their class.”  
Despite the paucity of relevant studies, broader approaches can be employed to 
generate predictions about how perceived ethnoracial identity might affect electoral 
behavior in Afro-Latin America and the DR in particular. These approaches, however, 
cannot fully explain why ethnoracial identification is of low salience at the ballot box in 
countries such as the Dominican Republic. My “exit over voice” argument fills this 
lacuna. Moreover, as Figure 1.1 illustrates, my argument engages disparate literatures on 
ethnoracial identity, which do not always interact. 
                                                 
8 See Franco (1969); Tolentino Dipp (1974); Cassá (1976); Dore Cabral (1985); Fennema and Lowenthal 
(1987); Moya Pons (1992); Coten et al. (1995); Torres-Saillant (1998); Sagás (2000); Howard (2001); 





Figure 1.1: The Positioning of “Exit Over Voice” in the Literature on Race, Ethnicity, 
and Politics. 
Group Specific Approaches 
 
Group-specific approaches from the comparative ethnic politics literature and the 
literature on race in American politics typically emphasize the salience of ethnoracial 
identity in elections. They presuppose that shared ethnoracial categorization leads to 
consolidated group identity and that groups hold collective preferences that are expressed 
at the ballot box. A group of sociologists led by Jenkins (1994), Loveman (1997), 
Brubaker (2004), Bailey (2009), Wimmer (2013) and others have challenged the 
assumptions behind these premises.  
The comparative ethnic politics literature has suggested that ethnic group identity 
often structures social behavior.9 There has been disagreement in the literature between 
so-called instrumentalists and primordialists over what constitutes ethnic identity and 
                                                 
9 See Hale (2004, 481). 
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over the degree to which ethnic identification is durable or free to change (Gil-White 
1999; Van Evera 2001; Hale 2004; Chandra 2001, 2006). And a few studies on Africa 
have found evidence of lower than expected levels of ethnic voting.10  
Nonetheless, much of the literature has suggested that ethnic identity is salient in 
electoral behavior either as an expression of ethnic identity or as an informational 
heuristic. The important works of Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) and Horowitz (1985), for 
instance, assume that vote choice is an expression of ethnic identity and, consequently, 
that voters engage in ethnic voting. The ethnic outbidding thesis developed by these 
authors, among others, not only assumed that ethnic voters would support co-ethnics but 
also that voters would respond to strong ethnic appeals. Such a response to ethnic 
appeals, in fact, would lead ethnic entrepreneurs to make ever more extreme ethnic 
appeals in order to outbid their competition. Scholarship on electoral volatility and ethnic 
party formation by Birnir (2007) and Chandra (2009), for instance, has made similar 
assumptions about the transmission of group-based preferences. These scholars 
conceptualized ethnicity as information heuristics that voters would use to identify their 
electoral preferences.11 
Although the literature has disagreed over how to measure ethnic identity,12 
datasets that support empirical studies of comparative ethnic politics, such as Bruk and 
                                                 
10 See studies on Ethiopia, Benin, and Mali by Ishiyama (2010), Martin and Seely (2010), and Dunning 
and Harrison (2010), respectively. 
 
11 A study on South Africa by Ferree (2006), for instance, finds that party labels function as racialized 
heuristics or credentials. These racialized party labels also condition beliefs about party performance. 




Apenchenko (1964), Alesina (2003), Fearon (2003), and Minorities at Risk, also take 
group identity formation as axiomatic. Ethnic groups are the basic unit of analysis in 
these datasets, which seek to measure the size and other characteristics of ethnic groups.13 
The American politics literature on race similarly assumes that members of the 
same racial category tend to favor each other, share a sense of common fate, and give 
primacy to collective benefits (Tajfel 1981; Dawson 1994). Survey and experiment-based 
studies of ethnic or racial voting in the U.S have found considerable evidence of racial 
matching, especially in studies of black and white U.S. voters.14 The American politics 
literature on race has also found that politicians, especially black politicians, are “reliably 
more likely to advance the interests of those who share their personal characteristics...” 
(Broockman 2013, 1). The assumption that individuals will vote along racial lines in U.S. 
racial politics is also evident in efforts by political elites to redraw congressional districts 
in order to take advantage of race-based voting (Tate 2003). 
Racial matching or racial voting is far from uniform even in the U.S. electoral 
context, however. White voters will sometimes support black candidates, and they do not 
systematically vote against black candidates based on the candidates’ race.15 This is 
evident in the 2008 and 2012 U.S. presidential elections (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2008; 
Ford 2009; Tesler 2010). And black voters also break with strict race-based voting. 
                                                 
13 See Chandra (2006, 397). 
14 See Sonenshein (1990); Terkildsen (1993); Lublin and Tate (1995); Sigelman et al. (1995); Reeves 
(1997); Voss and Lublin (2001); Tate (2003); Gay (2004); Herron and Sekhon (2005); Philpot and Walton, 
Jr. (2007).  




Indeed, they have historically done so more than white voters.16 Moreover, even when 
voters support candidates of their own race, it is not necessarily because of racial 
considerations.17 Furthermore, there is no consensus in the literature on the extent to 
which the behavior of Latino and Asian American voters is characterized by racial 
matching.18  
Nonetheless, a group-specific approach might expect that voters will favor 
candidates who share their ethnoracial identity. 
It is unclear, however, whether the assumptions undergirding group-specific 
approaches hold sway in the Dominican Republic. The DR, and much of the region, has 
had a very different type of racialization process—one more closely tied to nation-
building (Loveman 2014). Although ethnoracial categories are socially and economically 
consequential in the DR (as I will show), they were not legally institutionalized. Nor did 
they help congeal ethnoracial group identity and group consciousness as they did in cases 
such as the U.S. and South Africa (Verba and Nie 1972; Marx 1999). Most Dominicans 
are of mixed descent and identify situationally with ambiguous and porous ethnosomatic 
categories. They also tend to engage in hyperdescent, meaning that they classify 
themselves as belonging to the more socially dominant of the ethnoracial categories that 
their ancestors belonged to. Torres-Saillant (1998) has suggested that Dominicans engage 
                                                 
16 For a discussion on black voter’s cross-racial voting patterns see Walker’s precinct study of mayoral 
elections in Atlanta in Gurin et al. (1989). For explanations on the historically strong opposition of white 
voters to black candidates see Key’s “Black Threat Theory” and Kinder and Sears (1981) “Symbolic 
Racism Theory.” 
17 See Citrin et al. (1990); Howell and Perry (2004); Highton (2004). 
18  See Alvarez and Bedolla (2003); Pantoja and Segura (2003); McConnaughy et al. (2010); Beltran 




in hyperdescent as a way to manage the historical racial prejudice of elites. Extensive 
racial mixing has helped to attenuate both the degree of solidarity among in-group 
members and the degree of conflict with out-group members—two tenets of group-
specific approaches.  
 
Latin American Approaches to Race and Ethnicity 
Latin American literatures on race, such as the racial democracy thesis and the 
pigmentocracy literature, may also be used to generate predictions about the effect of 
perceived ethnoracial identity on elections in the DR. Neither of these approaches was 
developed to explain voting behavior, however.  
Because of the widespread intermixing and porous ethnoracial categories in Latin 
America, scholars writing in the mid-20th century often portrayed Latin American 
countries as racial democracies.19 These racial democracies purportedly stood in contrast 
to institutionalized racial domination and categorization in the United States. Latin 
American countries often promoted the racial democracy thesis because it allowed them 
to rebut the predictions of pseudo scientific racism and redefine themselves as cradles of 
egalitarianism, racial harmony, and progress (Helg 1991; De la Fuente 1999; Andrews 
2004; Loveman 2014).  
Most evidence-based scholars in the region have abandoned claims that Latin 
America is a racial democracy due to evidence of widespread racial marginalization and 
inequality in the region. Hernández (2013), for instance, demonstrates that Latin 
                                                 




American states historically enforced unwritten, customary laws to structure race 
relations and subordinate Afro-descendants. Telles and Bailey (2013) show that most 
Latin Americans acknowledge discrimination and attribute stratification to structural 
rather than to individual explanations. They found that this was the case whether 
individuals self-identified with dominant or subordinate ethnoracial groups. States, too, 
have turned away from the discourse of racial democracy. In cases such as Brazil, the 
state has even embraced affirmative action policies since the early 2000s to counter the 
impact of racism and institutional discrimination on Afro-Brazilian communities (Htun 
2004).  
A strand of the literature on race in the Dominican Republic led by Núñez (1990) 
and Henríquez-Gratereaux (1994), among others, has not entirely abandoned the racial 
democracy thesis.20 Although these scholars do not directly base their claims on the racial 
democracy thesis per se, they attribute the absence of social organization and conflict 
around race to extensive racial mixing patterns.21 
The racial democracy thesis assumes that mestizaje has largely eliminated racial 
discrimination and that race is relatively inconsequential in the region. Its proponents 
would presumably expect that neither the ethnoracial identity of the candidate nor the 
ethnoracial identity of voters would have much bearing on candidate evaluation. 
                                                 
20 This strand of the literature in many ways builds on earlier writings by Balaguer (1984) and Pérez 
(1990). 
21 Other Dominican scholars attribute the perception of racial democracy in the DR to the interracial and 




Contrary to the claims of the racial democracy thesis, the literature on colorism or 
pigmentocracy not only has suggested that there is social inequality in Latin America but 
also that inequality is stratified by ethnoracial categories and skin color gradations (Telles 
2014, 4). 22 Recent survey-based and experimental studies have found evidence of 
pigmentocracy or a socio-economic hierarchy based on skin color in the region. Sidanius, 
Peña, and Sawyer (2001), for instance, find clear patterns of group-based hierarchy on the 
basis of phenotypes in the DR. They conclude that there is a “clear and consensually 
structured racial hierarchy” (845) in which Dominicans with European phenotypes enjoy 
greater status and power than Dominicans with African phenotypes. Sawyer (2006) finds 
evidence of a similar skin color hierarchy in Cuba. Likewise, Telles and his PERLA 
colleagues (2014) find that skin color closely predicts socioeconomic status in Mexico, 
Peru, Brazil and Colombia.  
The pigmentocracy literature has not examined voting behavior in Latin America, 
and it has not made specific claims about how ethnoracial categories or skin color are 
valorized. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to think that pigmentocracies derive from 
(and are reinforced by) discrimination based on skin color. Nor is it unreasonable to think 
that discrimination might be present in the electoral arena as well.  In essence, the 
dominant socioeconomic status of “whites” has led individuals to privilege “whiteness” 
over “blackness” and reinforce the ethnoracial hierarchy. Indeed, various studies have 
                                                 
22 These are important differences between the pigmentocracy literature in Latin American and the 
colorism literature in the United States. The latter has focused on the valorization of European over African 
phenotypes within and across ethnoracial categories (see Maddox and Gray 2002: Maddox 2004; Boza-
Golash and Darity 2008; Darity, et al. 2011. It has also studied the effect of colorism on candidate 




shown that individuals in Latin America attach value to whiteness and tend to associate 
positive attributes with whiteness (Telles and Flores 2013; Sheriff 2001). There is also 
evidence that dark-skinned individuals in the region have frequently opted to self-identify 
as white or other superordinate categories rather than as black or other subordinate 
categories.  
The pigmentocracy literature thus yields what I refer to as the colorism thesis, 
which predicts that all voters would favor “white” candidates over “mixed” candidates 
and “mixed” candidates over “black” candidates. 
However, there is also reason to question the extent to which the colorism thesis 
can speak to the effect of perceived ethnoracial identity on electoral behavior. Although 
Latin American societies may be pigmentocracies, the masses may reject the 
pigmentocratic ordering of a society. As a result, European phenotypes might not be 
preferable at the ballot box. Moreover, while there is evidence that Dominicans impute 
higher social status and power to lighter racial phenotypes, they may not find these 
qualities to be similarly desirable in a political candidate. Likewise, while there is 
evidence that Dominicans impute lower social status and power to darker racial 
phenotypes, they may not disfavor candidates with dark phenotypes. 
In Table 1.1, I depict the main arguments and electoral predictions of existing 
approaches on race and ethnicity alongside those of my “exit over voice” argument. As 
the table shows, my argument makes very different predictions about ethnoracial 




approach makes similar predictions to the racial democracy thesis, but for very different 
reasons. Indeed, my own approach is grounded on the premise that Latin American 
societies are highly prejudiced and stratified. 
 
 




Voters share in-group preferences, seek to 
maximize gains and advance group-based interests 
 
Voters are likely to 
support candidates of their 






Latin American societies are socially stratified 
along pigmentocratic lines and valorize “white” 
phenotypes over “mixed” and “black” phenotypes 
 
 
Voters are likely to prefer 






Latin American societies are not stratified along 
racial lines; patterns of ethnoracial mixing 
attenuated ethnoracial differentiation 
 
 









In stratified societies, marginalized individuals are 
more likely to “exit” or reclassify their ethnoracial 
identification than contest or give “voice” to their 
marginalized condition in elections 




Table 1.1: Approaches to Understanding the Impact of Ethnoracial Identity on Electoral 






WHY ETHNORACIAL STRATIFICATION MAY UNDERMINE ELECTORAL PREFERENCES 
Much of the literature on ethnoracially diverse societies predict that ethnoracial 
identity is consequential in elections. This prediction is based on two key assumptions. 
The literature assumes that ethnoracial cleavages lead to distinct and competing 
collective interests. It also assumes that collective interests generate demands for 
ethnoracial candidates and parties and in turn produce a supply of ethnoracial voters and 
entrepreneurs. We might expect this reasoning to hold especially in ethnoracially-
stratified societies, where subordinate ethnoracial groups have incentives to protest their 
marginalization by voting for parties or candidates that make ethnoracial appeals. 
These assumptions are problematic for a couple of reasons, however. First, 
ethnoracial group identity is not always consolidated in ethnoracially diverse societies. 
Where there are high levels of intermixing, for instance, individuals may identify with 
multiple and overlapping ethnoracial classifications. Low feelings of loyalty toward any 
single ethnoracial category both inhibit the development of group identities and the 
expression of collective interests.  
Second, ethnoracial stratification does not necessarily encourage individuals to 
mobilize on the basis of ethnoracial grievances. Individuals may not attribute their 
marginalization to ethnoracial stratification or even conceptualize ethnoracial 
stratification as such. This is especially likely where political elites have historically 
made national and ethnoracial identity coterminous (Telles 2014, 19) and disarticulated 




I contend that ethnoracial differences are not necessarily salient at the ballot box 
in ethnoracially diverse societies, even those that are highly stratified. The literature 
seldom considers this possibility because it assumes that there is a direct and linear 
relationship between ethnoracial stratification and the salience of ethnoracial identity in 
elections. That is, the salience of ethnoracial identity in elections increases as the level of 
stratification increases. By contrast, I claim that in some cases ethnoracial stratification 
may actually discourage the electoral activation of ethnoracial identity.  
 Figure 1.2: Determinants of the Salience of Ethnoracial Identity in Elections. 
 
As Figure 1.2 indicates, I propose that the level of ethnoracial group identity 




ethnoracial identity in elections. Where ethnoracial stratification is high and ethnoracial 
group identity is strong, as in the United States, race and ethnicity are very likely to be 
salient in elections, as in quadrant I.  In these countries ethnoracial groups are likely to 
make economic as well as cultural and political demands. Race and ethnicity are also 
likely to be salient in elections in countries where ethnoracial stratification is low but 
ethnoracial identity is strong, as in quadrant III.  In these countries, such as Belgium, 
ethnoracial groups are more likely to focus on cultural and political demands. Race and 
ethnicity are least likely to be salient in elections in countries where ethnoracial 
stratification is low and ethnoracial identity is weak, as in quadrant IV. In these countries, 
ethnoracial groups are likely to make neither economic, nor cultural, nor political 
demands.  
Finally, where ethnoracial stratification is high but ethnoracial group identity is 
weak, as in quadrant II, the salience of ethnoracial identity is also likely to be low. My 
dissertation aims to explain the cases in this quadrant. It argues that Latin American 
countries, and especially the Dominican Republic, fall into this quadrant. In these 
countries, inchoate ethnoracial group identity and high levels of ethnoracial stratification 
have obstructed ethnoracial politics.  
Stratification often generates ethnoracial prejudice and unequal distribution of 
resources that in turn lead individuals to shun identification with marginalized ethnoracial 
categories. Rather than protest their marginalization by voting for ethnoracial parties or 




subordinate ethnoracial categories. Yet individuals are only likely to do this in countries 
where ethnoracial group identity is weak and ethnic boundaries are porous. 
In Latin America, high levels of ethnoracial stratification and prejudice have 
encouraged marginalized individuals to avoid ethnoracial political mobilization. By most 
accounts, Latin America is the most unequal region in the world (World Bank 2004; 
Telles and Bailey 2013). Despite lower levels of wage inequality and an expanded middle 
class over the past decade (Tsounta and Osueke 2014), an estimated 80 million people in 
the region live in extreme poverty (World Bank 2013).  
Afro-descendants, as well as indigenous people, are on the losing end of 
inequality.23 At present, they constitute 40 percent of the region’s poor (Hernández 
2013). In Colombia and Ecuador, for example, over 80 percent of Afro-descendants live 
below the poverty line, and the poverty rate among Afro-Peruvians is greater than the 
national average (Hernández 2013, 76-82).  
Afro-descendants in the region also face significant deficits with regard to 
education. According to figures by Hernández (2013, 75-85), over ten percent of Afro-
Ecuadoreans and thirty percent of Afro-Colombians are illiterate. In Brazil, non-whites 
are illiterate at more than double the rate of whites. 
And there is similar evidence of wage disparities. Bailey and his colleagues 
(2012) find that “blacks” earn less than whites in Brazil. This is true whether using a 
binary measure of racial classification that collapses “blacks and browns” or a ternary 
                                                 
23 Some Afro-descendant communities along the Pacific coast experience greater rates of infant mortality 




measure that disaggregates “black” and “brown.” They also find that disparities in wages 
between whites and non-whites increase at higher deciles of wage distribution (Bailey et 
al. 2012, 8).  
Likewise, Ñopo (2012) finds an ethnic earnings gap of 37.8 percent between 
minorities (including indigenous people) and non-minorities across seven countries in the 
region, ranging from 30.6 percent in Bolivia to 67.8 percent in Guatemala. He attributes 
the ethnic earnings gap, which is larger than the gender gap, to labor market 
characteristics (i.e. occupational segregation, formality, economic sector) and lower 
levels of educational attainment.  
Of course, other variables such as education and region can mitigate the impact of 
race and ethnicity on socioeconomic status (Flores and Telles 2012, 486; Bailey, 
Loveman, and Muniz 2012). Moreover, distinct measures of ethnoracial classification 
beget different pictures of inequality. Based on the 2002 Brazilian Social Survey (PESB), 
Bailey and his colleagues (2012) found that the degree of inequality was greater when 
using an ascribed measure of ethnoracial classification than self-identification.  
Nonetheless, ample evidence across the region suggests that inequality is structured by 
skin color.  
Discrimination based on skin color contributes to inequality and stratification. In a 
four-country survey study by Telles and the Project on Race and Ethnicity in Latin 
America (2014), individuals widely reported experiencing and witnessing color-based 




reported experiencing equal or higher levels of discrimination relative to their “light” 
counterparts in all cases. According to this study, 26, 24, 26, and 36 percent of “dark” 
classified individuals surveyed in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, respectively, 
reported experiencing discrimination by color. The percentage of “dark” (as well as 
“light” and “medium”) classified individuals that reported witnessing discrimination by 
color was even greater in all four countries.  
Although high levels of ethnoracial stratification can provide incentives for 
individuals to abstain from identifying with marginalized ethnoracial categories, it is not 
sufficient on its own to explain the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections. As 
Figure 1.2 makes clear, high levels of ethnoracial stratification can lead ethnoracial 
identity to be of high salience in elections, though it can also lead to the opposite.   
I argue that ethnoracial stratification is more likely to undermine ethnoracial-
based political behavior in societies where ethnoracial group identity is unconsolidated 
and individuals feel little loyalty to any single ethnoracial category. Inchoate group 
identity obstructs group consciousness and makes it difficult to organize collectively on 
the basis of ethnoracial grievances. I employ McClain and colleagues’ (2009, 474) 
definition of group identity as an attachment to a group “… based on a perception of 
shared beliefs, feelings, interests, and ideas with other group members.”  
If individuals have no possibility of exiting their ethnoracial group, they may 
respond to prejudice and inequalities by exercising voice. That is, they may organize 




inchoate and ethnic boundaries are fluid, however, individuals may opt for ethnoracial 
exit. That is, they may shun identification with marginalized ethnoracial groups and seek 
to identify with more privileged ethnoracial categories. Incentives to “exit” reduce the 
possibility that individuals will “voice” ethnoracial grievances and decrease the 
likelihood that ethnoracial entrepreneurs activate ethnoracial cleavages in elections. 
Granted, ethnoracial classification is not entirely fluid. Not all individuals have 
the option to “exit” ethnosomatic categories. State institutions, socio-demographic 
characteristics, and visible attributes may limit them. Telles and Paschel (2014) point out 
that ethnoracial classification in Latin America varies widely in the region. In some 
countries, such as the Dominican Republic, classification is indeterminate and lacks 
correspondence between external categorization and self-identification.  In other 
countries, such as Panama, classification is “viscous” and is determined by skin color. 
Despite this wide variation, intermixing has enabled many Latin Americans to identify 
with multiple and often overlapping ethnosomatic categories, which has facilitated exit. 
My argument draws on Hirschman’s (1970) insights about how consumers 
respond to the decline of organizational performance and quality. Hirschman suggests 
that exit options reduce the likelihood that customers will voice their dissatisfaction with 
an organization, particularly in the absence of feelings of loyalty. Specifically, he 
suggests that it is the most promising consumers and those most likely to rise to 
leadership who are also most likely to exit. Although Hirschman’s model was intended to 




client-patron; workers-employers; state-citizens; etc.), it may also shed light on the 
relationship between ethnoracial identity and political behavior. Indeed, it may well be 
that the ethnoracial exit option has been especially tempting for ambitious dark-skinned 
Latin Americans with high leadership potential. This could help explain the dearth of 
ethnoracial political entrepreneurs in the region.   
In Latin America, Afro-descendants have been unlikely to develop a strong sense 
of ethnoracial loyalty as a result of acute prejudice and disparities in collective rights, 
access to social services, and economic resources (Hooker 2005). Most Afro-descendants 
in the region have chosen to not identify as such in hopes of avoiding further 
marginalization. The absence of loyalty makes “exiting” from marginalized ethnosomatic 
categories far more appealing and far less costly than the option to “voice” ethnoracial 
grievances.  
I contend that nation-building efforts have obstructed the formation of strong 
ethnoracial identities and have suppressed ethnoracial political behavior in the region. 
Nation-building is understood here as inclusive and exclusionary policies that state actors 
enact to reimagine ethnoracial and national boundaries.  
Nation-building processes in the post-independence period in Latin America did 
much to discourage identification with a primary ethnoracial group identity (Hanchard 
1994; Bailey 2009; Telles 2014). They also helped to stymie collective action along 
ethnoracial lines. In an effort to refute the claims of pseudo race science about racial 




across the region sought to whiten their nations. Where they could not whiten by 
recruiting white immigrants and restricting non-white immigration, political elites 
resorted to lionizing high levels of intermixing and promoting a mestizaje ideology. As 
Loveman (2014) argues, these dual approaches helped reify a sense of national 
distinctiveness, signal a shift toward whitening, and vindicate their populations’ mixed 
ancestry.  
Elites’ success and vigor in promoting mestizaje varied across the region based on 
state capacity and racial composition (Telles and Garcia 2013, 133). These nation-state 
level differences account for varying degrees of support for mestizaje across country and 
ethnoracial categories in the contemporary period. Telles and Garcia report that 
mestizaje, measured as a national development principle or as support for intermarriage 
of a child to an indigenous or negro person, is embraced most in Brazil and Colombia 
and least in Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and Peru.24  
High levels of intermixing and pervasive identification with mixed categories, 
which in part resulted from states’ efforts to institutionalize hybridity, make Latin 
America unique. In the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, at least half of respondents in 
Ecuador (82%), Mexico (71%), Peru (68%), the Dominican Republic (67%), Guatemala 
(61%), and Colombia (52%) self-identified as mestizo (or a categorical equivalent) 
                                                 
24 The DR country mean support for mestizaje was 3.8 on a scale from 1 to 7. Telles and Garcia (2013, 
147) suggest that the strong rejection of mestizaje and intermarriage in the Dominican Republic can be 
traced to an anti-black/anti-Haitian process of nation-building and to the absence of multicultural and racial 
consciousness movements. Current rejection of mestizaje, however, does not diminish the impact of 





(Telles and Garcia 2013).25 In Brazil, where the mestizo category has been omitted from 
censuses, 48 percent of the population self-identified as mulatto/pardo in this 2010 
survey (Telles and Garcia 2013).  
Intermixing, whether real or putative, has allowed individuals to identify 
situationally with ethnosomatic categories. Hybrid and situational identification has 
generated ethnoracial boundaries with low degrees of boundedness or social closure, as 
Weber put it (Loveman 1999, 896-897). Ethnoracial boundaries have not strictly 
delineated ethnoracial distinctions or determined competition for resources (Wimmer 
2008, 976). Nor have they enforced the type of in-group / out-group juxtaposition that 
Barth (1969) initially theorized. Subaltern groups, in particular, have made strategic use 
of intermixing. They have exploited the multiple dimensions afforded by their mixed 
identities to reclassify their way out of marginalization. 
In particular, intermixing has depressed identification with Afro-descendant 
categories and weakened ethnoracial consciousness in the region. No more than 14 
percent of individuals self-identified as “black” in any country in the 2010 
AmericasBaromter survey, including those with significant Afro-descendant populations. 
Panama had the highest percentage of self-identified blacks (14%), followed by the 
Dominican Republic (10%), Brazil (10%), Colombia (7%), and Costa Rica (3%) (Telles 
and Paschel, 2014). 
                                                 
25 Using other measures of ethnoracial classification, including ascription, skin-color, descent rule, and 
photo comparison, for instance, may potentially yield a very different ethnoracial composition (Bailey et al. 




At the same time that political elites touted intermixing, they also obfuscated 
ethnoracial representation in order to rescue their populations from racial determinism. In 
Brazil, for example, they intermittently dropped a racial identification question on the 
census until 1980. Political elites in Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela, 
meanwhile, omitted the racial identification question on the census from the second half 
of the nineteenth century to the 1990s or 2000s (Hernández 2013; Loveman 2014). In 
other cases, such as Guatemala, political elites set out to eradicate ethnoracial groups 
from the nation (Grandin 2000). In the DR, we shall see, the ruling class carried out all of 
these exclusionary policies during periods of nation-building while also strategically 
enacting some policies of social integration. Both inclusive and exclusionary policies 
helped to disarticulate ethnoracial demands and advance elites’ interests. 
As Figure 1.3 illustrates, the confluence of inchoate group identity and high 
ethnoracial stratification explains why there is a limited supply of ethnoracial voters and 
entrepreneurs in Latin America. It also explains why ethnoracial boundaries have been of 





Figure 1.3: The Causes of the Low Electoral Salience of Ethnoracial Cleavages in Latin 
America. 
 
Afro-descendants have been even less likely than indigenous peoples to affirm a 
group-based ethnoracial identity. One reason is that Afro-descendants have been far less 
institutionalized since the colonial period. Wade (1997) argues that whereas states have 
mostly helped preserve and extol indigenous heritage through special recognition and 
protection, they have aimed to extinguish African cultural symbols through appropriation 
and dispersion. Given lower levels of institutionalization, Afro-descendants have not 




networks (Yashar 1998) and constitutional reforms (Van Cott 2002), that have aided 
indigenous organization and mobilization. 
Most Afro-descendants in the region do not identify with a distinct community, 
“understood as cultural symbols and ethnic distinctiveness and ethnic ancestries” (Bailey 
2009, 76). Nor do they identify with a single ethnoracial category. Low category loyalty 
has hampered their ability to express unified political interests and engage in ethnoracial 
political behavior. 
Afro-descendants in rural and regionally isolated regions have been the exception. 
Garífunas and Creoles in a few countries in Central America, including Honduras and 
Nicaragua, have been more likely to consolidate group consciousness, secure land and 
cultural rights, and mobilize politically (Hooker 2005, 295-296). Communities along the 
Pacific in the Chocó region of Colombia and in the Esmeraldas region of Ecuador have 
also consolidated group consciousness and achieved similar gains (Paschel and Sawyer 
2008; Paschel 2010).26 As Hooker argues, these communities “have been able to cast 
themselves as ‘autochthonous’ groups having an indigenous-like status and distinct 
cultural identity” (293). Black communities in these countries have also benefited from 
constitutional reforms that institutionalized indigenous rights and recognition. These 
communities, however, represent a small percentage of Afro-Latin America (Hooker 
2005).27  
                                                 
26 Afro-descendant communities along the Atlantic in Costa Rica (Limón) and Panama (Colón) have 
consolidated ethnoracial group identity, but they have not achieved similar rights or electoral success. 
27 Paschel (2013, 8) similarly argues that Afro-Colombians reframed their demands during the 




In sum, I claim that whereas inchoate group identity affords individuals a menu of 
viable exit options, ethnoracial stratification provides individuals with incentives to 
eschew identification with marginalized ethnosomatic categories. Weak ethnoracial 
group identity and high levels of stratification may impede ethnoracial-based candidate 
evaluation in Afro-Latin America. They do not, however, necessarily prevent candidate 
evaluation based on other cleavages, such as national origin. I argue that national origin, 
in fact, may be a more salient cleavage for candidate evaluation than ethnoracial identity 
where nationalist and ethnoracial cleavages overlap.  
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
My argument makes several theoretical contributions. First, it identifies a middle 
ground in the longstanding debate over how essential ethnoracial identity is to social 
organization in Latin America by examining the electoral side of social organization.28 
My argument suggests that while ethnoracial markers and identities structure some 
dimensions of social organization, including the distribution of resources and access to 
institutions, they do not necessarily structure other dimensions of social organization, 
such as political behavior. Individuals may be subordinated by ethnoracialized structures 
and institutions but may not respond by engaging in ethnoracial politics. This makes 
sense because individuals do not always experience the world – including the political 
world – in ethnoracial terms, as Brubaker (2004, 13) states.  
                                                 




Second, my argument suggests that subaltern sectors may also utilize 
mestizaje/mulataje strategically. The race and ethnicity literature on Latin America tends 
to privilege a top-down understanding of mestizaje — and with good reason. Elites have 
made use of mestizaje ideology to prevent subordinate groups from mobilizing along 
ethnoracial lines (Hernández 2013; Telles and García 2013). But my dissertation shows 
that subaltern groups have exploited the ethnic fluidity created by mestizaje to reclassify 
their way out of marginalization. Wimmer (2008: 988) refers to this type of strategy as 
repositioning, where individuals “shift sides” rather than contest the ethnoracial 
hierarchy. Some scholars have highlighted the distinct strategies that ethnoracial groups 
have appropriated to make demands (De la Fuente 1999, Grandin 2000, Foote 2006). But 
they have focused on strategies that are rooted in Liberalism and the myth of racial 
democracy rather than the strategy of exit that I emphasize here. 
Lastly, my argument suggests that national origin can sometimes be a salient 
consideration for candidate evaluation and that it may help to redirect ethnoracial 
cleavages. This may be true, for instance, in migrant-recipient countries, where 
candidates often identify with hyphenated national identities and where nationalism and 
ethnoracial identity are entwined. In these cases, voters may not primarily care about 
whether they share a candidate’s ethnoracial identity or programmatic positions. Rather, 





THE CASE OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
Inchoate ethnoracial group identity and high levels of ethnoracial stratification 
help explain why ethnoracial cleavages are of low salience in elections in the Dominican 
Republic. Extensive black-white admixing and colonial structural conditions discouraged 
the expression of clear and strong ethnoracial group affinities very early. Structural 
conditions, in particular, weakened rigid class structures that helped define ethnoracial 
group identity in other colonies. These conditions include the endurance of subsistence-
based cattle ranching (until the return of sugar plantations in the 19th century), 
depopulation, and poverty on the island (Torres-Saillant 1999).  
In addition, a mixture of inclusive and exclusionary nation-building policies from 
the post-independence period in 1844 through the 1930s enabled ruling elites to obstruct 
black political cohesiveness. At the same, this mixture of policies also enabled elites to 
appease the political and social anxieties of whites and non-whites alike. Two inclusive 
policies of nation-building were particularly inimical to the formulation of an Afro-
descendant group identity: the immediate incorporation of slaves into the republic, and 
the eventual social inclusion of black migrant laborers from the West Indies in the late 
19th century. Meanwhile, exclusionary policies such as nativism or Indigenismo and an 
ethnoracialized variant of anti-Haitianism, helped to dissociate blackness from the 
national identity. Ethnoracialized anti-Haitianism, in particular, helped maintain 




In concert with inchoate group identity, ethnoracial stratification helps explain the 
low political salience of ethnoracial cleavages in the Dominican Republic. Various 
survey-based studies (including my own) have found that “black” Dominicans lag behind 
“white” Dominicans across a number of socioeconomic indicators, including income, 
access to food, education, and infrastructure.  
Although Dominicans increasingly acknowledge that socioeconomic inequalities 
are structured along ethnoracial lines, they have not for the most part articulated 
ethnoracial grievances or demanded ethnoracial parties and candidates. One reason is that 
most Dominicans do not primarily attribute the struggles of Afro-descendants to 
ethnoracial discrimination. In a study by Telles and Bailey (2013), a slightly higher 
percentage of respondents (44.2 percent) attributed the poverty of minority groups to 
work ethic, intelligence, and culture than to discrimination (42.4 percent). Overall, 
however, most respondents attributed the poverty of minority groups to structural 
reasons, such as unfair treatment and low education. 
Afro-descendants in the DR have responded to entrenched ethnoracial 
stratification and prejudice by avoiding identification with marginalized ethnoracial 
groups. They do not tend to identify as black or affirm a single racial group identity. 
Instead, they identify with ambiguous, lighter-skinned and hybrid categories, such as 
indio. Low category loyalty has led to weak feelings of linked fate and to low levels of 
ethnoracial group solidarity. This interaction has impaired the emergence of ethnoracial 




The case of the Dominican Republic provides a great deal of analytic utility to 
evaluate the effect of perceived ethnoracial identity on candidate evaluation in Latin 
America. The DR deviates from the predictions of group-specific approaches. High levels 
of ethnoracial diversity in the DR have not spawned salient ethnoracial-based cleavages 
in elections.  
The Dominican Republic is typical of cases in Latin America with high levels of 
stratification and low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections. Candidates have not 
generally made ethnoracial appeals. And voters have not systematically discriminated 
against candidates based on their own ethnoracial attributes or those of the candidates 
(although they have historically discriminated against candidates based on national 
origin).  
Moreover, Afro-descendants in the Dominican Republic do not overwhelmingly 
identify with a single political party. It is true, as Morgan, Hartlyn, and Espinal (2008) 
find, that “PRD members are more likely to be black than their counterparts.” But as the 
authors also suggest, this finding is more likely an artifact of the PRD’s social-democratic 
and working-class roots than the result of particularly inclusive policies, programmatic 
positions or internal party rules that favor Afro-descendants.29 The PRD has not actively 
promoted Afro-descendant specific issues. Nor has it made targeted efforts to increase 
black leadership or black membership more than other political parties.  
                                                 
29 The recent splintering of PRD and emergence of the Partido Revolucionario Mayoritario (PRM) could 




In fact, there are no major political parties and only very few social justice 
movements in the Dominican Republic that articulate ethnoracial-based interests 
specifically. Movements led by Haitian migrants and Dominico-Haitians have come 
closest to making ethnoracial-based appeals. But they have primarily based their claims 
on migration status and citizenship rights rather than on ethnoracial identity, specifically. 
Afro-descendant-specific NGOs have not proliferated in the Dominican Republic to the 
extent that they have in other parts of Latin America (Hernández 2013, 102).30 
Although the Dominican Republic exemplifies the low salience of ethnoracial 
identity in elections, it is also distinct from its peers in ways that provide important 
variation to this study. Historically fractious relations with neighboring Haiti and anti-
Haitianism have shaped a distinct ethnoracial boundary-making dynamic that has not 
been commonplace between neighbors in the region. The Dominican Republic is the only 
country in the Americas that gained its independence from a black republic and shares an 
island with that same country.  
In addition, race has not been an insurmountable barrier for Afro-descendant 
candidates in the Dominican Republic (Silié 2005, 17). As Howard (2001, 59) points out, 
the Dominican Republic “has had more negro or mulatto presidents than any other 
                                                 
30 Hernández (183-198) lists only three organizations in the Dominican Republic that articulate Afro-
descendant specific interests (two of those organizations articulate Dominico-Haitian interests). Other 
organizations have either sprung or gained greater prominence since Hernández’s publication. These 
include Afro-Alianza Dominicana and Plataforma de Afro-descendientes. By contrast, Hernández lists at 
least nine organizations that articulate Afro-descendant interests in Colombia (33), Brazil (31), Peru (14), 
Ecuador (13), Panama (12), Uruguay (11), and Honduras (9). Most organizations that articulate Afro-
descendant specific interests in the DR, including Reconoci.do, Observatorio Migrantes del Caribe, 






country in the western hemisphere”—although they have not necessary identified as such. 
And despite entrenched ethnoracial prejudice and stratification, Afro-descendants are 
regularly elected to both houses of Congress and represent majority “black” and “white” 
municipalities and provinces alike. By contrast, Afro-descendants in countries such as 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica have been underrepresented in the national assemblies relative 
to the size of their populations (Hernández 2013).  
Given these differences, the Dominican Republic provides a unique opportunity 




I evaluated the effect of ethnoracial identity on electoral behavior in Latin 
America through a case-study research design based on the Dominican Republic. 
Because ethnoracial identity is highly contingent and fluid across and within cases in 
Latin America, a so-called “single-country, single shot” study helped to offset issues of 
conceptual validity, measurement, and comparability that can bedevil large-N studies. 
Moreover, a single-country study is ideally suited to meet the primary goal of this study: 
to modify (rather than disconfirm) existing theory on ethnoracial identity and electoral 
behavior (Gerring 2001, 220-221).  
I employed a combination of statistical and non-statistical methods to (1) test the 
predictions of existing theories against those of my own propositions, (2) specify the 




mixed-method strategy gave me the most leverage in examining the effect of ethnoracial 
identity on candidate evaluation given the limitations of individual methods. 
I conducted a field survey-experiment in the province of Santo Domingo, 
Dominican Republic in 2011 based on a stratified random sample of 694 adult citizens.31 
Because experiments can manipulate the causal variable under study, they can assess 
causal relationships and rule out spurious, pre-existing, and systemic factors better than 
other methods (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2009; Gerring 2001). As a 
result, I was able to ensure that the treatment in my survey-experiment (i.e. the perceived 
ethnoracial identity of fictitious presidential candidates) accounted for any differences in 
the responses of participants (Abdelal, et al., 8).  
A field survey-experiment also provided some important advantages in studying 
ethnoracial identity in the Dominican Republic, specifically. It allowed me to overcome 
the dearth of official data on ethnoracial identification, which was last collected and 
published in the 1960 census. Additionally, an in-person survey experiment gave me 
access to a representative sample of people with varying socio-economic (and 
ethnoracial) backgrounds. A laboratory or internet-based experiment in the Dominican 
Republic, for instance, would have yielded a sample composed disproportionately of 
middle and high socio-economic status individuals.   
To address issues of external validity that tend to arise in survey-experiment 
research, I used existing national-level survey data from the AmericasBarometer at the 
                                                 
31 I sampled seven municipalities in the province of Santo Domingo, which is home to over one-quarter of 
the national population. Funding limitations prevented me from collecting data in the borderlands 




Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). Survey data from 2010 and 2012 
enabled me to cross-examine public opinion trends on ethnoracial identification, social 
and ethnoracial preferences, political behavior, and key socio-economic indicators with 
my own survey data. Similarities on key issues between public opinion trends and results 
from my survey-experiment provided some indication that my findings were potentially 
generalizable to the national level. The random selection of participants in my study also 
helped to address issues of external validity. 
I tested pre-experimental treatment conditions and post-experimental survey 
questions during four two-hour long focus group sessions in Santo Domingo. Focus 
group sessions allowed me to uncover important and counterintuitive interactions 
between age, gender, and social class and the effect of perceived ethnoracial identity on 
candidate evaluation. Moreover, focus group sessions provided me with a more in-depth 
understanding of the contested process of ethnoracial identity formation. They also gave 
me greater insights into the parameters of Dominico-Haitian group boundaries than I 
could extract from mostly closed-ended questions in the survey-experiment. 
Given that my focus group research and survey-experiment mostly gave me 
access to the perceptions of non-elites, I also carried out over 50 semi-structured 
interviews with political elites and leaders in civil society, academia, and the private 
sector. Interviews with elites helped both to confirm and challenge my understanding of 




Although findings from my survey-experiment, focus group research, and semi-
structured interviews confirmed the low salience of ethnoracial identity in electoral 
behavior in the Dominican Republic, they were less useful for explaining how this came 
to be. I engaged in historical process-tracing to ascertain how the development of 
ethnoracial group identity, historical institutions and structural conditions ultimately 
helped to obstruct the expression of ethnoracial identity in elections. 
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
    
The remainder of the dissertation will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 discusses 
ethno-racial identity formation in the Dominican Republic. I argue that extensive patterns 
of ethnoracial admixing, structural conditions, and a mix of inclusive and exclusionary 
nation-building policies, including anti-Haitianism, prevented the consolidation of 
ethnoracial group identities in the country. As this chapter shows, anti-Haitianism, in 
particular, has been fundamental to disarticulating ethno-racial identity and elevating the 
salience of national origin in Dominican politics. 
Chapter 3 examines contemporary ethnoracial stratification and prejudice in the 
Dominican Republic. I draw on a variety of sources to show how high levels of 
ethnoracial inequality and discrimination have plagued the DR in recent years. I also 
examine ethnoracial classification in the DR. Based on existing public opinion data and 
my own survey research, I show that individuals have shunned dark-skinned categories in 
favor of identifying with hybrid and light-skinned categories. Lastly, I present evidence 




analysis of 2004 and 2008 electoral data to support my claim that ethnoracial identity is 
of low salience in Dominican electoral politics.   
Chapter 4 uses original quantitative data from the experimental survey that I 
carried out in the Dominican Republic in 2011 to test the predictions of the main 
alternative approaches in the literature against the predictions of my argument. I 
complement the statistical analyses of experimental and survey data with qualitative 
evidence from focus group research and semi-formal interviews. The evidence suggests 
that the confluence of stratification and inchoate ethnoracial group identity indeed has 
prevented the activation of ethnoracial cleavages in the Dominican Republic. This same 
combination, however, has not impeded the activation of national origin in elections. 
Rather than strengthening the salience of ethnoracial cleavages in elections, nationalism 
has helped to redirect those cleavages.   
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation. I explore how ethnoracial identity has 
shaped political behavior across the region, including in Afro-Latin America. And I 
examine the extent to which we can compare ethnoracial voting in Latin America to other 
regions. I also discuss the theoretical implications of my argument for theories of race 
and political behavior more generally. The final section lays out broader applications for 







Chapter 2: The Determinants of Inchoate Ethnoracial Group Identity 
 
Thus far, I have argued that the salience of ethnoracial identity in elections is 
likely to be low in countries where ethnoracial boundaries are permeable. Given these 
conditions, individuals are less likely to identify with marginalized categories and to 
articulate ethnoracial-based demands.  
In this chapter, I consider why individuals have not consolidated an ethnoracial 
group identity in the Dominican Republic. I contend that extensive intermixing, certain 
structural conditions, and a mix of inclusive and exclusionary nation-building strategies 
have impeded the consolidation of an Afro-descendant group identity.  
 Rapid and extensive patterns of black-white intermixing generated porous 
ethnoracial boundaries and soft in-category and out-category distinctions. Such elasticity 
in the boundary-making process muddled criteria for group membership and obstructed 
category loyalty. Individuals identified with more than one ethnoracial category. The 
absence of loyalty to a single ethnoracial category helped to foil the development of 
group consciousness.  
Depopulation and poverty during the colonial period, as well as an increased 
emphasis on cattle ranching, also contributed to inchoate ethnoracial group identity. 
Cattle ranching relaxed the rigid labor relations that were endemic to the plantation 
economy. This change led to greater interaction between slaves and masters. It also 
considerably increased the number of free blacks and mulattos in the colony. Poverty, 




landed elite class. Resulting depopulation from this exodus in turn provided greater 
openings for many free blacks and mulattos to fill positions of power in the colonial 
bureaucratic apparatus. Greater participation in the bureaucracy gave blacks and mulattos 
more access to social mobility and discouraged the articulation of ethnoracial-based 
grievances.  
 Lastly, I suggest that inclusive and exclusionary strategies of nation-building 
redirected ethnoracial cleavages and elevated the salience of national origin in Dominican 
culture. Political elites were committed to the abolition of slavery. They were well-aware 
that free blacks and mulattos were integral to securing (and later restoring) national 
independence. Likewise, black migrants from the British West Indies were perceived as 
vital to reviving the sugar industry and, in time, were socially included (with the 
exception of Haitians). These inclusive strategies prevented Afro-descendants from 
organizing around upending slavery or achieving collective rights.  
Exclusionary strategies of nation-building, such as nativism and anti-Haitianism, 
also stymied the development of a “black” group identity by splintering Afro-descendants 
along lines of national origin. Many Afro-Dominicans adopted prejudices against people 
of Haitian descent, which prevented the development of a broader black racial 
consciousness in the Dominican Republic.  
Intermixing, structural conditions in the colonial period, and 
inclusive/exclusionary nation-building strategies also help us better understand why 




stratification. As I suggest in the next chapter, high levels of stratification have 
encouraged Afro-descendants to identify with hybrid and lighter categories, such as 
indio, as a way to avoid further marginalization. And an inchoate ethnoracial group 
identity has made this strategy feasible. 
RACIAL MIXING 
Extensive patterns of black and white admixing (mulataje) in large part explain 
why individuals have not consolidated ethnoracial group identity in the Dominican 
Republic. Intermixing between whites and blacks (defined as the population that is 
exclusively of African-descent) occurred early in the Dominican Republic. Mulattos 
likely first appeared on a mass scale sometime after the government of the Jerónimos, 
which was composed of a group of Friar delegates in the colony, petitioned for African 
slaves in 1517 (Larrázabal Blanco 1975). From the earliest days, the process of mulataje 
between African slaves and Spanish colonialists was involuntary and exploitative. It 
hardly resembled the type of racial democracy that some in the region now believe it to 
be.  
Black and white intermixing was not the first form of hybridity on the island, but 
it was the most preponderant. The population of mestizos (the white-indigenous mixed 
population) was cut short with the precipitous decline of the aboriginal population in the 
sixteenth century. From a peak estimate of 100,000 to 300,000 aboriginals, 




The recruitment of slaves and the rate of black-white admixing in the Spanish 
colony were accelerated by the boom of the sugar trade in the 1520s. By the time the 
local gold mining economy collapsed in 1528, slaves and mulattos had largely displaced 
aboriginals from the workforce (Tolentino Dipp 1974). Black slaves and free mulattos 
constituted an estimated 69 percent of the total population in 1548 and comprised 89 
percent of the population in the first national census of 1606 (Franco 1969; Moya Pons 
2008).  
Data on the size of the mixed population are mostly unavailable or problematic 
before national independence in 1844. Official counts of the non-white population during 
the colonial period were mostly conducted along lines of free status rather than 
ethnoracial identity. They did not differentiate the mixed population from slaves and free 
blacks. In addition, existing estimates do not always coincide. Discrepancies in estimates 
of the ethnoracial composition particularly widened in periods of severe population 
decline, such as from 1795 to 1809, and in periods of extraordinary population growth, 
such as from 1739 to 1783 and 1875 to 1899 (Moya Pons 2008).  
Nonetheless, the literature agrees that black and white intermixing in the 
Dominican Republic was extensive. The censuses of 1606 and 1795, for instance, both 
show large numbers of mulattos. In addition, numerous bureaucratic ordinances and legal 
codes either proposed or passed by the Spanish Crown between 1528 and 1789 also make 
clear the extent of intermixing in the colony. These regulations aimed to disrupt the high 




1541, in particular, restricted marriage between slaves and non-slaves as a way to reduce 
the number of mulattos that could claim freedom from intermixing (Derby 2003; 
Andrews 2004). Although never implemented, the Código Negro Carolino of 1784 also 
aimed to discourage hybridity by restricting claims of whiteness to sixth generation 
mulattos (Larrázabal 1975). Ruling elites, in fact, would not embrace ethnoracial 
hybridity in the Dominican Republic until efforts to lure European immigrants for nearly 
a century finally abated in the mid twentieth century (Inoa 1999). 
Figure 2.1 plots the ethnoracial composition of the Dominican Republic between 
1561 and 2014. Data for the period from 1561 to 1960 are based on consistent estimates 
in the literature. I supplemented missing estimates after 1960 with data from voting 
registries and national surveys. The 1960 national census is the last census to estimate the 
ethnoracial composition of the Dominican Republic. As Roth (2012) suggests, however, 
the same figures have been mistakenly attributed to the 1980 census. 
The figure illustrates that whites have never constituted a majority of the national 
population. According to Tolentino Dipp (1974), mulattos and blacks surpassed whites as 
early as 1525. The white population began to rebound following national independence 
from Haiti in 1844 and further recovered with the surge of immigration from Turkey and 
modern-day Lebanon during the 1880s. Overall, however, the national percentage of 








Figure 2.1: The Ethnoracial Composition by Percentage of Total Population, 1561-201432 
But as the figure also shows, blacks have not constituted an outright majority of 
the national population either—at least not since mulattos and blacks were disaggregated 
in the data beginning in the late eighteenth century. Blacks did not even become the 
majority when the country experienced an influx of labor migrants from the British West 
Indies and Haiti between 1880 and 1930. Indeed, according to census data, blacks 
constituted only about 25 percent of the population at the peak of this migration from 
                                                 
32 Percentages for the period 1546-1960 were calculated based on total population estimates listed in the 
following sources: Pérez Cabral (1967); Franco (1969, 2003); Hoetink (1970); Dipp (1974); Larrázabal 
(1975); Moya Pons (1992, 2008); Howard (2001); Simmons (2009). Percentages for 1996 are based on 
voting registries from the Dominican Republic’s Junta Central Electoral (JCE) and appear in Moya Pons 
(2008). Percentages for the period 2004-2014 are based on self-identification survey data collected by the 


















1916 to 1924, when the U.S. occupied the Dominican Republic for the first time (Vega 
1993; Inoa 1999). Blacks, as well as whites, however, have each constituted the majority 
in certain rural and urban regions of the country (Moya Pons 2008). 
Estimates of the size of the black population in the Dominican Republic should be 
viewed skeptically, however. Ruling elites (and Afro-descendants themselves) 
historically have done a great deal either to obfuscate or understate the size of the black 
population. For instance, estimates of the black population were distorted during attempts 
by Buenaventura Báez to annex the nation between 1868 and 1873 and during nation-
building efforts by the Trujillo regime from 1930 to 1961. Glaring distortions are 
particularly notable in the 1950 and 1960 national censuses. A comparison between the 
1935 and 1950 censuses shows that, inexplicably, the black population decreased from 
19.5 percent to 11.5 percent (Simmons 2009). Nevertheless, immigration patterns, rates 
of intermixing, and travelers’ accounts give little reason to believe that the percentage of 
“blacks” ever approached a national majority after independence. Survey data from 2004 
to the present allows us to get a more reliable estimate of the percentage of the population 
that self-identifies as black, however. 
The mixed population eclipsed whites and blacks early on in the history of the 
Dominican Republic, and the nation has remained overwhelmingly mulatto ever since, 
even if only a small fraction of Dominicans refer to themselves using those exact terms. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates that the percentage of the mixed population has consistently 




since the late nineteenth century. Contemporary estimates of the number of mulattos 
typically range from 75 to 90 percent of the total population (Andrews 2004; Torres-
Saillant 2005; Sagás 2012). 
Early and pronounced patterns of ethnoracial mixing in the Dominican Republic 
have had important implications for the formation of ethnoracial identity at the individual 
and group levels. Ethnoracial hybridity generated identification with multiple and 
overlapping ethnoracial categories. It also made allegedly visible ethnoracial attributes, 
such as skin color and hair texture, salient membership criteria for ethnoracial 
classification. As in much of Latin America, however, cultural and descent-based 
characteristics, social class, nationality, age, education, popular culture, social 
movements, and occupation continue to influence ethnoracial classification in the DR.  
In addition, permeable ethnoracial boundaries stifled feelings of loyalty for any 
single ethnoracial category. Afro-descendants, for example, have been more likely to 
form bonds on the basis of social class than on the basis of shared ethnoracial identity. 
And they do not necessarily identify with the ethnoracial identity of subordinate groups.  
High levels of ethnoracial mixing in the Dominican Republic have also helped to 
sustain a popular myth of racial democracy that conceptualizes race as socially 
inconsequential. The myth of racial democracy has enabled the state to dismiss prickly 
questions of ethnoracial classification. It has also depressed the formation of ethnoracial 




CATTLE RANCHING, POVERTY, AND DEPOPULATION 
Certain structural conditions during the colonial period similarly undermined the 
consolidation of ethnoracial group identity in the Dominican Republic. A shift to cattle 
ranching, continued abject poverty, and depopulation inverted the highly rigid labor 
relations of the early colonial period (Torres Saillant 1998; Derby 2003).  
Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the Dominican Republic underwent an 
important transition from sugar to cattle ranching as its leading mode of production. By 
1580, the sugar boom had ended and the plantation system was mostly depleted. In 
addition to the erosion of the plantation system, the contraband of slaves on the northern 
coast deprived the Spanish monarchy taxes on the import of slaves (Andújar 2006). This 
gave the monarchy added reason to abandon the island.  
Cattle ranching endured for nearly three hundred years in the Dominican 
Republic—until the appearance of modern sugar factories in the 1870s. It achieved such 
longevity in large part because it had lower startup costs than the plantation economy. 
Cattle-ranching was less capital intensive than the sugar industry, required a smaller labor 
force and less supervision, and was practiced in communal lands or hatos (Hoetink 1970; 
Andrews 2004). In addition, cattle ranching’s less structured division of labor made it 
more adaptable to changing demographic patterns in the colony.  
The shift to cattle ranching had far-reaching consequences on the structure of 
inter-racial relations. Derby (2003) argues that relations between slaves and masters grew 
more intimate and paternalistic given the dependence of masters on few slaves and the 




become ranchers and purchase their own freedom by selling surplus production (Andrews 
2004). By the end of the eighteenth century, freedmen so vastly outnumbered slaves and 
whites that colonialists petitioned the Spanish monarchy in 1795 to renew the importation 
of slaves in order to rekindle production.33  
Cattle ranching by no means cushioned conditions for slaves or quelled slave 
insurrections. Slaves frequently led armed uprisings in the colony or fled to protest cruel 
mistreatment, among other reasons. By 1545, there were an estimated seven thousand 
runaway slaves, many of whom established maroon settlements in the mountains of 
Maniel and Bahoruco (Franco 1969; Larrázabal 1975; Moya Pons 2008). Nor did cattle 
ranching lead slaves to acquire sociopolitical rights. Slaves rebelled as late as 1812 in 
Mendoza and Mojarra to protect their right to Spanish nationality under the 1812 Spanish 
constitution (Torres-Saillant 1999; Andújar 2006). But cattle ranching, by and large, 
offered slaves greater freedoms and less structured relations with their masters on a day-
to-day basis. This was true even as the Spanish Crown tried to maintain highly stratified 
relations in the colony.  
Poverty and depopulation in the colonial period also allowed patterns of 
ethnoracial mixing to undermine the formation of ethnoracial group identity. Widespread 
poverty helped to narrow wealth disparities on the island and attenuated the importance 
of social class (Torres-Saillant 1999). Depopulation, meanwhile, cleared the way for a 
                                                 





number of “blacks” and mulattos to enter the colonial apparatus and to ascend to 
positions of power.  
The Dominican Republic was late to recover from the collapse of sugar 
production and ensuing poverty at the end of the sixteenth century. Cattle ranching was 
mostly subsistence based and could not by itself assuage poverty in the colony. And the 
Spanish Crown funneled most of its resources to colonies that either held geopolitical 
value or that showed promise in sugar production or gold and silver mining (Gates 2011). 
Sugar production and gold mining had collapsed in the Dominican Republic by 1580, 
which meant that it received few resources from the Spanish Crown during the period 
that followed. Economic depression especially worsened during renewed Spanish control 
from 1808 to 1821, a period known as La España Boba (Hoetink 1970). 
Although economic collapse threatened the buoyancy of the colony, it helped to 
avoid the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few during the colonial period. There 
were few wealthy landowners in the Dominican Republic, except for some remaining 
barons in Santiago and Puerto Plata, and land tenure was mostly communal and diffused 
(Hoetink 1970). There were also few slaveholders. Most settlers could not afford to 
import slaves. 
 The contraction of wealth in the colony delayed the formation of social classes, 
including the development of a bourgeoisie (Bosch 1992).34 Social classes in the 
Dominican Republic, in fact, remained largely unstructured until the late nineteenth 
                                                 
34 A different school of thought represented by Howard (2001) and Betances (1995), among others, has 
suggested that merchant groups in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in fact constituted an early form 




century, when sugar producers who fled the U.S. Civil War and the Ten Years’ War in 
Cuba established plantations and modern refineries in the Dominican south (Hoetink 
1982; Howard 2001).35 Rekindled sugar production generated an underclass of unskilled, 
low-wage black migrants, on the one hand, and a bourgeoisie comprised of foreign sugar 
producers and merchants, on the other. Derby (2003, 32) refers to this bifurcation as 
“ethnic labor market segmentation.” The neosultanistic rule of Ulises Heureaux between 
1882 and 1899 36 and the United States’ occupation of the Dominican Republic from 
1916 to 1924 also helped to consolidate the bourgeoisie and accelerated labor 
segmentation.37  
Depopulation and demographic instability during the colonial period were 
compounded by poverty and the neglect of the Crown. The exodus of legions of white 
settlers, including merchants and landowners, especially devastated the colony 
financially. From an estimated twelve thousand Spanish colonists in 1506, five thousand 
remained in 1546 and only 1,304 were counted in 1606 (Moya Pons 2008).  
                                                 
35  Large-scale sugar production in the south surged in the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
quickly outpacing coffee and tobacco production in the north (Hartlyn 1998; Howard 2001). From a total of 
7,000 tons in 1880, sugar exports reached 144,911 tons in 1916 (Cassá 1992; Martínez-Vergne 2005). 
36 Heureaux shielded sugar producers from the drop in sugar prices to protect his investments in the sugar 
industry. In doing so, he solidified their social position. Meanwhile, Heureaux obstructed the social 
mobility that had been available to blacks and mulattoes (Hoetink 1982). His centralization of the military 
and the bureaucracy, for example, reduced opportunities in parallel institutions and in provincial 
governments.  
37 Howard (2001) states that the bourgeoisie grew interconnected by modern communication and 
infrastructure and benefited from tariffs on local elites. In addition, patrimonial economic structures and 
neoliberal market policies following the U.S. occupation produced growth without redistribution and 





The Dominican Republic remained sparsely populated until the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, when the population exploded with the boom of contracted black 
labor from the British West Indies. The colony lost up to 120,000 settlers between 1795 
and 1809 (Moya Pons 1992). In 1844, at the point of independence, the total population 
of the nation had only reached 126,000—the equivalent of about a fifth of the size of the 
Haitian population at that time.  
Despite its destabilizing effects, depopulation literally opened a space for free 
blacks and mulattos in the colony. Most free blacks and mulattos became cattle herders 
and farmers and a significant number were appointed to the bureaucratic apparatus or 
enlisted in the armed forces (Sagás and Inoa 2003). Free blacks and mulattos, in 
particular, experienced ascent in the Dominican bureaucracy and the armed forces during 
Haiti’s entrance into Dominican territory in 1801 and during the Haitian unification of 
the island years later. 
The armed forces propelled many blacks and mulattos to positions of power. Two 
black Dominicans, Gregorio Luperón and Ulises Hereaux (Lilís), for instance, served as 
high-ranking military officials in the war against Spanish annexation in 1865 before 
reaching the presidency at the end of the nineteenth century. According to Derby (2003), 
greater social mobility enabled blacks and mulattos to gradually forge a “black middle 
sector” prior to the reemergence of sugar production.  
Depopulation did not eliminate economic disparities between blacks and whites, 




in the Dominican Republic. But depopulation allowed a greater number of blacks and 
mulattos to improve their socioeconomic status and fill positions of power. The 
newfound ascent of free blacks and mulattos, coupled with an unconsolidated class 
structure and sweeping poverty, facilitated greater ethnoracial mixing and put whiteness 
within closer reach. Free blacks and mulattos could not only inherit levels of whiteness 
through intermixing but could also afford to purchase privileges that had been reserved 
for whites through decrees such as “gracias al sacar” (Andrews 2004). 
Ethnoracial group affinities also became less salient as free blacks and mulattos 
were inserted into the colonial apparatus and gained greater social mobility. Those 
appointed to the colonial bureaucracy, for instance, commonly self-identified as “blancos 
de la tierra” or whites of the land (Fennema and Lowenthal 1987).  
There was little sense of in-group solidarity. This was as true for free blacks in the 
cities as it was for rural black peasants. For example, free blacks fought against slaves in 
1810 to help Spain maintain control of the island (Derby 2003). And rural black peasants, 
known as monteros, often colluded with hunters of runaway slaves during the Haitian 
revolution (Derby 2003).  
Taken together, cattle ranching production, poverty and depopulation during the 
colonial period hindered a sense of group solidarity and consciousness based on 
ethnoracial identity. These conditions ultimately helped to stunt the articulation of 
ethnoracial grievances. They also stifled the emergence of ethnoracial entrepreneurs. As I 




easier for inclusive and exclusionary strategies of nation-building in the nineteenth and 
twentieth to thwart the consolidation of ethnoracial group identity.  
NATION-BUILDING 
Inclusive and exclusionary strategies of nation-building also obstructed the 
consolidation of ethnoracial group identities in the DR.38 This mix of strategies, which 
usually followed periods of renewed sovereignty and autonomy between 1844 and 1924, 
appeased the sociopolitical anxieties of whites and non-whites alike. Whites feared that 
Haiti would make additional attempts to re-unify the island. They were also wary of the 
supposedly noxious effects that racial hybridity and African descent might have on the 
progress of the nation. Free blacks and mulattos, meanwhile, were concerned about the 
possibility of a return to slavery. They also wanted to escape the racial prejudice of elites, 
which only deepened with the emergence of modern sugar industries.  
In addition, nation-building strategies helped to foment greater unity among 
ethnoracial groups and to blunt ethnoracial cleavages. For elites, unity (or the perception 
of it) was essential given recurrent threats to national autonomy and the absence of a 
modern state. The mix of inclusive and exclusionary nation-building strategies redirected 
                                                 
38 I refer to three specific nation-building periods: post-independence from Haiti, post-Spanish annexation 
in 1865, and post-U.S. occupation in 1924. These periods did not merely serve as a stage for power 
contestations between liberal and conservative elites following the acquisition of sovereignty or autonomy. 
Rather, these periods reimagined the ethnoracial boundaries of nation and citizen. Although Juan Bosch’s 
victory in 1962 aimed to reimagine notions of nation and citizen, his government was overthrown before 




ethnoracial cleavages and elevated the importance of national origin in the construction 
of Dominican identity.39 
Inclusive Strategies 
Two inclusive strategies of nation-building in particular forestalled the formation 
of ethnoracial group identity: the abolition of slavery and the social inclusion of most 
black immigrant groups, with the exception of Haitians. These strategies impeded blacks 
and mulattos from organizing group identity around upending slavery or achieving 
group-based rights.  
Dominican political elites, both liberals (pro-independence) and conservatives 
(Annexationists), demonstrated a strategic commitment to emancipation in the nineteenth 
century. Realizing the risks of not appeasing the demands of free blacks and mulattos, 
who constituted a majority in the armed forces and in the national population (Inoa 
1999), elites capitulated. Within days of gaining independence from Haiti in 1844, the 
Junta Central or ruling Central Board ratified the abolition of slavery (Torres-Saillant 
1999).  
Slaves in Dominican territory already had gained freedom in fits and starts prior 
to final emancipation in 1844. Haitian Governor Louverture abolished slavery in 1801, 
during the period when Dominican territory was ceded to France. However, the 
Napoleonic government of Charles Leclerc deposed Louverture in 1802 and Governor 
Gerrard Ferrand reinstated slavery in 1804 (Hoetink 1970). The Spanish monarchy 
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continued slavery after regaining control of the eastern side of the island in 1808. 
President Boyer finally reintroduced abolition in Dominican territory during Haitian 
unification from 1822 to 1844. 
Although abolition was not entirely novel in the Dominican Republic in 1844, 
Dominican independence leaders considered it an important strategy of inclusion. Liberal 
elites such as Juan Pablo Duarte and some members of the secret society La Trinitaria 
courted popular classes and ethnoracial groups to ensure that freed slaves and mulattos 
would support national independence.40  
Freed slaves and mulattos already had shown that their support was necessary to 
consolidate independence. In 1821 a segment of blacks and mulattos defied the brief, 
“ephemeral independence” led by José Núñez de Cáceres and instead supported Haitian 
unification in exchange for protection. They remained wary that independence would not 
address their concerns over slavery given the close ties between the faction of Núñez de 
Cáceres and the interests of the Spanish monarchy (Franco 1969, 2003). Moreover, freed 
slaves had shown in their rebellion at Monte Grande, shortly after independence, that 
they would contest any continuation of slavery in the new republic. Emancipation allayed 
the most immediate political anxieties of blacks and mulattos. 
                                                 
40 Abolition in the DR in 1822 and final ratification in 1844 preceded abolition in nations around the region 
with a similar percentage of Afro-descendants, with the exception of Haiti (1804). Abolition in Puerto 
Rico, Cuba, and Brazil was passed in 1873, 1886, and 1888, respectively. Although abolition in Chile 
(1823), the Central American Federation (1824), and Mexico (1829) was passed before ratification in the 
DR, the percentage of slave populations was not as high or as consequential for their respective economies 




In the aftermath of independence, efforts to withstand attacks from Haiti   
heightened the importance of sustaining a commitment to the abolition of slavery. 
Abolition ensured that freed slaves would remain loyal to the nascent republic in the 
period between 1844 and 1856, during which the Haitian oligarchy made at least three 
serious attempts to invade the Dominican Republic and recover lost territory (Moya Pons 
1998; Inoa 1999). With abolition at home secured, free slaves had little reason to seek 
protection from Haiti or to collude with invading Haitian forces. Free slaves also had 
little reason to organize on the basis of slavery. 
Conservative elites led by Pedro Santana also reinforced a strategic commitment 
to the abolition of slavery during the Spanish annexation from 1861 to 1865, though 
Santana exiled members of La Trinitaria. The St. Thomas Manifesto of 1861, for 
instance, ensured that Spain would not reinstate slavery on Dominican territory (Torres-
Saillant 1999). Conservative elites hoped that maintaining abolition would weaken 
opposition to Spanish annexation by free blacks and mulattos. Blacks and mulattos feared 
that Spain would again undermine their rights, as in the period of La España Boba, and 
further displace them from top administrative posts (Hoetink 1970). Santana sought both 
to mollify blacks and mulattos and to extend annexation, which he argued was necessary 
to protect the Dominican Republic from future invasion attempts by Haiti.  
But rather than weakening opposition to Spanish annexation, abolition 
strengthened opposition. The mistreatment of blacks and mulattos during annexation, 




restore national sovereignty. Nonetheless, a strategic commitment to abolition by elites 
obstructed the formation of an ethnoracial group identity around upending slavery.  
The social inclusion of most black migrants in periods of nation-building also did 
much to keep a broad black group identity unconsolidated in the Dominican Republic. It 
helped to dilute racial, ethnic, and linguistic differences among non-white immigrant 
groups and hindered organization along those lines. It should be noted, however, that 
despite gaining social inclusion black migrants remained politically marginalized. The 
state remained under the control of foreign capital or under elite-led exclusionary regimes 
for much of the twentieth century (Conaghan and Espinal 1990).  
For black migrants, inclusion was cyclical rather than linear or gradual. The initial 
inclusion of black migrants took place early during Haitian unification. In 1824 and 1825, 
president Boyer incorporated a number of black migrants, including six to thirteen 
thousand black U.S. Southern Methodists in the cities of Samaná and Puerto Plata 
(Larrázabal Blanco 1975).41  
Efforts to integrate black migrants were discontinued in the immediate aftermath 
of independence from Haiti by ruling elites who sought to whiten the population. Based 
on pseudo-scientific theories of Herbert Spencer and Count Arthur de Gobineau, among 
others, elites believed that whitening could rehabilitate the supposed impurity of 
hybridity and counteract the deficiencies of racial mixture (Skidmore 1990, Loveman 
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2014).42 They also believed that white immigrants were key to populating the island, 
reducing the domestic debt, and consolidating nation-building, as Martínez-Vergne 
suggests (2005, 82-84). And they employed a diverse tool kit to court white immigration, 
including presidential decrees, legal reforms, and preferential fiscal policies, such as tax 
exemptions (Hoetink 1970; Martínez-Vergne 2005).  
The administrations of Buenaventura Báez in 1852 and Gregorio Luperón in 1880 
especially attempted to recruit European immigrants, as did the Trujillo regime. In the 
1930s, Trujillo recruited Jewish refugees to the northern side of the Dominican Republic 
and in 1941 he offered citizenship to an additional ten thousand Jewish refugees 
(Fennema and Lowenthal 1987). For the most part, however, Trujillo, Luperón, Báez, and 
others were unable to recruit white migrants at the same rate at which whites had 
migrated from the Canary Islands in the early 1760s, for instance. 
Ruling elites compensated for their failure to attract white immigrants by reducing 
black immigration in periods when there was either a surplus of black wage laborers or 
when they wanted to flex national sovereignty. They applied a number of legal reforms to 
obstruct black immigration and delay the inclusion of black migrants. The Agrarian Law 
of 1911 during the Cáceres administration, for instance, specifically aimed to curb black 
immigration and stimulate white migrant labor in the agricultural industry. Likewise, the 
immigration law of 1912, Executive Order 372 of 1919, and the immigration law of 
1932, all attempted to discourage black immigration from the British West Indies and 
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included José Ramón López, Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, Federico García Godoy, Américo Lugo, and 




from Haiti. Whereas the first two required black migrants either to seek permission or to 
hold additional work permits, the latter imposed residential taxes on black migrants (Inoa 
1999). Popular classes, too, opposed black migration. In 1914, members of a so-called 
Propaganda Society railed against black migrants for depressing wages and displacing 
Dominican laborers (Inoa 1999).  
Notwithstanding intermittent opposition from ruling elites and from popular 
classes, most black migrants were socially integrated and eventually embraced in the 
Dominican Republic. In the absence of sufficient white immigration, black migrants 
helped to populate the nation, relieved labor shortages, and worked in perilous conditions 
for lower wages. Only Haitian migrants remained perpetually marginalized (Martínez-
Vergne 2005), even after Haiti no longer posed a military threat and had recognized 
Dominican sovereignty in the Peace and Commerce Treaty of 1874. Nonetheless, Haitian 
migrants were vigorously recruited and continued to self-integrate as they had done along 
the borderlands for generations.  
 Few migrant groups were as included during nation-building periods that 
followed Spanish annexation as those from the British West Indies—except, perhaps, for 
migrants from Turkey and modern-day Lebanon referred to as Árabes or Arabs.43 From 
the late 1880s to the late 1920s, laborers mostly from St. Kitts and Nevis migrated in 
mass to cities such as San Pedro de Macorís, Montecristi, and Puerto Plata. They became 
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century given their ambulatory commercial practices and their grip over commerce. However, they 




highly in demand in the sugar industry as the price of sugar dropped and wages in sugar 
refineries declined.  
Migrants from the British West Indies eventually replaced Puerto Rican migrant 
laborers and Dominican peasants who spurned low wages. Despite their own labor strikes 
in 1901, 1911, and in the 1920s, West Indians enjoyed protection from their government, 
the British Crown. This protection stabilized West Indian migration flows until they were 
eventually displaced by Haitian immigration. An average of five thousand British West 
Indians migrated annually between 1912 and 1920 and eight thousand laborers resided in 
the city of San Pedro de Macorís alone by 1924 (Inoa 1999).  
The social inclusion of black migrants from the British West Indies helped to foil 
the development of black group identity. Social inclusion swept away racial and 
linguistic characteristics that had initially defined black immigrant groups. It also avoided 
the types of confrontations between blacks and whites that bedeviled plantations in Costa 
Rica and Honduras, for instance (Andrews 2004). Relations between blacks and whites 
indeed remained relatively harmonious in the Dominican Republic even as levels of 
ethnoracial stratification heightened with the return of sugar. Ethnoracial harmony would 
portend well for legitimizing the myth of racial democracy.  
Exclusionary Strategies 
Exclusionary strategies of nation-building also undermined the formulation of 
ethnoracial group identities. Indigenismo and anti-Haitianism, in particular, dissociated 




stratification. Anti-Haitianism, in particular, divided “black” Dominicans between those 
who were and those who were not of Haitian descent. 
After political elites in much of Latin America failed to attract sufficient white 
immigration, they began to exalt indigenismo, mestizaje, and ethnoracial hybridity to 
refute the claims of the eugenics movement (Stepan 1991; Andrews 2004). Gilberto 
Freyre and José Vasconcelos were two of the most prominent proponents of mestizaje. 
Bonilla-Silva (2010) argues persuasively that elites touted white-indigenous intermixing 
(mestizaje) in part to cushion racial conflict but also as way to keep mixed populations 
invested in perpetuating castes.   
Dominican political elites, too, turned to mestizaje and indigenismo at the 
beginning of the 1930s to unite the nation.44 But unlike nations in the region with 
predominant mestizo and indigenous populations, the Dominican Republic had been 
overwhelmingly mulatto and devoid of aboriginals since the mid sixteenth century. 
Indigenismo helped political elites to extricate blackness from the national identity. 
Indigenismo was first institutionalized during the regime of Rafael Leonidas 
Trujillo, though an indigenous literary genre had emerged at the end of the nineteenth 
century in the Dominican Republic.45 His regime emphasized the indigenous and 
Hispanic roots of the nation and sought to play down its blackness. It designated both 
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indio and mestizo as official census categories in 1935 and in 1950 (Simmons 2012).46 
The regime also erected a legal apparatus to protect the hallowed Hispanicity of the 
nation. Law 319 of 1943, for instance, renamed the names of cities along the border in 
Spanish and prohibited the practice of Vodou (Inoa 1999).  
Indigenismo, alongside Hispanicity, resumed historical efforts by ruling elites to 
differentiate the Dominican Republic from Haiti. Those efforts had been largely 
interrupted by U.S. occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1915 and 1916, 
respectively. Rather than looking outward, the Trujillo regime turned inward and 
conjured a long lost aboriginal ancestry to differentiate the Dominican Republic from 
Haiti. This differed from the strategies employed by ruling elites in the nineteenth 
century, who attached the nation to Spain, attempted to annex the nation to the U.S., and 
recruited white immigration.  
Indigenismo offered a framework through which the Trujillo regime endorsed 
racialized anti-Haitianism that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century. Indigenismo 
delimited the ethnoracial boundaries of the nation and restored the country’s ethnoracial 
distance from a mostly black Haitian population.47 That distance had been breached with 
the influx of Haitian labor migrants after the U.S occupation.  
                                                 
46 Mulato was dropped as a census category during the U.S. occupation and reappeared in 1998 but as a 
skin color category on the national identification card (Simmons 2012). 
47  Trujillo also sought to demarcate territorial boundaries between the two nations, which had remained 
murky since the Treaty of Aranjuez in 1777. The 1936 boundary agreement between the Trujillo and 
Vincent governments was one of few attempts to demarcate clearer borders between the Dominican 




 Broad support for indigenismo from whites and non-whites alike ensured the 
endurance of indigenismo and dissociated blackness from the national identity. For 
conservative white elites, indigenismo was an effective rhetorical means by which to 
dilute the nation’s blackness without having to import whiteness. For mixed-race 
Dominicans, indio represented an intermediate ethnic category between white and black 
that was more clearly differentiated from blackness. It also provided a sense of 
ethnoracial ambiguity and accommodated ethnoracial hybridity. And for “black” 
Dominicans unable to pass for mixed, identification as indio helped to avoid prejudice. 
By embracing indigenismo, however, “blacks” and mulattos inhibited the development of 
a black group identity.  
Anti-Haitianism was similarly detrimental to the formation of ethnoracial group 
identity in the Dominican Republic. Anti-Haitianism consigned blackness to Haitian 
migrant labor and, similar to indigenismo, dissociated blackness from Dominican national 
identity. Politically, anti-Haitianism marginalized Dominicans of Haitian descent and 
subverted potential coalitions among afro-descendants.  
Although Dominican nationalism has almost always existed in contraposition to 
Haiti, anti-Haitianism did not become ethnoracialized until the second decade of the 
twentieth century. Anti-Haitianism intensified during Haitian unification but it was not 
entirely ethnoracialized or directed at the popular classes. Most Dominicans opposed the 




agriculture and the economic crisis of 1843 (Martínez-Vergne 2005; Derby 2003, 
2012).48  
During independence efforts in 1844, anti-Haitianism was grounded on national 
differentiation more than on ethnoracial differentiation. The Trinitarian Manifesto of 
1844 and subsequent decrees, for instance, called for measures to differentiate the 
Dominican Republic from Haiti by expropriating Haitian-owned goods and by nullifying 
the Haitian currency (Inoa 1999). Following independence, Dominicans attributed the 
defeat of Haiti’s divided and demoralized military to myths of Dominican tactical and 
moral superiority. They also directed anti-Haitianism largely at Haitian ruling elites, who 
made attempts to recover the Dominican Republic until 1856.  
An ethnoracialized brand of anti-Haitianism emerged among the popular classes 
around 1916 when a sharp rise in sugar prices led to a boom of contracted Haitian 
migration.49 In the late 1920s, Haitian migrants displaced West Indian labor particularly 
in the low-wage cane cutting industry (Derby 2003). By 1935, there were 52,657 Haitians 
registered in the national census (Simmons 2009). The Trujillo regime massacred and 
repatriated thousands of Haitians and Dominico-Haitian labor migrants in 1937 to stem 
the flow of Haitian migrants and nationalize the borderlands. The massacre was also part 
of broader ethno-national differentiation project. It juxtaposed Dominican Hispanicity 
                                                 
48 Despite opposition, Boyer retained support from many free blacks and mulattos as well as small-
landowners and merchants in the Cibao region and in the borderlands because he passed reforms that 
punctured the Spanish caste system. These reforms included land redistribution, the suspension of feudal 
privileges, and the more egalitarian constitution of 1843. 
49 Ethnoracial distinctions between the two sides of the island were made at the diplomatic level as far back 
as the early to mid 19th century, when U.S. State Department officials deliberated whether the D.R. had the 




and indigenismo to Haitian blackness and consigned blackness to Haiti (Vega 1993). But 
anti-Haitianism was not entirely ethnoracialized among elites immediately before or even 
after the 1937 massacre. Vega (2007), for example, argues that racialized anti-Haitianism 
emerged during the Trujillo regime only after his relations with Haitian President Élie 
Lescot soured in the early 1940s.  
Ethnoracialized anti-Haitianism also crystallized following the ouster of Jean-
Claude Duvalier in Haiti in 1986. His ouster broke off previous interstate labor 
agreements reached in 1952, 1959, and 1966, and demilitarized the border. As a result, 
Haitian migration increased significantly and migrants began to labor outside of sugar 
enclaves (Cassá 1992; Vega 1993). Although they were recruited by the state, the Haitian 
migrants that moved into new areas such as construction, service and the informal sectors 
were blamed for the economic crisis in the Dominican Republic in the early 1990s. 
Since the mid to late 1990s, when the Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC) 
began its electoral slide and left the right-of-center up for grabs, ruling elites have 
primarily appealed to ethnoracialized anti-Haitianism. They have evoked anti-Haitianism 
as a means to glue together ultra-conservative sectors and marginalize a voting segment 
of the opposition. In addition, anti-Haitianism has allowed elites to play up national 
sovereignty and signal measured defiance to international actors. This has resonated well 
across diverse domestic constituencies given the history of foreign transgressions against 




Racialized anti-Haitianism played out most publically in the 1994 and 1996 
presidential campaigns of José Francisco Peña Gómez, a presidential candidate of Haitian 
descent and a leader of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD). In 1996, the 
incumbent party (PRSC) colluded with segments of the opposition to slow support for 
Peña Gómez. They waged mudslinging attacks on Peña Gómez’s Haitian descent. The 
alliance also heightened existing anxieties over the threat of Haitian migration to 
Dominican territorial sovereignty and cultural integrity (Sagás 2000). Peña Gómez, the 
front-runner in 1994 and in 1996, lost both elections by a narrow margin, though the 
1994 elections were sullied by evidence of electoral fraud.  
Since the Senate approved the 2004 Migration Law, the ruling PLD party has 
institutionalized policies that are deleterious for Dominicans of Haitian descent. In 2007, 
the Central Electoral Board (JCE) issued “Circular 017,” an instruction to government 
officials to confiscate or withhold copies of civil registry documents that contained 
irregularities (UN General Assembly Report 2008).  
Rulings by the Supreme Court in 2005 and 2010 qualified Haitian undocumented 
migrants and their descendants as “in transit” and denied them citizenship. In September 
of 2013, the national Constitutional Tribunal applied the 2010 ruling retroactively to 
1929. The ruling potentially deprives citizenship to up to four generations of permanent 




(Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes 2012; Oficina Nacional de Estadística 2012).50 Efforts 
in 2014 by the government of Danilo Medina to naturalize or regularize the status of 
individuals affected by the 2013 ruling are unlikely to benefit the largest and most 
vulnerable group: Dominican-born Haitian descendants not in the civil registry.     
 Legal and electoral strategies that aim to disenfranchise Haitian descendants and 
consolidate the right-of-center electoral bloc have impeded the consolidation of political 
coalitions between Haitians and dark-skinned Dominicans. For marginalized Dominicans 
of Afro-descent, the uncertain legal status of Dominico-Haitians dampens the appeal of 
forging a group identity inclusive of Dominico-Haitians despite similar ethnoracial 
attributes and common grievances. 
The benefits of unregulated migration for both governments, along with various 
other push and pull factors, have helped to sustain the flow of undocumented Haitian 
migrants and keep Haitian descendants disenfranchised.51 The Dominican economy has 
become dependent on the labor of Haitian migrants. A recent study by the European 
Union and the United Nations Population Fund found that Haitian migrants contribute 5.4 
percent of the value added to the Dominican national economy (Bolivar Díaz 2014). 
Since the earthquake in 2010, undocumented Haitian migration has increased by nearly 
20 percent (García-Peña 2013). In 2012, over 450,000 Haitian migrants resided in the 
                                                 
50 After an initial audit of birth records since 1929, the Central Electoral Board (JCE) determined that 
13,672 Haitian descendants had been registered invalidly and would stand to lose Dominican citizenship. 
The JCE, however, has yet to determine the impact of the ruling on populations that were never registered. 
The plan set into motion by the state in November 2013 largely aims to regularize descendants who were 
registered invalidly. 
51 See Báez and Lozano (1992, 2005); Corten and Duarte (1992); Dore (1999); Silié, Segura, et al. (2002); 




Dominican Republic (ENI-2012). Haitian migrants constitute slightly over eighty-seven 
percent of the immigrant population and approximately five percent of the national 
population. This number could increase in the years ahead. In the 2012 Barometer of the 
Americas survey of Haiti, 58 percent of interviewees stated that they intended to 
emigrate—the highest percentage in the region (Espinal and Morgan 2012).  
Haitians migrate en masse to the Dominican Republic to escape severe 
underdevelopment and high levels of inequality. The 2013 United Nations Development 
Program Report ranked Haiti last in the region and 161 out of 186 nations in terms of 
human development. On a scale of 0 to 1, in which 0 is low and 1 is high, Haiti had a 
Human Development Index of 0.456 or 0.273 after adjusting for inequality.52 The value 
of remittances to Haiti also encourages Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic and 
elsewhere. Formal remittances to Haiti in 2010 totaled nearly $1.5 billion dollars, 
equivalent to twenty-one percent of Haiti’s GDP and greater than virtually all of Haiti’s 
financial inflows (World Bank Development Prospects Group; Migration Policy 
Institute). Two-thirds of Haitian interviewees in the same Barometers of the Americas 
survey stated that they received remittances. This placed Haiti first in the region and well 
above second-place Jamaica (43 percent). 
 Whereas Haitian emigration relieves overpopulation in Haiti and remittances 
boost financial inflows, Haitian immigration provides Dominican public and private 
sectors with a low-wage labor pool. Haitian migrants are recruited incessantly to staff 
                                                 





jobs shunned by many Dominicans, and at minimal costs to employers. Most Haitian 
migrants do not receive guaranteed labor contracts or health insurance (ENI-2012). And 
given their precarious legal status, many are vulnerable to arbitrary expulsions and 
massive roundups without a due process that allows them to contest deportations or to 
collect their wages.  
 That Haitians are usually phenotypically darker than most Dominicans and that 
Haitian migrants constitute a poor and unskilled underclass compounds ethnoracialized 
anti-Haitianism. More than half of Haitian migrants live in homes without running water, 
cooking gas, or adequate home flooring, and nearly seventy percent either hold no formal 
education or have completed only primary education (ENI-2012).  
In addition to depressing labor wages, Haitian migrants are marginalized in the 
Dominican Republic because they place further stress on already scant public resources. 
The Ministry of Health spent ten percent of its budget on Haitian nationals in 2012 
(though some estimates put spending closer to 18 percent), and the Ministry of Education 
spent some two million dollars on pre-university education for Haitian nationals from 
2011 to 2012 (Martínez 2013). Although small, these sums are not insignificant. In 2013, 
the Dominican government invested only 4 percent of its nearly $64 billion dollar GDP 
on education and only 2 percent on health (UNDP 2013). In October 2015, the public 
debt represented 36.2 percent of the national GDP. 
Haitian migrants also exacerbate existing developmental challenges in the 




development and, specifically, in per capita income, the Dominican Republic remains 
below regional averages in both categories.53 Its Human Development Index placed it 
thirteenth in the region and 96th in the world. The DR also performs below the regional 
average in terms of education (measured both as average years of schooling and 
secondary education completed), life expectancy, maternal deaths, adolescent pregnancy, 
child labor, homicides, and perceptions of public safety (UNDP 2013).  
Low wages and highly regressive taxes (as a percentage of wages) have helped to 
increase levels of inequality since 2002 despite economic growth. The Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) ranked the Dominican 
Republic as the third most unequal nation in the region based on the distribution of 
income between the top and bottom quintiles (Meacham 2013). Whereas the top quintile 
earned 50 percent of national income in 2012, the bottom quintile merely earned four 
percent (CEPAL 2013).  
Data from the World Bank, CEPAL, and from the Central Bank also point to 
continuing high levels of poverty and economic inactivity among the population. Only 2 
percent of Dominicans were pulled out of poverty over the last decade despite 50 percent 
growth in the GDP across the same period (World Bank 2014). Over forty percent of the 
population lived in poverty and 10.4 percent lived in extreme poverty in 2011 and 2012, 
relative to 32.8 percent and 8.8 percent, respectively, in 2002 (CEPAL 2013; Espinal 
2013). In addition, more than 700,000 Dominicans were economically active but 
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unemployed (PEAD), and over 800,000 reported that they neither attended school nor 
formed part of the labor force in the 2013 Labor Force National Survey.  
  Ethnoracialized economic anxieties over continued Haitian labor migration, and 
the elites’ historical antipathy toward Haiti and Haitian descendants have help spawn 
anti-Haitian public opinion (Cassá 1992; Moya Pons 1999). Data from a variety of 
surveys point to continuing high levels of anti-Haitianism. Enduring anti-Haitian public 
opinion does much to undermine the formation of a cohesive black group racial identity. 
Evidence from a 2011 survey that I conducted in Santo Domingo based on a 
representative sample of 694 voting age Dominicans illustrates the strength of anti-
Haitian attitudes. A little over half of respondents expressed either very negative or 
negative impressions of Haitians relative to some 35 percent of respondents who 
expressed positive or very positive impressions of Haitians. Very negative or negative 
evaluations of all other ethnoracial categories, including morenos, mulatos, indios, 
jabaos, and whites, did not surpass 17 percent. One exception was the evaluation of 
Cocolos, descendants from the British West Indies, which reached nearly 42 percent. 54 
 Fifty-five percent of self-identified “whites” and 53 percent of morenos in my 
survey expressed very negative or negative impressions of Haitians, more than all other 
groups. By contrast, 45 percent of self-identified “blacks” expressed positive or very 
positive impressions of Haitians, more than any other group. An ordered-probit analysis 
presented in Table 2.1 show, however, that the relationship between the racial identity of 
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respondents and the evaluation of Haitians was not statistically significant. Only being of 
Haitian descent and respondents’ level of education had a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with the evaluation of Haitians. This was true irrespective of the 
measure of ethnoracial identification employed. 
Existing survey data lend support to my findings on anti-Haitianism. Over 35 
percent of respondents in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey reported having witnessed 
acts of discrimination against Haitians. And when respondents were asked whether they 
believed that Haitians faced discrimination in the Dominican Republic, the mean score 




































































































Observations 681 686 680 
***p <0.01  
Table 2.1: The Effect of Respondent Characteristics on the Evaluation of Haitians 




Moreover, a relatively low percentage of citizens favor measures that benefit 
Haitian migrants or Dominicans of Haitian descent. In a report based on data from the 
2012 AmericasBarometer survey, Orces (2013) found that only 41 percent of the sample 
agreed or strongly agreed that the children of immigrants born in the Dominican Republic 
should be Dominican citizens, relative to 32 percent that disagreed or strongly disagreed 
and 27 percent that expressed more neutral attitudes. Respondents who self-identified as 
black, who were wealthy, or who were high school graduates were more likely to agree 
that children of immigrants born in the Dominican Republic should be Dominican 
citizens. Likewise, most Dominicans expressed lukewarm feelings when asked whether 
the government should provide social services to immigrants (of which 87 percent are 
Haitian) and give Haitian undocumented migrants work permits. 
That a significant segment of the population blames Haitian migrants for 
displacing Dominican workers helps to perpetuate discrimination against Haitian 
migrants and their descendants. Over 40 percent of the sample in the 2012 
AmericasBarometer survey disagreed with the statement that immigrants carry out jobs 
that Dominicans do not want compared to 60 percent of the sample that agreed with the 
statement. Wealthier and more educated interviewees were more likely to agree with the 
statement. 
Similar anti-Haitian attitudes are present in early surveys on discrimination 
against Haitians, even if Dominicans are also aware that Haitians endure treacherous 




believed that Haitian laborers suffered from worse working conditions than Dominican 
laborers and 48 percent agreed that Haitian laborers were treated as slaves in the 
Dominican Republic (Vega 1993). Surprisingly, however, 65 percent of the sample 
agreed that Haitians should be repatriated, which increased to 74 percent when Penn and 
Schoen repeated the survey in 1992. Anti-Haitian attitudes were also evident in a 1994 
survey conducted in the city of Santiago by ONE-RESPE. Seventy-five percent of the 
sample expressed that Dominicans mistreat Haitians and 20 percent of those believed that 
mistreatment was based on skin color (Badillo and Badillo 1996).  
  Anti-Haitian public opinion has not only endured in the Dominican Republic but 
has also permeated across issue domains and social classes. In a 1995 poll by RUMBO-
GALLUP, over 51 percent of the sample were unfavorable to a close relative marrying a 
person of Haitian descent. Only 11 percent of respondents in the sample favored the idea 
and 36.6 percent expressed ambivalence. Strongest opposition came from the most 
socially marginalized interviewees. Over 54 percent of interviewees that identified as 
lower class were unfavorable to the idea relative to 40.2 percent for interviewees that 
identified as middle class and 32.3 percent of interviewees that identified as upper class. 
One explanation, as Sagás (2012) suggests, is that lower classes and Afro-descendants, 
perhaps more than other groups, employ anti-Haitianism to avoid the legal and social 
implications of being misidentified as Haitian.   
Anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic has not impeded moments of 




Haitians harken back to the colonial period and extend through the twentieth century. 55  
During unification, for instance, Haitian and Dominican liberals allied against the Boyer 
regime over unpopular policies, such as high tariffs, land privatization, and agrarian 
reforms. Those policies were intended to increase state revenue and help Haiti pay back 
its debts to France (Hoetink 1970). Haitian and Dominican forces allied once more during 
the Spanish annexation over fears that slavery would return to the island (Vega 1993; 
Franco 2003).  
Recently, the Dominican Republic responded with alacrity in the aftermath of the 
2010 earthquake in Haiti and supplied significant first-aid. In addition, a segment of 
Dominicans on the island and throughout the Diaspora have opposed the 2013 ruling of 
the Constitutional Tribunal and stood in solidarity with Haitian migrants.  
Bilateral commerce and trade, and educational exchanges also have been largely 
unaffected by enduring anti-Haitianism. Haiti continues to be the second largest market 
for the Dominican Republic behind the United States. In 2011, Dominican exports to 
Haiti totaled over a billion dollars in the formal market and between 250 and 300 million 
dollars in the informal market (Bolivar Díaz 2013).56 In addition, middle and upper class 
Haitians continue to study in Dominican universities. At present, there are 15,000 
Haitians registered in the Dominican state university system.  
                                                 
55 In 1678, runaway slaves from the French side of the island founded one of the oldest neighborhoods in 
the municipality of East Santo Domingo, San Lorenzo de los Minas. The transit of free slaves from the 
French side to the Spanish side of the island was so pervasive that the return of slaves became a contentious 
issue during the demarcation of borders in 1777 (Moya Pons 1998; Inoa 1999; Torres-Saillant 1999).  
56 The importance of Haitian markets for Dominican producers was underscored in 2013 when the Haitian 




Despite moments of cooperation, however, racialized and non-racialized variants 
of anti-Haitianism remain deeply entrenched. In fact, there is some evidence that anti-
Haitianism may be on the rise. Recent data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey 
show lower levels of support for the claims (1) that the government should give work 
permits to undocumented migrants, (2) that immigrants fill the jobs that Dominicans do 
not want, and (3) that the children of Haitian migrants should be granted citizenship 
compared to levels in 2008, 2010 and 2012 (Espinal and Morgan 2014, 227). This shift in 
public opinion likely reflects recent government policies and court rulings that have 
limited the citizenship rights of Dominico-Haitians. 
Public policies and sustained migration flows have made national origin a more 
salient sociopolitical cleavage than ethnoracial identity. Just as inclusive nation-building 
policies have prevented the emergence of a black group identity in the Dominican 
Republic, anti-Haitianism has splintered Afro-descendants along national lines and kept 
black group consciousness at bay.  
CONCLUSION 
 Extensive patterns of ethnoracial mixing, structural conditions in the colonial 
period, and a mix of inclusive and exclusionary strategies of nation-building have 
obstructed the formation of group identity around race and ethnicity. Indeed, nation, not 





Patterns of ethnoracial mixing generated an ambiguous notion of race that stifled 
feelings of loyalty toward ethnoracial categories and that discouraged co-ethnic 
solidarity. And inclusive and exclusionary nation-building strategies virtually 
extinguished blackness from the national identity. Anti-Haitianism, in particular, has 
reinforced prejudiced notions of race and stymied the development of coalitions between 
Afro-descendants and Dominicans of Haitian descent.   
 In the absence of robust ethnoracialized affinities around which to articulate 
ethnoracial-based grievances, Dominicans have managed entrenched ethnoracial 
prejudice and marginalization by making use of their ethnoracial ambiguity. As I explain 
in the next chapter, identifying with lighter or hybrid ethnoracial categories has given 
mixed and dark-skinned Dominicans alike an “escape hatch” from the bottom of the 





Chapter 3: Ethnoracial Stratification and Its Effects on Electoral 
Behavior  
   
 In the previous chapter, I provided an argument for what determines inchoate 
ethnoracial group identity in the Dominican Republic. I suggested that intermixing, 
economic structural conditions, and nation-building created permeable ethnoracial 
boundaries. This fluid racial order has enabled Afro-descendants to exploit their multiple 
ethnoracial identities and pay allegiance to no single ethnoracial identity. 
 In this chapter, I make a case for why individuals in the Dominican Republic are 
encouraged to reclassify their ethnoracial identification rather than why they are able to 
do so. I posit that individuals in the Dominican Republic reclassify their ethnoracial 
identification as a way to manage high levels of ethnoracial stratification. Ethnoracial 
stratification offers individuals incentives to shun marginalized ethnoracial categories and 
to self-identify with hybrid or lighter categories, such as indio. This is a different 
incentive structure than what is proposed in much of the literature, which assumes that 
stratification encourages individuals to organize and mobilize politically around 
ethnoracial identity. The tandem of inchoate group identity and ethnoracial stratification 
accounts for the low salience of ethnoracial identity in Dominican politics. 
 In what follows, I provide evidence of ethnoracial stratification in the Dominican 
Republic. Existing public opinion data and my own data show that black Dominicans 
tend to lag behind white Dominicans across a number of socioeconomic indicators. 




ethnoracial identification. The data also show evidence of prejudice against Afro-
descendants. I claim that ethnoracial prejudice, like stratification, discourages individuals 
from identifying with categories typically associated with marginalized populations. 
  Having provided evidence of stratification, I then present evidence that 
individuals in the Dominican Republic tend to reclassify their ethnoracial identification. 
This evidence lends support to my claim that ethnoracial stratification and prejudice 
encourage the practice of hyperdescent (or identification with more socially dominant 
categories).  
 Lastly, I show that despite high levels of stratification and prejudice, ethnoracial 
identity in the Dominican Republic is not salient in elections. Dominicans commonly 
vote for politicians from other ethnoracial groups. They have elected Afro-descendant 
presidents, and those presidents have drawn support from provinces where individuals 
tend be light-skinned as well as from provinces where individuals tend to be dark-
skinned. Dominicans have also elected Afro-descendant legislators, including some who 
have represented provinces and municipalities where individuals tend to be light-skinned. 
Moreover, politicians have not typically used ethnoracial appeals in campaigns. The oft-
cited Peña Gómez presidential campaigns in the mid 1990s are an obvious exception. I 
make the case, however, that his electoral popularity casts doubt on just how 





ETHNORACIAL  STRATIFICATION 
 
The relationship between ethnoracial identity and class in the Dominican 
Republic is not clear-cut (Howard 2001). Differentiating social classes by ethnoracial 
identity may not be entirely meaningful given high levels of intermixing and porous 
ethnoracial boundaries. In addition, whereas ethnoracial stratification in the Dominican 
Republic may unfold in a bi-racial order on some issues, it may also unfold in a tri-racial 
or even in a plural racial order on other issues. As Bonilla-Silva (2010) suggests, this is 
the case for much of Latin America. 
 Furthermore, it is unclear how high levels of vertical stratification evident in 
education and income should be weighed against lower levels of horizontal stratification 
evident in housing, for instance (Bonilla-Silva 2010). Although blacks in the DR tend to 
reside in the poorest neighborhoods, as Sagás (2012) and others have noted, there is little 
evidence of systemic residential segregation or discrimination by the state. There is also 
relatively low popular support for residential segregation. In the 2012 
AmericasBarometer survey, for instance, only 3.8 percent of the sample expressed 
opposition to having a black neighbor. The Dominican Republic ranked in the middle of 
thirteen Latin American countries on this issue. 
Nonetheless, socioeconomic inequalities in the Dominican Republic tend to fall 
along ethnoracial lines.57 This is so despite extensive intermixing and some inclusive 
nation-building efforts. The evidence of ethnoracial stratification challenges 
                                                 
57 See Hoetink (1967, 1970); Pérez Cabral (1967); Howard (2001); Derby (2003); Franco (2003); 




commonplace assumptions held in the DR that the country is a racial democracy and that 
ethnoracial distinctions are inconsequential.  
Various studies have found that relative to their “white” counterparts, “black” 
Dominicans have lower levels of wealth and income and have less access to food, social 
services and infrastructure (Hoetink 1985; Howard 2001; Mercedes 2006). A combined 
56 percent of self-identified “black” Dominicans in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey 
characterized their overall financial situation either as bad or very bad compared to 35 
percent of self-identified “whites.”  
Table 3.1 presents average scores of socioeconomic indicators across different 
measures of “black” and “white” identification based on data from the 2012 
AmericasBarometer Survey. The scores show that there is a difference of means in levels 
of wealth and income between self-identified blacks and whites, although the difference 
was not statistically significant for personal income. The difference of means in levels of 
income between respondents ascribed as white and black was statistically significant, 
however.58 Similarly, the relationship between ascribed ethnoracial identity and wealth 
was also statistically significant in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey (Morgan and 
Espinal 2010, 249).  
                                                 
58 The different results for self-identified and ascribed measures may reflect the tendency of dark-skinned 
individuals to self-identify with lighter-skinned (and intermediate) categories. Ethnoracial self-
identification measures in the Dominican Republic typically produce slightly less statistically significant 
results with respect to income and wealth than do ascriptive measures. The practice of hyperdescent can 
also obscure levels of stratification in intermediate categories. Comparing ethnoracial categories at the 
poles can offer a clearer picture of ethnoracial stratification than comparing ethnoracial stratification 












    
 White Black White Black 
Income 8.20 7.60 9.51** 6.80 
Income is Sufficient 2.19** 1.96 2.32** 1.73 
Financial Situation 2.76** 2.56 2.82** 2.35 
Social Class 2.55** 1.85 2.50** 2.04 
Education 9.64 8.98 9.19 8.15 
No food at home at any time in past 
3 months 
.312 .438* .200 .549** 
Indoor Running Water .763** .596 .820** .414 
Indoor Bathroom .741** .622 .865** .457 
Assaulted .161 .141 .224 .170 
Satisfied with Quality of 
Health/Medical Care 
2.44 2.45 2.37 2.63** 
** P≤0.05; *P≤0.10  
 Source: AmericasBarometer Survey 2012  
Table 3.1: Mean Scores of Socioeconomic Indicators Across Ascribed and Self-
Identification Measures, AB 2012 
 
In addition to having lower levels of wealth, Black Dominicans appear to lag 
behind non-blacks in access to food and infrastructure. Forty-three percent of self-
identified “black” respondents in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey did not have food 
at home sometime in the last three months compared to 32 percent of indios, 31 percent 




difference of means between whites and blacks was statistically significant for ascribed 
and self-identification measures of ethnoracial identity.  
Black respondents both in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey and in my own 
survey also reported less access to infrastructure relative to white respondents. In the 
AmericasBarometer survey, black respondents had lower average scores for access to 
indoor running water and indoor bathroom facilities than white respondents. Table 3.1 
shows that the difference of means in indoor running water and indoor bathroom facilities 
was statistically significant across ascribed and self-identification measures of ethnoracial 
identity.  Likewise, as Table 3.2 shows, the difference of means in access to adequate 
home flooring between “black” and “white” respondents in my survey was statistically 





















Income 2.11** 1.50 1.95* 1.55 2.12** 1.67 
High Earning Occupation 2.40 2.33 2.42 2.33 2.60* 2.42 
Unemployed .407 .480 .525 .508 .460 .451 
Education 3.37** 2.50 3.07* 2.66 3.32** 2.84 
Indoor Flooring 3.88** 3.20 3.72** 3.40 3.87** 3.48 
** P≤0.05; *P≤0.10 





Data from my 2011 survey also suggest that income and education is 
ethnoracially stratified in the Dominican Republic. Table 3.2 presents average scores of 
socioeconomic indicators across three different measures of ethnoracial identity. The 
scores show that respondents ascribed as black had the lowest mean income category 
(1.50) while white respondents had the highest mean income (2.11). The difference of 
means between blacks and whites was statistically significant across all three measures. 
These findings echo a study by Howard (2001) that finds that “negros/as and 
mulatos/as… in general, have considerably lower incomes than blancos/as, experience 
less social mobility and are more likely to be in the urban informal market” (50).  
In addition, black respondents in my survey had lower scores of schooling than 
white respondents across all three ethnoracial identification measures. The difference of 
means, moreover, was statistically significant in all three measures, as Table 3.2 shows. 
A recent study by Telles and Steele (2012) from Princeton University’s Project on 
Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA) bolster these results. The authors found 
that dark-skinned Dominicans held lower levels of education. Controlling for class, 
gender, and urban/rural residence, dark-skinned Dominicans averaged nearly two years of 
schooling less than their light-skinned counterparts. 
Much of the Dominican public acknowledges that Afro-descendants are impacted 
disproportionately by structural inequalities. In a study by Telles and Bailey (2013), 65.8 




low access to education and discrimination. College-educated individuals were especially 
likely to use structural accounts to explain poverty. 59 
Elite attitudes about stratification have not kept pace with changes in public 
opinion, however. Dominican officials acknowledge that Afro-descendants have unequal 
access to resources. In a 2007 periodic report to the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the government stated that “most 
Dominicans of African origin are in the lower strata of society” and that “those of 
African cultural origin are among the main victims of failure to enjoy economic, social 
and cultural rights” (Diène 2008, 11). But Dominican officials continue to downplay the 
impact of prejudice and discrimination on inequality. 
Although black Dominicans tend to lag behind white Dominicans with respect to 
socioeconomic indicators and access to social services, they do not necessarily have 
lower levels of political participation and sense of inclusion than white Dominicans. 
There is some evidence that black Dominicans are less likely to register to vote than 
white Dominicans, for example. Thirteen percent of respondents that self-identified as 
black in the 2012 AmericasBarometer sample were not registered to vote.60 This was the 
highest percentage among all racial groups and more than twice as high as respondents 
who self-identified as white (6 percent). Results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer 
                                                 
59 Perhaps because they are aware that “blacks” in the DR have unequal access to education, a combined 38 
percent of respondents in the 2012 AmericasBarometer sample either strongly or very strongly favored 
affirmative action at the university level. By contrast, a combined 29 percent of respondents either strongly 
or very strongly rejected affirmative action. 
60 The 2012 AmericasBarometer report found an inverse relationship between high levels of education and 




survey in Table 3.3 show that blacks had a lower average score than whites on voting 
registration for both measures of ethnoracial identity. The difference of means was 








 White         Black White      Black 
Registered Voter .934** .867 .931** .835 
Voted in last National Elect. .612 .689 .662 .723 
Interest in Politics 2.41 2.36 2.20 2.26 
Persuaded Others to Vote 1.86 1.95 1.69 1.90 
Campaigned  .108 .137 .112 .085 
Politicians Care About What 
People Like You Think 
3.62 3.27 3.09 3.27 
Parties listen to People Like You  3.11 3.01 2.62 2.88 
** P≤0.05; *P≤0.10      
 Source: AmericasBarometer Survey, 2012  
Table 3.3: Mean Scores of Political Inclusion Indicators Across Ascribed and Self-
Identification Measures, AB 2012 
 
Additional evidence suggests, however, that blacks in fact may have equal if not 
higher levels of political engagement than whites in the Dominican Republic. As Table 
3.3 shows, black respondents had higher mean scores than white respondents on voting in 
the last election for both measures of ethnoracial identity, though the difference of means 




respect to persuading others to vote, though the difference in means was not statistically 
significant. Likewise, blacks had higher average scores than whites on campaigning in 
the last election when the self-identification measure was used. The difference of means 
was also not statistically significant. High levels of clientelism cannot explain these 
levels of black political engagement in the Dominican Republic. The 2014 
AmericasBarometer survey found no statistically significant relationship between skin-
color and clientelistic offerings (Espinal and Morgan 2014, 197).  
The extent to which black Dominicans have a lower interest in politics, perceive 
that political parties do not listen to them, and feel that governing officials do not care 
about what they think is similarly inconclusive. Table 3.3 shows that different measures 
of ethnoracial identity produce different results. When the self-identification measure was 
used in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, black Dominicans had lower mean scores 
than white Dominicans across these political inclusion questions. When the ascribed skin-
color measure was used, however, the reverse was true and blacks had higher average 
scores than whites across those same questions. The difference of means was not 
statistically significant for either measure on any of these questions.  
In my own survey, the difference of means for questions on political attention, 
political sophistication, and voting were also mostly statistically insignificant, as Table 
3.4 makes clear. Where they were significant, participants who described their own skin 























Political Attention 3.70 4.03 3.97 4.11 3.97 4.21* 
Political Sophistication 1.77 1.48 1.62 1.52 1.76 1.63 
Voted in last election 
(Legislative or National) 
.629 .659 .675 .576 .601 .643 
** P≤0.05; *P≤0.10    
Table 3.4: Mean Scores of Political Inclusion Indicators Across Ascribed, Skin Color, 
and Self-Identification Measures 
 
The absence of stark differences between black and white Dominicans with 
regard to political inclusion may in part account for low levels of inter-ethnic conflict and 
for asymmetries in feelings of patriotism. Sawyer, Peña, and Sidanius (2004, 109) find 
that “asymmetries in racial status quo…[do not] reflect asymmetries in national 
attachment” in the Dominican Republic. In turn, low levels of inter-ethnic conflict and 







Although political elites continue to propagate the myth of racial democracy 
based on political inclusion and high levels of intermixing,61 prejudice against black 
ethnoracial attributes persists in the Dominican Republic. This prejudice is partly evident 
in individuals’ attitudes toward their own black attributes. A combined 22 percent of the 
sample in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, for example, agreed on some level (from 
moderate to strong) that they would like their skin color to be lighter.  
Prejudice against black ethnoracial attributes is also evident in historical attitudes 
on black marital partners. Using demographic statistics from 1960 and 1961, Pérez 
Cabral (1967) found evidence that men contracted interracial marriage with women who 
were lighter-skinned than they were at higher rates than with women who were darker-
skinned than they were. In 1960, there were 734 marriages between men and lighter-
skinned women compared to 584 marriages between men and darker-skinned women. 
The gap widened in 1961. There were 780 marriages between men and lighter-skinned 
women compared to 513 marriages between men and darker-skinned women.62 
A 1995 RUMBO-GALLUP survey found similar patterns of prejudice against 
black marital partners. When asked whether they would prefer that a close relative marry 
a Dominican of white, indio, or black racial makeup, only 2.8 percent of the sample 
preferred that a close relative marry a black person. Respondents that identified with the 
                                                 
61 Former president Leonel Fernández recently argued that the DR could not be a racist nation given 
patterns of intermixing. See “Leonel: ‘República Dominicana no puede ser un país racista’” (Diario Libre, 
15 December 2013).  




lowest social classes most preferred that a close relative marry a black person. By 
contrast, nearly 12 percent of the sample preferred that a close relative marry a white 
person and 26 percent preferred that a close relative marry an indio or mixed-race person. 
Overall, most Dominicans expressed ambivalence on this survey question.  
 More recently, Telles and Garcia (2013) found lukewarm support for black 
marital partners. When respondents were asked the extent to which they would agree with 
their own child marrying a black person, the national sample mean of the Dominican 
Republic was 4.78 on a scale from 1 to 7 (in which 1 is strong disagreement and 7 is 
strong agreement). This was the second lowest score in a study of seven countries. The 
difference of means across racial groups was not statistically significant.  
Preferences against black ethnoracial attributes are not exclusive to adults. From 
1995 to 1997, Ashindi Maxton studied 320 randomly selected five-year olds in Santo 
Domingo and Santiago. She found that children based their evaluations of dolls on a 
somatic valorization of white and black attributes. Whereas most children associated 
whiteness with beauty, intelligence, and virtuousness, they associated blackness with 
unattractiveness and with brute and evil characteristics. Girls were especially likely to 
make those associations (El Caribe, 18 July 1997). 
Dominicans are aware of the social significance that is attributed to ethnoracial 
attributes. A combined 68 percent of respondents in my survey believed that skin color 
mattered either some or a lot in Dominican society relative to a combined 30 percent of 




acknowledge the impact of skin color on social inequality. Sixty-five percent of 
respondents in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey believed that dark-skinned 
Dominicans were poorer than other groups because they were treated unfairly, up from 
42 percent in 2010. There is also evidence that Dominicans, particularly those who 
belong to wealthier social classes, acknowledge the disadvantages associated with having 
dark skin. In semi-formal interviews with 300 residents in three study sites, Howard 
(2001, 70) found that “…nearly half of the sample believed that to be negro/a was a 
disadvantage in the Dominican Republic, a recognition that increased with social status. 
Similarly, 46 percent believed a white skin to be advantageous, the highest proportion 
again being in the upper classes.”  
 Even in the absence of institutionalized discrimination, prejudiced attitudes 
against Afro-descendant attributes in the Dominican Republic can represent significant 
impediments to employment and recreation. Afro-descendants are especially vulnerable 
to social exclusion in the workplace given the absence of a legal framework that 
specifically sanctions discrimination on the basis of ethnoracial identity. 
  In 2008, Dominican labor unions filed a claim with the International Labor 
Organization citing evidence of discrimination in the workplace against dark-skinned 
nationals and Haitian foreigners. A 2013-14 report by the United Nations Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed similar concerns of 




Social exclusion is also present in recreational venues. In 2013, the Attorney 
General’s office called for legislation to regulate racial discrimination at public 
entertainment venues after a string of dark-skinned patrons were denied entrance into 
elite nightclubs of Santo Domingo. 
 Survey data suggest that Dominicans recognize patterns of racial discrimination, 
even if they are reticent to share their own experiences of discrimination with 
interviewers. Telles and Bailey (2013) found that 63 percent of the sample recognized 
that blacks and mulattos are treated unequally. Individuals who were categorized as 
belonging to minority groups (blacks and mulattos) were only slightly more likely to 
recognize discrimination (68.4 to 62.2 percent) than those who were categorized as 
dominant (whites and mestizos or indios).  
Likewise, the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey found that 54 percent of 
respondents believed that dark-skinned Dominicans were treated worse than light-
skinned Dominicans. And nearly 9 percent believed that dark-skinned Dominicans were 
treated much worse. Moreover, a combined 42 percent of respondents stated that they had 
witnessed discrimination based on skin color either many times or some times. 
Remarkably, however, nearly 90 percent of respondents also expressed that they had 
never personally experienced discrimination based on skin color. 
In sum, evidence from existing public opinion data and my own data show that 
there is ethnoracial stratification and prejudice in the Dominican Republic. These 




reclassify their ethnoracial identification. In the next section, I provide evidence that 
dark-skinned Dominicans indeed tend to reclassify their ethnoracial identification with 
lighter-skinned or hybrid categories. As I have argued, weak category loyalty and low 
levels of ethnoracial affirmation help to explain the dearth of ethnoracial voters and 
entrepreneurs in elections. I will also show, much like the findings on political 
participation and inclusion indicate, that ethnoracial identity is not very salient in 
elections. This is true despite ethnoracial stratification and prejudice. 
ETHNORACIAL CLASSIFICATION 
 
Dominicans have had little reason to affirm an ethnoracial group identity as their 
primary form of identity (Torres-Saillant 1999). As I noted in Chapter 2, enduring 
poverty, depopulation, and a preference for cattle ranching in the colonial period 
disrupted rigid labor and class relations around which to structure clear ethnoracial 
boundaries. In addition, inclusive and exclusionary nation-building policies, such as 
nativism and anti-Haitianism, ultimately encouraged allegiance to the national identity 
rather than to individual ethnosomatic categories. Ethnoracial stratification and prejudice 
in the Dominican Republic have further impeded the consolidation of ethnoracial group 
identity.  
Data on affinity toward in-category members and levels of linked-fate help to 
illustrate that ethnoracial group identity is indeed inchoate in the DR. Only 42 percent of 
self-identified black respondents in my survey agreed that they “identified most with 




that “their individual success was linked to the success of persons that share their same 
race.”  
Statistics on black ethnoracial identity in the United States provide some 
perspective on the weakness of ethnoracial group identity in the Dominican Republic 
(though statistics on ethnoracial identity are not exactly comparable to statistics on skin 
color). The General Social Survey (1993-2004) found that 78.9 percent of black 
respondents in the U.S. “felt close to other blacks” and an even larger proportion of 
blacks, 87.5 percent, expressed this sentiment in the National Black Politics Study 
(1993). Moreover, the 1993-1994 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) found 
that a little over 70 percent of “black” respondents agreed that their fate was linked to that 
of other “blacks” (Hochschild and Weaver 2007, 656-658).63 
My own survey data indicate low levels of ethnoracial solidarity in the Dominican 
Republic. Individuals were more likely to give significantly higher evaluation marks to 
in-category members than to out-category members in only three of six ethnoracial 
categories.  
Rather than responding to ethnoracial stratification and prejudice by strengthening 
ethnoracial group identity and solidarity, Afro-descendants in the Dominican Republic 
have made use of ethnoracial ambiguity to avoid further marginalization. They have 
shunned identification with darker ethnoracial categories and migrated toward lighter and 
hybrid ethnoracial categories. By identifying with hybrid and lighter categories, 
                                                 
63 Hochschild and Weaver (2007) find a statistically significant relationship between high levels of linked 




individuals have avoided being placed at the bottom of the pigmentocracy alongside 
Dominicans of Haitian descent.  
My survey data support the claim that participants across the ethnoracial spectrum 
avoid identification with dark ethnoracial categories. Cross-tabulations show that only 
30.7 percent of respondents who self-identified as white were ascribed as white by 
interviewers. Interviewers also categorized self-identified white respondents as jabao 
(30.7 percent), indio (23 percent), mulatto (12.8 percent), and moreno (2.5 percent). 
Likewise, 48 percent of self-identified morenos were categorized as black by 
interviewers.  Similarly, in a study by Telles and Paschel (2014, 883), only 60 percent of 
the darkest Dominicans self-identified as black.  
A similar trend of lightening ethnoracial classification was evident in respondents 
who self-identified as indio in my sample. Of the 47 percent of respondents who self-
identified as indio, 34 percent of those were ascribed a darker ethnoracial category by 
interviewers. By contrast, only 14 percent of the 47 percent of respondents who self-
identified as indio were ascribed a lighter racial category.  
Self-identified mulattos were the exception since many of them were lighter-
skinned individuals. Of the 9 percent of participants who self-identified as mulatto in my 
survey, 64 percent were ascribed a lighter ethnoracial category by interviewers compared 
to only 15 percent who were ascribed a darker ethnoracial category. Howard (2001, 69) 
found that individuals who self-identify as “mulatto” appear to be more forthcoming 




and upper classes, Howard suggested that they could absorb the social consequences of 
identifying with more marginalized categories. These findings echo recent conclusions by 
Simmons (2009) and by Telles and Paschel (2014). In the case of the Dominican 
Republic, Telles and Paschel found that “high-educated Dominicans were nearly four 
times as likely to identify as mulatto when compared to low-educated Dominicans…” 
(888).   
Interviewer error and discrepancies in ethnoracial classifications between 
interviewers and respondents cannot explain the tendency of participants in my survey to 
identify with lighter ethnoracial categories. Evidence from the 2012 AmericasBarometer 
survey also indicates that Dominicans tend to identify with lighter ethnoracial categories. 
In that survey, interviewers used a more “objective” eleven-point skin color palette to 
categorize respondents. Figure 3.1 illustrates the ethnoracial composition of the 2012 AB 
survey sample by self-identification and ascribed skin color measures. The figure shows 
that nearly three-quarters of participants self-identified as white (12.5) and indio (60.4). 
By contrast, only a little more than half of participants were ascribed skin colors that I 
coded as “white” and “indio.” The percentage of participants that self-identified as white 
(12.5), in particular, was nearly double the percentage of participants that were ascribed 






Figure 3.1: The Ethnoracial Composition of the 2012 AmericasBarometer Survey Sample 
By Different Measures of Ethnoracial Identity 
 
Despite a proclivity to lighten, Dominicans do not entirely dissociate from 
blackness or solely identify with whiteness. Just as Dominicans traditionally have 
consigned blackness to Haitians, they also have consigned whiteness to elites and to 
invading or occupational forces (Torres-Saillant 1999, 32). Dominicans tend to identify 
with descriptive categories that denote ethnoracial hybridity, although these categories 
overstate their degree of whiteness.  
In addition to identifying with lighter ethnoracial categories, Afro-descendants 
have circumnavigated further marginalization by self-identifying as indio, a term that 
suggests Indian or indigenous ancestry. Indio, as a hybrid classification, is an example of 
what Degler (1971) referred to as a “mulatto escape hatch.”   
 Colloquially, indio denotes an “ethnoracial in-betweenness” or ethnoracial 






















identity that was imposed during Trujillo’s nation-building period. Through its “grammar 
of deracialization” (Racusen 2012), the indio ethnoracial classification has done much to 
stymie the development of ethnoracial group identity in the Dominican Republic.  
Indio is the ethnoracial category of choice for most Dominicans. Sixty-one 
percent of respondents in the 2012 AmericasBarometer national survey self-identified as 
indio, and nearly half self-identified as indio in my own survey, which was based on a 
representative sample of the province of Santo Domingo. Likewise, over 45 percent of 
respondents in a closed-ended question in my survey stated that Dominicans mainly 
belonged to an indio ethnoracial group. By contrast, 25 percent of respondents stated that 
Dominicans were mainly of European descent and 29 percent stated that they were 
mainly of African descent. 
Data from my survey and from the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey similarly 
show that self-identification with indio is negatively correlated with income, although the 
relationship was not statistically significant in either study. A combined 90 percent of 
self-identified indios in my survey identified with one of the three lowest income groups. 
And a combined 65 percent of self-identified indios in the AmericasBarometer survey 
identified with one of the two lowest social class groups, with 32 percent identifying as 
middle class. 
 Interestingly, the relationship between educational attainment and indio self-
identification was not negative but was curvilinear both in my own survey and in the 




were most likely to self-identify as indio while those at the lowest and highest levels of 
educational attainment were least likely to self-identify as indio. Stratification might help 
to explain this curvilinear pattern. As I have suggested, individuals in the Dominican 
Republic who have least access to education are unlikely to pass for indio and are more 
likely to self-identify as black. By contrast, individuals who have most access to 
education are also most likely to be able to self-identify as “white” and have little 
incentive to identify as indio. 
The state’s disproportionate use of indio to classify citizens in official documents 
helps explain the widespread tendency of Dominicans to self-identify as indio. Using a 
convenience sample of 150 adults, Simmons (2009) found that the Central Electoral 
Board in the province of Santiago overwhelmingly classified citizens as indio (125) when 
issuing cédulas or national identification cards. The Central Electoral Board sparingly 
classified citizens as black (3) or mulatto (12).  
ETHNORACIAL IDENTITY AND ELECTIONS 
  
As I have shown, there is considerable evidence of ethnoracial stratification and 
prejudice in the Dominican Republic. Ethnoracial identity appears to structure access to 
resources and to order social attitudes. I argued that high levels of ethnoracial 
stratification and prejudice help to explain why marginalized individuals identify with 
hybrid or lighter-skinned ethnoracial categories, such as indio.  
Despite high levels of ethnoracial stratification and prejudice, ethnoracial identity 




numerous Afro-descendant legislators, for example. And some of those legislators have 
represented provinces where individuals tend be lighter-skinned as a result of historical 
patterns of migration and low levels of intermixing. 
Using photographs of legislators from (1) electoral campaigns, (2) reports 
published by the Electoral Central Board (JCE), (3) congressional webpages, and (4) 
online newspapers, I coded the 2006-2010 and 2010-2016 congresses by ethnoracial 
category. I compared photographs across multiple sources to control for variation in the 
images. Dominican legislators tend to be shown having lighter skin in official 
photographs than in unofficial ones. 
 Legislators were classified into one of six ethnoracial categories (white, jabao, 
indio, mulatto, moreno, and black). My criteria for classification combined three types of 
physical attributes. These were skin color (i.e. light, medium, dark), hair type (i.e. straight 
or kinky), and facial features, such as nose and lips (i.e. thick/wide or thin). Using a 
combination of these attributes provided greater leverage than using a single attribute, 
even if that attribute is skin color. Skin color is a strong predictor of ethnoracial 
identification in many countries in Latin America (Telles and Paschel 2014). But it is a 
weaker predictor of ethnoracial identification in the case of the DR, specifically (Telles 
and Paschel 2014, 884). Moreover, skin color does not necessarily align with other 
physical attributes. Individuals in the Dominican Republic may have similar skin color 




Figure 3.2 illustrates my criteria for classification along dimensions of skin color, 
hair type, and facial features. At one end of the ethnoracial spectrum, I coded light-
skinned legislators as white if they had straight hair and thin facial features or if they had 
straight hair and thick facial features. I coded light-skinned legislators as jabao if they 
had thin facial features and kinky hair or if they had thick facial features and kinky hair.  
At the middle of the ethnoracial spectrum, I coded “medium” or bronze-skinned 
(Candelario 2007) legislators as indio if they either had straight or kinky hair and thin 
facial features or if they had straight hair and thick facial features. I coded “medium”-
skinned legislators as mulatto if they had kinky hair and thick facial features or if they 
had dark skin, straight hair, and thin facial features. 
At the other end of the ethnoracial spectrum, I coded dark-skinned legislators as 
moreno if they had thick facial features and straight hair or if they had thin facial features 
and kinky hair. And I coded dark-skinned legislators as black if they had kinky hair and 
thick facial features. 
Given my claim that Dominicans have elected numerous Afro-descendant 
legislators, I made an effort to classify legislators as lighter (i.e. white, jabao, and indio) 
rather than darker classifications (mulatto, moreno, and black) when it was difficult to 
decide between categories. This happened often. Ethnoracial categories in the Dominican 
Republic are continuous and overlap, and the ethnoracial spectrum is very fine-grained 
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 Figure 3.2: Criteria for the Ethnoracial Classification of Legislators Along Dimensions 
of Skin Color, Hair Texture, and Facial Features  
 
In my analysis, I refer to legislators whom I coded as mulatto, moreno, and black 
as Afro-descendant (although legislators do not necessarily refer to themselves as such). I 




descendant attributes) in order to provide the most conservative estimate of Afro-
descendants elected to Congress. 
Table 3.5 presents a breakdown of legislators in the 2006-2010 congress by 
ethnoracial category. The results show that Afro-descendants (legislators I categorized as 
mulatto, moreno, or black) were well represented in both legislative bodies relative to the 
percentage of Afro-descendants in the national population (measured by ascribed skin 
color). Although black legislators accounted for only 6 percent of the Senate, Afro-
descendant legislators collectively accounted for almost one-third (31.3%) of the Senate. 
This percentage was nearly equivalent to the percentage of white legislators (34.3%). 
Afro-descendant legislators represented almost exactly half of the Senate if we include 
legislators that I coded as indio. 
A greater percentage of Afro-descendant legislators were elected to the 2006-
2010 Chamber of Deputies (COD) than to the Senate. The COD differs from the Senate 
in some important ways. There are more legislative seats for each provincial district in 
the COD than in the Senate. 64 And whereas legislators in the COD are elected through a 
preferential open-list PR system, legislators in the Senate are elected through a method of 
plurality.  
 
                                                 
64 The Senate is comprised of 32 elected members (1 member for each province and 1 member for the 
National District) and the 2006-2010 COD was comprised of 178 elected members. Five National Deputies 
and 7 Overseas Deputies were added to the 2010-2016 COD for a total of 190 members. I excluded 
members elected overseas from my analysis because it is unclear whether voters in the national territory 
and voters overseas use the same criteria to elect their legislators. Legislators in the 2010-2016 Congress 




































































































































20.7 8.98 19.1 19.6 20.2 11.2 
N=178 
(100) 
Self- Id              
(% of National 
Population)^ 
9.58 - 67.6 11 - 10.1 - 
Ascribed           
(% of National 
Population) ^ 
3.87 18.4 38.5 18.2 16.6 4.54 - 
Note: Row Percentages are in parenthesis. 
^ Source: AmericasBarometer Survey, 2010 (color-palette groupings and computations 
for ascribed measure are mine). 
Table 3.5: The Distribution of Legislators in the 2006-2010 Congress by Ascribed 




The results show that the percentage of mulatto (19.6) and moreno (20.2) 
legislators in the 2006-2010 COD was nearly identical to the percentage of white 
legislators (20.7). The percentage of black (11.2) legislators was much lower than that of 
white legislators. In total, Afro-descendant legislators held half of the seats in the 2006-
2010 COD. That percentage increases to 70 percent if we include the legislators that I 
coded as indio. The percentage of black, mulatto, and moreno legislators is particularly 
impressive considering that self-identified mulattos and blacks only account for 21.1 
percent of the Dominican population, according to the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey. 
And members of the darker skinned categories only accounted for 39.3 percent of the 
Dominican population, according to the same AmericasBarometer survey.65 
Table 3.6 presents a breakdown of legislators in the 2010-2016 congress by 
ethnoracial category. The results indicate that Afro-descendant legislators also have a 
strong presence in the current congress relative to the percentage of Afro-descendants in 
the national population (measured by ascribed skin color). There were no black 
legislators elected to the Senate, but Afro-descendants collectively account for nearly 
one-third (28 percent) of all legislators, just as they did in the 2006-2010 Senate. That 




                                                 
65 I categorized numbers 9 through 11 on the AmericasBarometer color palette into black, numbers 7 and 8 























































































































24 10.9 14.7 26.7 15.8 7.65 
N=183 
(100) 




13.4 - 58 12.4 - 15.8 - 




4.27 13.8 41.5 18.5 17.7 4.01 - 
Note: Row Percentages are in parenthesis. 
^Source: AmericasBarometer Survey, 2014 (color-palette groupings and computations 
for ascribed measure are mine). 
Table 3.6: The Distribution of Legislators in the 2010-2016 Congress by Ascribed 




As with the previous congress, a higher percentage of Afro-descendant legislators 
were elected to the 2010-2016 Chamber of Deputies than to the Senate. Afro-descendant 
legislators in the COD accounted for a little over half of all legislators, just as they did in 
the 2006-2010 COD. The percentage of white legislators was again higher than the 
percentage of black legislators (7.65), as was the case in the 2006-2010 COD. 
There are some differences between the ethnoracial composition of the 2010-2016 
and the 2006-2010 congresses. There is a slightly higher percentage of white legislators 
and a slightly lower percentage of black legislators in the 2010-2016 Senate and COD. 
The results also suggest that Afro-descendant legislators are not restricted to one 
or two parties. No single political party consistently had the highest percentage of Afro-
descendant legislators. In the 2006-2010 COD, 53 percent of legislators in the Partido de 
la Liberación Dominicana (PLD) were Afro-descendant compared to 51 percent of 
legislators in the Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC) and 42 percent of 
legislators in the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD). In the 2010-2016 COD, by 
contrast, 53 percent of PRD legislators were Afro-descendant compared to 48 percent of 
PLD legislators and 33 percent of PRSC legislators.  
Afro-descendant legislators also appear to be similarly represented across all three 
parties in the 2006-2010 Senate. Thirty-one percent of PLD legislators were Afro-
descendant compared to 33 percent and 25 percent of legislators in the PRD and the 




It is difficult to test the extent to which differences between political parties are 
statistically significant, however. As the tables illustrate, the cell sizes are very small. For 
example, the PRD and the PRSC combined have a single legislator in the 2010-2016 
Senate, and only 9 legislators of 190 members in the COD represented the PRSC. 66 
 In a number of provinces across the country, Afro-descendant legislators are 
elected to the majority of seats. I calculated the percentage of Afro-descendant legislators 
in each of the 31 provinces and 1 national district for the 2006-2010 and the 2010-2016 
congresses.  
The results are plotted in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. The figures show that Afro-
descendant legislators were elected to half or more than half of the seats in 12 provinces 
in the 2006-2010 congress. They also were elected to 40 percent or more of the seats in 
another five provinces. In the 2010-2016 congress, Afro-descendants were elected to half 





                                                 
66 In 2015, a faction of the PRD formed the Partido Revolucionario Moderno (PRM). I did not specify 
which PRD members now identify with the PRM because of ongoing migration from the PRD to the PRM 
(and back to the PRD, in some cases). The PRD and the PRSC will ally with the PLD in the next 
presidential elections and will not run their own candidate. They are likely to continue their electoral 





Figure 3.3: The Percentage of Afro-descendant Legislators per Province in the 2006-2010 
Congress  
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These results should not be overstated. About two-thirds of provinces in the DR 
have five or fewer total legislative seats. In those provinces, 2 or 3 Afro-descendant 
legislators are enough to account for 40 or 50 percent of all the legislators. Moreover, 
electoral pacts between political parties in exchange for retaining legislative seats are 
common in the DR. These pacts can occlude the extent to which voters actually factor 
race and ethnicity into voting for legislators at the level of provinces. 
Nonetheless, the results suggest that Afro-descendant legislators make up an 
important share of legislative representatives in a number of provinces. Moreover, the 
presence of Afro-descendant legislators across the country is even greater if we include 
indio legislators. 
The results also show that Afro-descendant legislators have been elected in 
provinces where individuals tend to be lighter-skinned. This is true in the 2006-2010 and 
in the 2010-2016 legislatures. In the absence of census data on ethnoracial classification 
in the Dominican Republic, I used the following selection process to identify provinces 
where individuals tend to be lighter-skinned. First, I selected provinces in which the 
percentage of self-identified whites was equal to or greater than the percentage of self-
identified whites in the sample of the 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 AmericasBarometer 
(AB) surveys.67 I then narrowed the list to provinces that met that criterion in at least 
three of the four surveys.  
                                                 
67 The percentage of respondents who self-identified as white in the AB surveys was 12.78 in 2006, 13.94 




Table 3.7 lists the legislators from the provinces of Duarte, Espaillat, La Vega, 
Monseñor Nouel, Peravia, and Santiago that I coded as Afro-descendant (i.e. mulatto, 
moreno, and black). With the exception of Peravia, these provinces are located in the 
Cibao region, which historically had higher levels of white migration and a landed elite.68 
The table shows that Afro-descendants were elected either to the Senate or to the COD 
(or both) in the 2006-2010 and 2010-2016 legislative periods across these provinces, 
except in Peravia. These Afro-descendant legislators represented all three political 
parties. 
Most Afro-descendant legislators in these provinces were elected to the COD. For 
example, at least two Afro-descendant legislators in Duarte, La Vega, and Santiago were 
elected to the 2006-2010 as well as to the 2010-2016 COD. And two Afro-descendant 
legislators in Monseñor Nouel were elected to the 2006-2010 COD. Moreover, one Afro-
descendant legislator in Espaillat was elected to the 2006-2010 as well as to the 2010-
2016 COD, and one Afro-descendant legislator in Monseñor Nouel was elected to the 
2010-2016 COD. 
                                                 
68 It should be noted, however, that Afro-descendants have settled in the Cibao region likely for as long as 
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MC (PRD), AB (PRD), 
JCV (PLD), DM 
(PLD), MR (PLD), SR 
(PLD), AA (PRD) 
 







- - - 
Julio César Valentín 
(PLD) 
 



















AG (PLD), DM (PLD), 
FM (PLD), MR (PLD), 
AB (PRD), JJ (PRD), 
MM (PRD), FS (PRD), 
MC (PRSC), CBT 
(PRD) 
 
Table 3.7: Afro-descendant Legislators in the provinces of Duarte, Monseñor Nouel, Peravia, Espaillat, La Vega, and Santiago 
in the 2006-2010 and the 2010-2016 Legislatures 
 
 118 
The number of Afro-descendant legislators in the province of Santiago was much 
higher compared to the other provinces. One obvious reason is that Santiago holds 18 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Seven Afro-descendant legislators in Santiago were 
elected to seats in the 2006-2010 COD and 10 Afro-descendant legislators were elected 
to seats in the 2010-2016 COD. I provide the full name of these legislators in Table 1A in 
Appendix A. 
Nonetheless, Afro-descendant legislators were also elected to the Senate in three 
of these provinces. For example, Felix Nova (PLD) from Monseñor Nouel was elected to 
the 2006-2010 Senate and was re-elected in 2010. Likewise, Porfirio Bautista (PLD) from 
Espaillat was elected to the 2006-2010 Senate, and Julio César Valentín (PLD) from 
Santiago was elected to the 2010-2016 Senate (after being elected to the COD in 2006). 
In addition to electing Afro-descendant legislators, Dominicans have also elected 
Afro-descendant presidents. Ulises Hereaux, a man of Haitian and West Indian descent, 
and Gregorio Luperón were elected in the period known as the Second Republic that 
followed the restoration of independence from Spain in 1865. Although they shared 
African ethnoracial attributes, Luperón and Hereaux received very different levels of 
support. Gregorio Luperón, who presided over a short provisional government in 1879, 
was revered as a national hero for his leadership in the war of 1865 against Spain (Torres-
Saillant 1999). Hereaux, by contrast, was despised for most of his twelve-year neo-
sultanistic regime (1887-1899). He enriched himself with state resources and nearly 
mortgaged away the nation to foreign capital (Hartlyn 1998). 
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More recently, Dominicans have also elected an Afro-descendant president. 
Leonel Fernández (PLD) was elected to three presidential terms: 1996-2000, 2004-2008 
and 2008-2012. And there is evidence that Fernández drew just as much support from 
provinces and municipalities where lighter-skinned individuals tend to be more prevalent 
as he did from other provinces.  
 Table 3.8 presents the percentage of votes that the PLD (and its allies) received in 
the 2004 and 2008 elections across provinces where individuals tend to be lighter-
skinned. I extended the aforementioned criteria of selection of provinces with a high 
proportion of light-skinned individuals to the 2004 AmericasBarometer survey. I also 
selected municipalities that had the largest number of valid votes and that are also known 
to have a high proportion of light-skinned individuals. Table 2A in Appendix A lists the 
percentage of self-identified white respondents in these provinces. 
The data show that in the 2004 elections the PLD and its allies won in nearly 
every province and municipality where light-skinned individuals tend to be more 
prevalent. And it won convincingly in some cases. Over 60 percent of residents in the 
municipalities of Baní and La Vega voted for Fernández, for instance. He received less 
than 50 percent of the vote in the 2004 elections in all but one province, Montecristi, 
which was also the only province that he lost (45.69% to 45.31%) on this list. The PLD 
received fewer votes across provinces when Fernández ran for re-election in 2008 (with 
one exception). But the PLD still received more than 50 percent of the votes in most 
provinces and municipalities and won in all but one province where lighter-skinned 

















55.21 Won 50.36 Won 
Espaillat  56.23 Won 50.13 Won 
 Moca 57.42 Won 49.94 Won 
La Vega  59.31 Won 51.13 Won 
 La Vega 60.17 Won 52.14 Won 
 Jarabacoa 55.19 Won 45.96 Won 
Montecristi  45.31 Lost 47.15 Lost 
Monseñor Nouel  54.24 Won 50.26 Won 
      
 Bonao* - - 50.17 Won 
Peravia⌃   58.75 Won 51.97 Won 
 Baní 60.08 Won 52.93 Won 
Puerto Plata  53.17 Won 52.57 Won 
Salcedo/Hnas. 
Mirabal 
 56.06 Won 54.59 Won 





57.57 Won 50.41 Won 
Santiago 
Rodríguez 
 51.01 Won 48.91 Won 
Source: Junta Central Electoral 
* Township was not considered a municipality in 2004. 
^  Peravia was the single “light-skinned” province that also had a prevalence of self-
identified Afro-descendants across most AB surveys from 2004-2012. 
Table 3.8: The Share of Votes for the PLD and its Allies in the 2004 and 2008 
Presidential Elections by “Lighter” Provinces and Municipalities 
As Table 3.9 shows, the PLD and its allies received just as much support in 
provinces where dark-skinned individuals tend to be more prevalent. I used a similar 
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selection process to identify provinces where individuals tend to be dark-skinned as I did 
to identity provinces where individuals tend to be light-skinned. I selected provinces in 
which the percentage of self-identified blacks was equal to or greater than the percentage 
of self-identified blacks in the sample of the 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 AB 
surveys.69 I then narrowed the list to provinces that met that criterion in at least three of 
the five surveys. I also selected municipalities that had the largest number of valid votes 
and that are also known to have a high proportion of dark-skinned individuals. Table 3A 
in Appendix A lists the percentage of self-identified black respondents in these provinces. 
The results show that Fernández won each province and municipality in the 2004 
elections and received more than 50 percent of the vote in all of them. He was especially 
supported in La Romana, where he received over 70 percent of the vote. The PLD 
received fewer votes in the 2008 elections. This was true across provinces where darker-
skinned individuals are more prevalent. Nonetheless, the PLD won across those 




                                                 
69 The percentage of respondents who self-identified as black in the AB surveys was 9.58 in 2004, 19.94 in 
2006, 17.85 in 2008, 10.18 in 2010, and 15.66 in 2012. 
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Province Municipality 




PLD & Allies 
% Votes, 2008 
Result 
El Seibo  53.40 Won 50.65 Won 
 
Santa Cruz del 
Seibo 
54.28 Won 51.15 Won 




54.75 Won 58.88 Won 
La Romana  70.22 Won 59.86 Won 
 La Romana 72.15 Won 61.44 Won 
Monte Plata  52.75 Won 53.52 Won 
 Monte Plata 54.79 Won 55.46 Won 
 Yamasá 55.32 Won 54.27 Won 




58.09 Won 53.57 Won 
 San Cristobal 62.57 Won 59.77 Won 
Samaná  53.40 Won 49.38 Won 
 Samaná 50.55 Won 47.52 Won 
San Pedro de 
Macorís 
 56.56 Won 56.82 Won 
 
San Pedro de 
Macorís 
62.39 Won 59.92 Won 
Santo Domingo  63.96 Won 58.29 Won 




- - 61.87 Won 








64.29 Won 58.10 Won 
Source: Junta Central Electoral  
* Township was not considered a municipality in 2004. 
Table 3.9: The Share of Votes for the PLD and its Allies in the 2004 and 2008 
Presidential Elections by “Darker” Provinces and Municipalities 
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These data suggest that voters in the Dominican Republic have not typically based 
their electoral preferences on ethnoracial identity. Dominicans from a variety of different 
provinces, including provinces that are mostly composed of light-skinned individuals, 
have elected Afro-descendant legislators. Moreover, provinces with a prevalence of 
lighter-skinned individuals and those with a prevalence of darker-skinned individuals 
similarly supported an Afro-descendant candidate, Leonel Fernández, in the 2004 and 
2008 elections. 
 Individual-level voting data from the 2004 and 2008 elections provide further 
evidence of the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in the Dominican 
Republic. Table 3.10 presents the percentage of self-identified white and black 
respondents that voted for Leonel Fernández and for runner-up candidates in the 2004 
and 2008 elections. The data show that Leonel Fernández received similar levels of 
support from self-identified whites and self-identified blacks in both elections. In fact, a 
slightly higher percentage of self-identified white respondents reported voting for Leonel 
Fernández in the 2004 and 2008 elections. This is was true in the 2006 and 2008 
AmericasBarometer surveys that asked about the 2004 elections. It was also true in the 
2010 and 2012 AB surveys that asked about the 2008 elections. Moreover, the data show 
that Leonel Fernández received more than double the level of support from self-identified 
whites than runner-up candidates in both elections, though Hipólito Mejía and Miguel 




 % Whites  % Blacks 
2004 Elections     
 AB2006 AB2008 AB2006 AB2008 
Leonel Fernández 65.3 71.5 63.6 60.6 
Hipólito Mejía 
(Runner-up) 
26.2 20.8 28.9 30.9 
2008 Elections     
















31.1 36.3 43.7 
Source: AmericasBarometer, 2006-2012 
 
Table 3.10: The Percentage of Self-Identified White and Black Respondents that Voted 
for Leonel Fernández and for Runner-Up Candidates in the 2004 and 2008 
Elections  
 
Politicians have not typically appealed to ethnoracial identity in electoral 
campaigns either. The 2006 senate race in San Francisco de Macorís between Alejandro 
Williams and José Hazim Frappier is an oft-cited example of an election that lacked 
ethnoracial overtones in spite of the stark ethnoracial differences between the candidates. 
In this election, Williams, a black dentist of Cocolo (West Indian) descent, defeated 
Hazim, a wealthy heir to the founders of the Universidad Central del Este in a race that 
was largely devoid of ethnoracial appeals.   
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Campaigns against Peña Gómez during the 1994 and 1996 presidential elections 
are an important exception in Dominican electoral history. With the support of the 
incumbent, Joaquín Balaguer, opposition parties used vile political propaganda and 
negative advertisements to viciously attack Peña Gómez’s character, his negroid features, 
and his purported Haitian origin (Sagás 2000).  
Based on the case of Peña Gómez, scholars such as Howard (2001) concluded that 
“racism plays a fundamental part in Dominican politics” (154). They reasoned, much like 
Howard did, that “in Dominican politics, race and nation cannot be considered as 
isolated, unitary terms” (154). 
It is true that race and nation have been inextricably linked in the Dominican 
Republic. But the effect of ethnoracial identity and national origin on electoral behavior 
should not be presumed to be the same. In the context of the Dominican Republic, 
decoupling race and nation allows us to see that racism and anti-Haitianism are not 
necessarily equally salient in electoral politics. 
Based on data in Howard (2001) and Sagás (2000), I compiled references 
specifically about Peña Gómez in the 1994 and 1996 elections. I coded these references 
dichotomously (0, 1) based on whether the content of these references stressed Peña 
Gómez’s (1) ethnoracial identity only, (2) his ethnoracial identity and his national origin, 










Reference to Race and 
National/Cultural Origin 
Reference Only to 
National/Cultural Origin 
17 July 1992 Hoy Newspaper article 0 1 0 
26 July 1995 
El Siglo Newspaper 
article 
0 0 1 
14 September 
1994 
Listín Diario  
Newspaper article 
0 0 1 
     
1985 





11 June 1996 Rumbo-Gallup Poll 0 1 0 
19 June 1996 Rumbo-Gallup Poll 0 0 1 
5 May 1994 Anonymous Faxes 0 1 0 
     
n/a 
Political Cartoons (8), 
El Nacional Newspaper 
0 1 0 
     
n/a Aerial leaflet drops 0 1 0 




0 0 1 
 Total 0 6 4 
Sources: Sagás 2000; Howard 2001 
Table 3.11: References in the 1994 and 1996 Elections about Peña Gómez’s Candidacy 
Based on Race, Race and National Origin, and National Origin  
 
The results in Table 3.11 suggest that references about Peña Gómez in the 1994 
and 1996 campaigns mostly stressed his national origin and ethnoracial identity or his 
national origin alone. There were zero references to Peña Gómez’s ethnoracial identity 
alone in this small sample of newspaper articles, public opinion polls, political cartoons 
and other media.  
 127 
Results from a 1985 poll about Peña Gómez lend support to these findings. Citing 
a study by Alvarez Vega (1985), Sagás (2000, 107) reports that “24.03 percent of the 
respondents mentioned that the Haitian ancestry of Peña Gómez was his main obstacle as 
presidential candidate, while another 5.85 percent mentioned that Peña Gómez’s black 
skin color—and the fact that the Dominican Republic is a racist country—as his main 
political obstacle.” And we know that ethnoracial identity alone could not have been 
determining in the case of Peña Gómez. He won the popular vote in 1994 and won the 
first round in the 1996 elections. These results suggest that in the case of Peña Gómez, 
national origin was far more salient than ethnoracial identity. 
In addition, provincial data on the 1994 and 1996 elections indicate that Peña 
Gómez in fact won support in light-skinned provinces as well. The data is presented in 
Table 3.12. In the 1994 elections, Peña Gómez won in six of ten provinces where light-
skinned individuals tend to be most prevalent. He did even better across these provinces 
in the first round of the 1996 elections, in which he won all provinces but two (Santiago 
and Salcedo). And he also won the provinces that he lost in the 1994 elections, with the 
exception of Santiago, which he lost across all three contests. The results do show that 
Peña Gómez lost in eight of ten of these predominantly light-skinned provinces in the 
second round of the 1996 elections. But given his earlier success in the first round of the 
1996 elections (and in the 1994 elections), it is likely that his defeats in the second round 
were more likely the result of the “patriotic alliance” between the PRSC and the PLD 







PRD & Allies % Votes, 1996 







Duarte 46.42 Won 44.32  Won 46.63 Lost 
Espaillat 43.97 Won 42.02  Won 45.30 Lost 
La Vega 46.4 Won 43.52  Won 46.28 Lost 
Montecristi 44 Lost 53.23  Won 54.91 Won 
Monseñor Nouel 43.73 Won 46.36  Won 49.20 Lost 
Peravia 28.92 Lost 46.05  Won 49.19 Lost 
Puerto Plata 34.55 Lost 45.67  Won 48.83 Lost 
Salcedo 43.81 Won 36.14  Lost 38.87 Lost 
Santiago 
Rodríguez 
40.13 Won 48.08  Won 50.04 Won 
Santiago 38.10 Lost 40.45  Lost 43.35 Lost 
Source: Political Database of the Americas 
Note: Calculations are mine. 
Table 3.12: The Share of Votes for the PRD and Allies in the 1994 and 1996 Presidential 





In this chapter, I argued that individuals in the Dominican Republic reclassify 
their ethnoracial identification as a way to manage high levels of ethnoracial stratification 
and prejudice. I presented evidence that suggests that there are high levels of stratification 
and prejudice in the Dominican Republic. This combination is an important incentive 
structure. Rather than motivate marginalized individuals to mobilize collectively, 
stratification and prejudice encourage individuals to identify with lighter categories, such 
as indio.  
Despite high levels of ethnoracial stratification and prejudice, however, 
ethnoracial identity has not been salient in elections. Dominicans have elected numerous 
Afro-descendant legislators, including some who have represented provinces where 
lighter-skinned individuals are more prevalent. Dominicans have also elected Afro-
descendant presidents. At least one of those presidents, Leonel Fernández, was able to 
draw support from provinces with very different ethnoracial compositions. Moreover, 
politicians have not typically used racial appeals in campaigns. Even where they have 
used ethnoracial appeals, they have used them in combination with appeals to national 
origin, as in the campaigns against Peña Gómez. 
In the next chapter, I test the salience of ethnoracial identity and national origin in 
elections using a combination of qualitative, quantitative, and experimental methods. The 
survey-experiment, in particular, will enable me to test in a more rigorous manner 
whether Dominicans use ethnoracial considerations at the ballot box. It also allows me to 
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test the claims of competing approaches against my own claims. I support my findings 




Chapter 4: Nation Before Pigmentation 
  
 Although ethnoracial identity and social class do not neatly overlap in the 
Dominican Republic, stratification indeed tends to unfold along ethnoracial lines, as I 
show in Chapter 3. Contrary to the predictions of dominant theoretical approaches on 
ethnoracial identity and electoral politics, however, stratification and somatic-based 
prejudice have not axiomatically led to ethnoracial politics. This is evident, for example, 
in the absence of candidates and political parties in the Dominican Republic that 
articulate ethnoracial grievances.  
Group-based approaches have either downplayed or not considered the crux of 
my central argument that the degree of ethnoracial group identity also shapes ethnoracial 
politics. High levels of stratification combined with low degrees of ethnoracial group 
consolidation will typically lead to outcomes in which ethnoracial identity is not salient 
in elections (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1). The literature on race in Latin America has not 
paid sufficient attention to how ethnoracial mixing and stratification affect electoral 
behavior. 
As I contended in Chapter 2, ethnoracial mixing, structural conditions during the 
colonial period, and inclusive/exclusionary nation-building policies in the Dominican 
Republic thwarted the development of a consolidated group identity. Encouraged by de-
racializing nation-building policies, blacks and mulattoes in the Dominican Republic 
have taken advantage of their mixed ethnoracial heritage to reclassify into lighter 
ethnoracial categories and avoid further marginalization and prejudice. I argue that this 
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form of “exit” has obstructed the emergence of ethnoracial voters and entrepreneurs and 
stymied ethnoracial politics.  
 In this chapter, I present the results of my field survey-experiment and focus 
groups to adjudicate between the predictions of group-based approaches and the literature 
on race in Latin America. First, I discuss the design of my survey-experiment, which was 
fine-tuned in a number of pre-experimental focus group sessions. Second, I test 
competing approaches individually using bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses to 
present results with and without controls. Employing both types of analyses circumvents 
disagreement in the literature on whether it is necessary to add control variables in 
experiments with randomly assigned treatments.  
Third, I examine what evidence exists to support my own argument that 
ethnoracial voting behavior has failed to emerge in spite of ethnoracial stratification and 
prejudice in the DR. The results suggest that participants did not consistently support 
candidates that shared their ethnoracial attributes, but they did slightly favor “white” 
candidates.  
National identity, however, does strongly shape electoral preferences, according 
to my analyses. Participants in the experiment discriminated against candidates of Haitian 
origin. And survey respondents as well as focus group participants openly admitted their 
reluctance to vote for Dominican candidates of Haitian origin. Nevertheless, the anti-
Haitian attitudes were not clearly tied to race since the same respondents were willing to 
support dark-skinned Dominican candidates who were not of Haitian origin. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
 
To test my claims and those of competing approaches, I carried out an in-person, 
randomized survey-experiment in the province of Santo Domingo. Studies on Mexico by 
Aguilar-Pariente (2011) and on Brazil by Mitchell (2009), Dunning (2010), and Aguilar-
Pariente et al. (2015) have employed similar survey-experimental designs to examine the 
impact of skin color and ethnoracial identity on candidate evaluation. This is the first 
study, however, to employ such a research design in the case of the Dominican Republic. 
Moreover, this study improves on those studies because it includes participants from all 
ethnoracial groups and from rural and urban populations.  
I generated a probability sample using a stratified, multi-stage technique. Over 70 
neighborhoods were drawn at random across seven municipalities in the province of 
Santo Domingo, but still reflected the economic strata of the 2010 national census when 
measured by the type of home flooring.70 In the absence of recent ethnoracial self-
identification census data, economic stratum is a good proxy for ethnoracial identity in 
the DR. As I have shown, the two are strongly correlated. The selection of municipalities 
was followed by a randomized selection of streets, households, and adult individuals. A 
total of 694 voting-age Dominican citizens participated in the study, which represented 
an 82 percent overall response rate.71 Figure 4A in the Appendix shows that my sample 
                                                 
70 The 2010 Dominican Republic census did not ask questions about personal or household income, but it 
did ask questions about different measures of wealth, such as home flooring. 
71 The overall response rate reflects the percentage of participants who completed the study. In most cases, 
however, there were several failed attempts before interviewing the participants. 
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overrepresented young adults, women, college-educated, and rural populations of Santo 
Domingo relative to the 2010 census data.72 
Through a process of sequential randomization, participants were exposed to a 
single campaign sheet from a total of twelve fictional campaign sheets or conditions. 
Each campaign sheet in the treatment group consisted of four items. First, they included 
the complete name of the candidate. Second, they included one of three different 
photographs of Brazilian legislators to represent “white,” “mixed,” and “black” 
ethnoracial candidates. The photograph used to represent the black candidate was also 
used to represent the candidate of Haitian origin. The distinction was denoted using a 
French-Creole as opposed to a Spanish surname.  
Third, campaign sheets included a short biography in bullet point form, including 
age, occupation, class, marital status, and education. I only varied the level of education 
in these biographies (i.e. the sheets either stated that the candidate had completed 
university-level studies or made no reference to education). Lastly, the sheets included a 
generic statement about the candidate’s policy position on uncontroversial domestic 
issues, such as crime, education, electrical shortages, corruption, and employment. Policy 
positions remained constant across all fictional candidates. I excluded the party 
membership of candidates from this wave of the experiment to prevent potential 
associations or previous information from interfering with the evaluation of the campaign 
                                                 
72 For the candidate evaluation questions, I included a probability weight to correct the oversampling of 
women and to balance experimental conditions. The probability weight did not significantly change the 
results.  
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sheets (see Pariente-Aguilar 2008). Sample campaign sheets of candidates with high 
levels of education are included below in Figure 4.1. 
 
(From left to right, row 1: “black” candidate and “mixed” candidate; row 2: Dominico-Haitian 
candidate and “white” candidate; row 3: Dominico-Haitian candidate and Spanish-surname 
control candidate) 
Figure 4.1: Sample Campaign Sheets of Candidates Assigned a High Level of Education 
 136 
The materials used were comparable in design and content to those used by 
Dominican politicians. Because the experimental campaign sheets would be viewed in 
one-shot sessions, the material included greater detail about candidate background and 
policy positions than is the norm. Actual campaigns are more likely to present the same 
information piecemeal across different media, including television, print, and radio.  
The control group, which accounted for four of the twelve campaign sheets, 
excluded photographs of candidates. In two of the campaign sheets in the control group, 
however, it was explicitly stated that the candidate was of Haitian origin. Details on the 
treatment and control groups are provided in Table 4.1. 
Respondents answered several candidate evaluation questions, as well as a 
question about how likely they were to vote for a candidate. Candidate evaluation 
questions asked about the likelihood that candidates would improve the respondents’ 
economic well-being and about the probability that the candidates would control 
undocumented Haitian migration. These two candidate evaluation questions and the 
voting question were coded as discrete variables. They were measured on an ordinal scale 
ranging from 1 to 4 in which 1 is very unlikely, 2 is somewhat unlikely, 3 is likely, and 4 
is very likely. Questions also asked about the capacity, trustworthiness, and physical 
attractiveness of candidates. These questions were also coded on a scale of 1-4 in which 1 





 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Treatment             
Photo and Implicit Reference to 
Haitian origin 
            
Photo of Black candidate             
Photo of Mixed candidate             
Photo of White candidate             
High Education             
No Education Reference             
Control              
No Photograph of Candidate             
Explicit Reference to Haitian 
origin 
            
Number of Assigned 
Respondents  
58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 57 57 
Table 4.1. Treatment and Control Group Conditions Across Campaign Sheets
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A 63-item survey section followed the experimental section. It asked a battery of 
questions about political knowledge, political and racial attitudes, and socio-
demographics. The survey section sought to measure the respondent’s level of social 
desirability (or the likelihood that respondents would adjust their answers to conform to 
social norms) using questions derived from Terkildsen’s (1993) study. As I show in the 
next section, personality scales had very little interaction with the survey questions. 
This study employed three different measures of respondents’ ethnoracial 
identity: an ascribed ethnoracial measure, an ethnoracial self-identification measure, and 
a self-identified skin color measure. The ascribed measure asked interviewers to assign 
respondents to one of six ethnosomatic categories: (1) white; (2) jabao; (3) indio; (4) 
mulatto; (5) moreno or (6) black. The ethnoracial self-identification question asked 
respondents to assign themselves to one of those categories. These categories resembled 
those used in Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer’s (2001) pigmentocracy study in the Dominican 
Republic. Figure 4.2 presents the ethnoracial composition of my sample by ascribed and 
self-identification measures. 
Ethnosomatic categories in the Dominican Republic overlap (Telles and Flores 
2013). In fact, categories such as mulatto and indio cover nearly the entire somatic 
spectrum because they are not necessarily based on visible or objective markers. There is, 
however, a loose positioning of categories. For instance, jabao is typically viewed as 
being closer to white, though it includes some African somatic attributes, whereas 
moreno is closer to black, though it includes some non-African somatic characteristics. 
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Mulatto, like indio, is a mixed category but it is typically conceived as somatically darker 
than indio. The intervals between each category are not equally spaced (Sagás 2000). 
 
Figure 4.2: The Ethnoracial Composition of the Sample By Different Measures of 
Ethnoracial Identity 
 
I also included a number of traditional control variables in the analyses, including 
party identification, age, gender, income, and education. Political sophistication and 
social desirability were measured as indexes based on pooled questions.   
I estimated most of the models presented here using ordered probit, though I also 
used logistic regressions in some cases. The assumptions of the ordered probit model 
provide the most accurate method to test ordinal dependent variables, such as the 
aforementioned candidate evaluation questions (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975). 
Focus Groups 
 
I conducted and filmed four two-hour long focus group sessions in Santo 

































experimental survey questions. These sessions took place at the premises of Emevenca 
República Dominicana, a market-research firm. Focus groups were comprised of 8 
individuals each and varied in age, gender, and social class. The sample was 
disproportionately well-educated, male, and young relative to the national population. 
Most participants in the focus group sessions, like most citizens of the DR, self-identified 
ethnoracially as indio and reported their skin-color as “neither white nor dark.” 
Approximately 46 percent of focus groups participants self-identified as indio, 16 percent 
as mulatto, 13 percent as moreno, 3 percent as black, and 6 percent as jabao and as white. 
As evident in Figure 4.2, this distribution closely resembled the ethnoracial composition 
of participants in my survey-experiment. It also resembled the ethnoracial composition of 
the 2014 AmericasBarometer national survey. In the 2014 AB survey, 58 percent of 
participants self-identified as indio, 15.8 percent as black, 13.5 percent as white, and 12.4 
percent as white. The percentage of focus group participants who self-identified as black 
was much lower than the percentage of individuals who self-identified as black in my 
sample and in the 2014 AB sample.  
Participants were sorted into the following groups: (1) college-age men and 
women from all socioeconomic strata; (2) men and women of all ages from lower 
socioeconomic strata; (3) men of all ages from all socio-economic strata; and (4) women 
of all ages from all socioeconomic strata. I held separate sessions for men and women, 
young adults, and individuals from lower socioeconomic strata to minimize any prejudice 
or deference-related bias that could emerge as a result of differences in age, gender, and 
socioeconomic status. In addition, these groupings allowed me to control for age and 
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socioeconomic status, which have been shown to be important sociopolitical cleavages in 
the Dominican Republic (see Chapter 2).  
In each session, participants were first asked to individually complete the survey 
and experimental sections and to share their responses as a group. They were then probed 
on the design of the survey-experiment, the data presented in the campaign sheets, and 
the perceived ethnoracial identity and social status of the fictional candidates. Finally, 
participants were asked to reflect on questions related to ethnoracial identity and electoral 
politics in the Dominican Republic.  
Focus group sessions improved the uniformity and credibility of the experimental 
conditions (i.e. campaign sheets). Participants helped to ensure that the photographs 
selected to represent fictional candidates aligned with Dominican ethnoracial parameters 
and were comparable across all other dimensions, including friendliness, attractiveness, 
and experience. For example, participants remarked that the initial fictional subjects used 
to represent black candidates were too old and unattractive (though the subject ultimately 
selected to represent the black candidate was also evaluated as unattractive by 
respondents in the survey-experiment). 
Participants also helped to test that the data provided on the candidates’ 
socioeconomic status, educational credentials, experience, and policy proposals were 
credible and compelling. Several important changes were made to the campaign sheets as 
a result. For instance, I added data on the candidates’ college degree, major, and class 
rank. I also replaced candidates’ policy proposals with more timely and broadly-
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appealing agendas, such as subsidizing child care for single mothers, enforcing anti-
corruption laws, and bolstering the agricultural sector.  
 Insights from focus groups also led to changes that improved the function and 
clarity of the post-experimental survey questions, particularly those related to race and 
ethnicity. For instance, I modified the wording and order of questions that asked whether 
light-skinned Dominicans were more intelligent, harder working, and patriotic than dark-
skinned Dominicans. This reduced the risk of priming and social desirability bias 
affecting the results. Similarly, I shortened the number (and reversed the order) of 
questions that asked participants to evaluate various ethnoracial categories. This change 
helped to discourage the kind of chain-sequence responses that many participants 
provided in the focus group.  
EVALUATING COMPETING APPROACHES 
 
I tested the predictions of competing approaches against my own using data 
gathered from my survey-experiment and focus groups. As I noted in Chapter 1, group-
specific approaches would predict that voters in the Dominican Republic would support 
candidates of their own ethnoracial category, and the colorism thesis would predict that 
voters would support lighter candidates over darker candidates. By contrast, my argument 
predicts that voters are unlikely to express any ethnoracial preferences. 
I found mixed support for the predictions of group-specific approaches. Table 4.2 
presents a comparison of means for in-category and out-category evaluations across 
participants’ ethnoracial self-identification. As group-specific approaches would predict, 
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participants did consistently express greater affect toward in-category members than 
toward out-category members. The difference of means was only statistically significant 
for half of the ethnoracial categories, however. These categories were self-identified 
whites, indios, and morenos.  
 
Self-identified Ethnoracial 
Category of Respondent 
Ethnoracial Category of 
Groupings Evaluated 
Average evaluation score 
   
White 
White 
Whites     3.92**  
Non-Whites 3.59 
N=40   





N=66   




Indios     3.94**  
Non-Indios 3.75 










Morenos       3.90*** 
Non-Morenos 3.68 
   






Table 4.2: Comparison of Means for the Evaluation of Ethnoracial Categories by 
Respondents’ Self-Identified Ethnoracial Identification 
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Whereas the results for whites are consistent with the valorization of whiteness in 
the Dominican Republic, the results for morenos and for indios are unexpected. Unlike 
mulattos, morenos and indios do not affirm their Afro-descent more than other 
ethnoracial categories. Moreover, they have not developed particularly strong feelings of 
linked fate or a sense of group consciousness, which are characteristics typically 
associated with greater levels of affect for in-category members.  
As with participants’ evaluation of in-category members, there was some support 
for group-specific approaches with respect to participants’ evaluation of in-category 
candidates. Table 4.3 presents participants’ mean scores for their evaluation of in-
category and out-category candidates across six evaluation questions. As the results 
show, self-identified white and jabao participants consistently gave higher evaluation 
scores to in-category candidates than to out-category candidates. But the results also 
show that support for group-specific approaches was modest. Only in the case of whites 
was the difference of means statistically significant across evaluation questions. Self-
identified moreno and jabao participants did give in-category candidates statistically 
significantly higher scores, but only for one question each. Interestingly, they gave in-
category members higher scores for the same question (candidates’ attractiveness).  
As with the previous results, we should not overstate these findings given the 
small size of some cells. For example, only 4 self-identified white participants evaluated 
white candidates, and only 6 self-identified black participants evaluated black candidates. 
Nonetheless, these results taken together provide either mixed or little support for the 































        
White 
 
White     3.25** 3.50        3.25*      3.25**     3.50** 3.75** 
n=4       
Non-White 2.22 3.14  2.04  2.36 1.95    2.45 
n=22       
        
Jabao 
 
White 2.75 3.18 2.56 2.62 2.50     3.12 
n=16       
Non-White 2.72 3.13 2.31 2.24 2.06     2.13*** 
 n= 29       
        
 
Indio 
Mixed 2.60 3.00 2.39 2.55 2.12     2.61 
n=57       
Non-Mixed 2.85 3.17 2.48 2.53 2.25     2.65 
 n=164       
        
Mulatto 
 
Mixed 2.50 3.33 2.50 2.42 1.75     2.33 
n=12       
Non-Mixed 2.62 3.12 2.34 2.19 1.90     2.25 
 n=32       
        
Moreno 
 
Black 2.77 3.07 2.85 2.75 2.64     2.17 
n=28       
Non-Black 2.78 3.23 2.50 2.54 2.37     2.64* 
 n=64       
        
 
Black 
Black 2.00 3.33 2.67 2.83 2.67     3.17 
n=6       
Non-Black 
n=29 
2.58 3.03 2.48 2.48 2.00     2.51 
***P<0.01**P<0.05; *P<0.10 
Table 4.3: Comparison of Means for Respondents’ Ethnoracial Identification by 
Ethnoracial Category of Candidate Across Evaluation Items 
Results from multivariate analyses bolster the findings of the simple comparison 
of means analyses. Ordered probit regressions in Table 4.4 interact the ethnoracial 
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category ascribed to candidates with the participants’ ethnoracial self-identification. The 
relationship between interaction terms (ethnoracial identification of candidates and 
participants) was statistically significant and positive for only a few candidate evaluation 
questions. For example, the interaction term between the white candidate and self-
identified white participants had a positive and statistically significant effect on two 
questions: the trustworthiness of the candidate and the willingness of the candidate to 
control undocumented Haitian migration. Likewise, the interaction term between the 
black candidate and self-identified black participants had a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the candidate’s attractiveness. 
Overall, however, there is little support for the predictions of group specific 
approaches. The interaction terms between the ethnoracial identification of candidates 
and respondents did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance for most 
candidate evaluation questions and willingness to vote. These results held whether I used 
interaction terms with ascribed or self-identified measures of ethnoracial identification. 
One exception was the interaction term between the indio candidate and participants 
ascribed an indio identification. That interaction had a statistically significant effect on 
the willingness to vote for that candidate. The interaction term was negative, however, 
which suggests that participants ascribed an indio identification were less likely to vote 





















































































































































































































Observations 691 692 690 689 692 462 
**P<0.05; *P<0.10 
Table 4.4: Interactions between the Ethnoracial Identification of Candidates and 
Participants Across Candidate Evaluation Items Ordered-Probit Analysis 
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The colorism thesis might appear more likely than group-specific approaches to 
shed light on ethnoracial identity and candidate evaluation in the Dominican Republic. It 
avoids some assumptions of “groupism,” and contends that ethnoracial prejudice and 
stratification—not shared ethnoracial identification—are the most salient social forces 
within and across ethnoracial categories. 
The colorism literature has not made specific predictions about the effect of 
ethnoracial identity on electoral behavior in Latin America. It is reasonable to assume, 
however, that it would expect the valorization of whiteness over blackness to prevail in 
the electoral arena as much as it does in the social sphere. Specifically, it would expect 
white candidates to be consistently favored overall, and for black candidates to be 
consistently disfavored overall.  
Results from bivariate analyses provide mixed support for the predictions of the 
colorism thesis. Figure 4.3 presents the average evaluation scores for different ethnoracial 
categories and category pairings. Whites (3.84) did receive significantly higher scores 
than some Afro-descendant categories, such as blacks (3.79) and mulattos (3.72). But the 
results show no clear indication of a pigmentocratic ordering. For example, whites also 
received significantly lower scores than indios (3.90), and they received the same average 





      
     Lightest                                                                                                      Darkest 
 
 
    Whites.……………Jabaos  
     (3.84)***                     (3.60) 
    Whites.…………………………... Indios  
     (3.84)                                              (3.90)** 
    Whites.………………….………………...........Mulattos 
     (3.84)***                                                              (3.72) 
    Whites ……………………………………………………… Morenos  
    (3.84)                                                                                        (3.84) 
    Whites ………………………………………………………………… Blacks  
    (3.84)*                                                                                                      (3.79) 
                                   Jabaos ……… Indios  
                                   (3.60)               (3.90)*** 
                                   Jabaos..…………………….Mulattos  
                                   (3.60)                                      (3.72)*** 
                                   Jabaos…………………………………... Morenos 
                                   (3.60)                                                         (3.84)*** 
                                   Jabaos………………………………………..……. Blacks                                
                                   (3.60)                                                                      (3.79)*** 
 
                         Indios……Mulattos 
                    (3.90)***   (3.72) 
                                                             Indios…………………. Morenos 
                                         (3.90)**                           (3.84) 
                                                             Indios……………………………... Blacks 
                                                           (3.90)***                                           (3.79) 
 
                                                                 Mulattos… Morenos 
                                                                   (3.72)           (3.84)*** 
                                                                                 Mulattos………………Blacks 
                                                                                (3.72)                            (3.79)* 
                                                                             
                                                                                                     Morenos…Blacks 
                                                                                                   (3.84)*       (3.79) 
***P<0.01**P<0.05; *P<0.10 
Figure 4.3: Comparison of Means for the Evaluation of Ethnoracial Category Pairings 
Across the Ethnoracial Spectrum 
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Also contrary to the predictions of the colorism thesis, blacks did not receive the 
least favorable evaluations overall. In fact, they received significantly higher scores than 
jabaos (3.60), who tend to be only somatically darker than whites. Blacks also received 
significantly higher evaluation scores than mulattos, who are typically lighter than blacks. 
As Figure 4.3 makes clear, participants did not necessarily give significantly higher 
evaluation scores to lighter ethnoracial categories than to darker ethnoracial categories. 
This was true as true for pairings in which the distance between categories on the 
spectrum is small as it was for pairings in which the distance between categories is large.  
There is greater support for the colorism theory with respect to candidate 
evaluation. As Table 4.5 shows, participants gave higher evaluation scores to white 
candidates in four of six evaluation items. They were also significantly more willing to 
vote for white candidates relative to mixed and black candidates. The evaluations of 
candidates’ attractiveness were also consistent with the predictions of the colorism thesis. 
Participants rated white candidates as significantly more attractive than mixed candidates, 
and they rated mixed candidates as significantly more attractive than black candidates.  
That participants evaluated white candidates more favorably is in some ways 
consistent with my argument. I have provided evidence that Dominicans tend to lighten 
their ethnoracial identification as way to deal with discrimination and stratification. The 
same logic of “exit” over voice that leads individuals to reclassify their identification 
with lighter ethnoracial categories also leads them to favor white candidates.  
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Although the results support some predictions of the colorism thesis, it does not 
support other predictions. Black candidates did not receive significantly lower scores than 
mixed candidates—except on attractiveness, and they were evaluated more on par with 
white candidates than mixed candidates were. Black candidates received significantly 
lower scores than white candidates in only two of six evaluation questions, attractiveness 
and willingness to vote, and the difference of means for willingness to vote was at the 
weakest level of statistical significance (p<.10). By contrast, mixed candidates received 





















       
White Candidate     2.92** 3.24 2.62* 2.58   2.41* 
    
3.13*** 
Mixed Candidate 2.61 3.15 2.37 2.51 2.13     2.62 
       
Mixed Candidate 2.61 3.15 2.37 2.51 2.13     2.62** 
Black Candidate 2.65 3.18 2.45 2.59 2.36 2.31 
       
Black Candidate 2.65 3.18 2.45 2.59 2.36     2.31 
White Candidate   2.92* 3.24 2.62 2.58 2.41 
    
3.13*** 
***P<0.01**P<0.05; *P<0.10 
Table 4.5: Comparison of Means for White, Mixed, and Black Candidate Pairings Across 
Evaluation Items and Willingness to Vote 
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The predictions of the colorism thesis received mixed support in the multivariate 
analysis as well. Table 4.6 presents an ordered probit analysis of the effect of candidates’ 
ethnoracial characteristics on candidate evaluation. Participants were significantly more 
willing to vote for the white candidate versus the mixed category, but they were not 
significantly less willing to vote for the black candidate (versus the mixed reference 
category). Moreover, the sign on the coefficient on the willingness to vote for the black 
candidate was positive, which is the opposite of what the colorism thesis would expect.  
Findings from the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey support the idea that 
Dominicans do not systematically discriminate against dark-skinned candidates. A 
combined 84 percent of respondents in this survey agreed or strongly agreed when asked 
whether dark-skinned individuals make good leaders. Moreover, as Chapter 3 showed, 
Dominicans consistently elect Afro-descendants to the legislature and have elected an 
Afro-descendant to the presidency in contemporary elections. 
With respect to the other evaluation questions, the results from Table 4.6 also 
show mixed support for the colorism thesis. Participants did give significantly more 
favorable evaluations to the white candidate than the mixed reference category in five of 
six evaluation items. But they also gave black candidates favorable evaluations relative to 
the mixed-reference category. This was especially the case on the likelihood that the 
black candidate would control undocumented Haitian migration, which was statistically 
significant. In addition, the coefficient for the black candidate is negative in only one of 


























































































































































Observations 689 690 688 687 690 462 
***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p<0.10 
Table 4.6: The Effect of Candidate Ethnoracial Characteristics on Candidate Evaluation 
Ordered Probit Analysis (Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 
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 As with the bivariate results, participants rated white candidates as significantly 
more attractive than the mixed candidate reference category. They also rated black 
candidates as less attractive than the mixed candidate reference category, though not at 
statistically significant levels. These differing assessments of physical attractiveness did 
not translate into markedly lower scores for black candidates across evaluation items, 
however. Indeed, in the survey carried out alongside my experiment, 88 percent of the 
sample expressed their willingness to vote for a black candidate for president. 
 These results should not be taken as confirmation of the racial democracy thesis, 
however. The Dominican Republic hardly resembles a racial democracy. As I showed in 
Chapter 3, ethnoracial stratification and prejudice are pronounced in the Dominican 
Republic and a large swath of Dominicans acknowledge as much. Data from my focus 
groups in Santo Domingo further undermine the racial democracy thesis. Similar to 
previous studies on racial attitudes and identity in the Dominican Republic (Sidanius, 
Peña, Sawyer 2001; Simmons 2009), I found considerable evidence of a somatic 
hierarchy that privileges white over black phenotypes. Despite some differences, 
participants routinely attributed positive traits such as education, wealth, and 
attractiveness to whites—even if they expressed disdain toward the privileges afforded to 
whites. This somatic hierarchy does not appear to markedly shape electoral preferences, 
however. Remarks from the low-income focus group helps make sense of this finding. 
 I: What about this white candidate? Would you vote for him? 
P1: Actually, I don’t quite see him as presidential. I see him more as a 
Presidential Adviser. 
P2: That guy has never seen a blackout in his life. I wouldn’t (vote for him). 
I: What about his image? Does it inspire greater confidence or trust? 
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P1: His image is easier to swallow than the “morenito.” 
 
The effects of this somatic hierarchy on ethnoracial attitudes are also less than 
straightforward. Egalitarian views on race and anti-black prejudice coexist uneasily 
within the same individuals, leading to seemingly contradictory racial attitudes. 
Participants in the focus groups who at times denounced anti-black prejudice also 
succumbed to it. One participant, for instance, both valorized and devalued black 
phenotypes. 
P1: People wear their phenotypes very differently. Some look great with curly 
hair, others look hideous. There are women who have a wide nose, but they’ll 
carry it well because their face or hair is nicely made-up and it creates a nice 
balance. (Focus Group, Young Adults) 
 
A tense exchange between participants who were evaluating candidates similarly 
evinced how the same individual in the Dominican Republic can deplore and nourish 
anti-black prejudice. 
I: Knowing that these candidates have a similar biography and policy 
proposals, what is your impression of the black, mixed, and white candidates, 
now? 
P1:  Twenty years ago, most people would have supported the white candidate 
because he’s white. In this day and age, it’s not so much race but what they’ve 
accomplished that matter. 
P2: The white candidate looks more presidential than the mixed and black 
candidates. 
P3: I agree. The white candidate looks most presidential. The mixed candidate 
looks better fit for a municipal post. 
P1: But the only reason you’re saying that is because he’s white and looks 
better. The racism just poured out of you! If you evaluated him against Obama 
you would probably still say that the white candidate is more competent.  
P3: No, no, no! Anyone would agree that the white candidate is a better 
candidate and looks more presidential. It’s a personal choice.  
I: What about the black candidate? 
P1: The black candidate would never win.  
P4: You just accused us of being racist a moment ago! 
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P1: It’s not racism! It’s just that not a single member of the wealthiest five 
families in the Dominican Republic since Columbus arrived is black. They are 
people who came from Spain; they are Turkish. None of them are prieto 
(black).  (Focus Group, Males) 
 
It is also unclear the extent to which subdominant actors help reproduce the 
somatic ethnoracial hierarchy. Participants in male and female focus groups, in particular, 
revealed that Afro-descendants perpetuate anti-black prejudice. I suggested in Chapter 2 
that Afro-descendants might privilege mestizaje or indigenismo over blackness because 
they seek to secure a place in their nation’s imagined community (Anderson 1983). Afro-
descendants have carried on historical efforts by Dominican elites to deracialize 
Dominican national identity and redeem the racial mixing from the fate prescribed by 
race science. Participants in the male group were quite forthcoming about intra-racial 
prejudice.  
P1: Let me ask you a question, who do you think it is that discriminates most 
against blacks in this country—whites or other blacks? 
P2: The (man in the) mirror! 
P3: We do ourselves! 
P1: Most Dominicans are Afro-descendant, so any racism in this country must 
be in part the fault of black people. 
I: Would you say that black people discriminate against each other more so 
than whites discriminate against blacks? 
P4: Yes! Black Dominicans discriminate most against other black 
Dominicans. We have been taught in schools since we were kids that most 
presidents in our country have been white. We have been taught that most 
CEOs are white. We have been taught that most bosses are white. This has 
inculcated in people that whites are more competent than blacks. 
 
 Participants in the focus groups did not necessarily say that anti-black social 
prejudice translated into an electoral handicap for black and mixed candidates. But they 
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did not support the claims of the racial democracy thesis, either. In fact, as the exchange 
below suggests, the opposite was true in some cases. 
I: Which candidate would you say was most memorable and convincing? 
P1. The white candidate (“el blanquito”), of course. He’s been the most 
convincing. Although I am not racist, color influences a lot in this country. 
Most Dominicans in this country are racist; it’s the truth. 
P2. Appearance matters a lot for Dominicans. (Focus Group, Low Income) 
 
Although alternative approaches on race and ethnicity may be useful for studying 
other issue areas, my findings suggest they are less helpful for understanding why 
ethnoracial identity is not salient in candidate evaluation in the Dominican Republic. 
Contrary to the predictions of alternative approaches, results from my focus groups and 
survey experiment make clear that most respondents did not favor in-category candidates. 
Moreover, they did not evaluate candidates strictly based on a somatic hierarchy—though 
there is evidence that individuals tend to valorize white over black phenotypes.  
My approach makes better sense of these findings than alternative approaches. In 
the Dominican Republic, ethnoracial stratification and prejudice have incentivized 
individuals to switch ethnoracial categories rather than mobilize collectively along lines 
of ethnoracial identity. Inchoate ethnoracial group identity helps explain why Afro-
descendants have preferred an “exit” strategy to “voicing” their grievances at the ballot 
box.  
NATION BEFORE PIGMENTATION 
 
I posit that historically fractious relations with neighboring Haiti and the 
persistence of racialized anti-Haitianism have helped to ensure that a black group identity 
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in the Dominican Republic remains inchoate and apolitical. In addition, I argue that anti-
Haitianism has redirected ethnoracial cleavages and made national origin a salient 
consideration for candidate evaluation.  
Results from my survey-experiment support these claims. Table 4.7 presents a 
comparison of means for treatment and control groups across candidate evaluation items 
(tests of significance are in italics). Bivariate results indicate that respondents gave 
candidates assigned the Haitian treatments lower scores across nearly all evaluation 
items. Many of these differences were statistically significant. 
My experiment on the impact of anti-Haitianism included two separate 
treatments. In the first treatment, dubbed the explicit treatment, participants were 
provided with a campaign sheet that included no photograph, but they were told that the 
candidate was a Dominican of Haitian origin. The control group for this treatment was 
given the same campaign sheet but was not told that the candidate was of Haitian origin. 
In the second treatment, dubbed the implicit treatment, participants were given a 
candidate sheet in which the candidate was assigned a French-creole surname and thus 
implicitly identified as being of Haitian origin. The control group for this treatment was 
































2.78 3.22 2.50 2.57 2.18 n/a 
 z  -3.50*** 
-
2.94*** 






2.67 3.00 2.38 2.34 1.97 2.20 
Control  
n=116 
2.65 3.18 2.45 2.59 2.36 2.31 
z 0.06 -1.33 -0.63 -1.77* -2.88*** -0.72 
***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.10 
Table 4.7: Comparison of Means for Treatment and Control Groups Across Candidate 
Evaluation Items and Willingness to Vote 
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Not surprisingly, the explicit treatment had stronger effects than the implicit 
treatment. Participants gave the candidate who was explicitly identified as Haitian much 
lower scores than the control group. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test shows that 
differences in means were highly statistically significant across all candidate evaluation 
items with the explicit treatment. Likewise, participants gave the candidate assigned a 
French-creole surname lower scores than the control group in five of six items, but these 
differences in means were statistically significant in only two of six items.  
Table 4.8 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis of the individual-
level correlates of willingness to vote for a Dominican candidate of Haitian descent. 
Results from my survey suggest that the ethnoracial identity of participants appeared to 
play little role in determining the willingness to vote for candidates of Haitian origin. 
This was true irrespective of the measure of ethnoracial identification employed. The fact 
that self-identified white and light-skinned participants were not significantly less likely 
(and self-identified black and dark-skinned participants were not significantly more 
likely) to vote for candidates of Haitian origin suggests that racism is not entirely at the 
root of this anti-Haitianism. 
The only consistently significant determinants of the willingness to vote for 
candidates of Haitian origin were age, income, and political sophistication. Younger, 
wealthier, and more politically sophisticated participants were more willing to vote for 
candidates of Haitian origin. PRD supporters were also significantly more willing to vote 
for a candidate of Haitian origin in one of the analyses. 
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Observations 678 682 677 
**p <0.05  
Table 4.8: Logistic Correlates of the Willingness to Vote for a Dominican Candidate of 
Haitian Descent 
 162 
Table 4.9 presents a comprehensive multivariate analysis of the correlates of the 
various candidate evaluation items. The analyses lend support to my claims that national 
origin is a more salient consideration than ethnoracial identity in candidate evaluation. 
Respondents were far more likely to oppose Dominico-Haitian candidates than they were 
to oppose black candidates. Candidates of Haitian origin fared worse than other 
candidates on virtually all of the candidate evaluation questions and these differences 
were statistically significant for the most part, especially for the explicit treatment group. 
By contrast, participants were not significantly more or less likely to support 
white or black candidates, with one exception. The coefficient of the variable for white 
candidates was statistically significant for willingness to vote for that candidate. Nor did 
participants give white or black candidates higher scores on the other candidate 
evaluation questions for the most part. The only exceptions were for white candidates, 
who were rated as physically more attractive and more likely to control undocumented 
Haitian immigration. 
These results hold whether or not I control for social desirability bias and socio-
demographic variables, with two exceptions. After excluding socio-demographic 
variables, for instance, the likelihood that an implicitly identified Haitian candidate 
would improve the economic well-being of a respondent and control undocumented 




























































































































































Observations 682 682 682 682 682 682 
**p <0.05; p<0.10 
Table 4.9: The Effect of Explicit and Implicit Haitian Treatments on Candidate 
Evaluation Ordered Probit Analysis (Standard errors in Parenthesis) 
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Figure 4.4 presents predicted probabilities of voting for a candidate who was 
explicitly identified as being of Haitian origin (versus a candidate without any 
identifiable ethnicity) based on the ordered probit analysis in Table 4.9. As the figure 
shows, only 18 percent of participants were “very likely” to vote for Dominico-Haitian 
candidates compared to 32 percent for the control group. By contrast, 33 percent of 
participants were “very unlikely” to vote for Dominico-Haitian candidates compared to 
18 percent for the control group. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Predicted Probabilities of Willingness to Vote for Candidates  
 
The implicit treatment yielded somewhat similar results, although they were not 
as strong. Of particular note is the fact that participants rated the candidate with the 









Control Group Dominico-Haitian Candidates (Explicit Treatment)
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French/creole surname as significantly less physically attractive than the candidate with 
the same photo but a Spanish surname. Participants, moreover, were quite willing to 
admit their bias against candidates of Haitian origin. Indeed, in the survey that 
accompanied the experiment 74 percent of the sample stated that they were unwilling to 
vote for a candidate of Haitian origin for president. I present a logistic analysis of this 
survey question in Table 4.8. 
To some degree, reluctance to support a candidate of Haitian origin can be 
attributed to broad antipathy toward Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian origin that is 
expressed in anti-Haitian public opinion on residential and marital preferences. Based on 
fifteen focus group sessions in the cities of Santo Domingo and Santiago, Sagás (2000, 
79) found that most Dominicans, “even those who lived and worked closely with 
Haitians, expressed public feelings of dislike and distrust toward Haitians.”  
 But my own focus group research suggests that there is something specific about 
a candidate of Haitian origin that generates resistance far beyond that of a candidate with 
origins in another country. As one focus group participant remarked, the Dominican 
Republic recently has elected vice-presidents and presidents with origins in other 
countries or regions, including France, Catalonia, Puerto Rico, and Lebanon (which the 
participant conflated with Turkey).  
I: Do you believe that Dominicans would ever vote for a candidate of a 
foreign origin? 
P1: Yeah! Take the example of Jacobo Majluta, who was Turkish. Although 
he had a different nationality, he reached the presidency after (the death of 
President Antonio) Guzmán. (Focus Group, Males) 
 
 166 
Interestingly, the Dominican Republic has also elected presidents of Haitian 
ancestry in the contemporary electoral period. But Rafael Leonidas Trujillo and Joaquín 
Balaguer both arduously obscured their Haitian ancestry. And as I proposed in Chapter 1, 
ancestry may be less socio-politically consequential than origin, which retains a greater 
degree of “unassimilatedness” and is far more temporally proximate and sticky.  
Participants in the focus groups and in the experiment perceived candidates of 
Haitian origin as being significantly more likely to relax migration laws against Haiti and 
unify the two nations. This perception is reinforced by shopworn but effective scare-
tactics that are continually revived by ultra-nationalist sectors of Dominican society. The 
following exchange from the young adult focus group illustrates that these scare-tactics 
not only endure in Dominican society but also shape the electoral landscape. 
I: How likely is it that a Dominico-Haitian candidate will be elected in the 
Dominican Republic? 
P1: I would say that [a Dominico-Haitian candidate] either has a very remote 
chance of being elected president in this country or none at all simply for 
being Haitian. He may be more competent and better connected than his 
Dominican opponent, but he doesn’t stand a chance once the opposition seizes 
on his Haitian origin. 
P2: In truth, it isn’t that I am opposed to helping a Haitian on any given 
moment. They are human beings, after all. I just don’t want them leading my 
country. 
P3: A Dominico-Haitian candidate is unlikely to win even against a 
Dominico-Mexican candidate, not because he’s black, but because we are 




The results of my experiment and survey must be taken with caution given that it 
was carried out on a medium-sized sample of the province of Santo Domingo. It is 
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possible that the estimation of my variance could have been affected by the relatively 
small cell sizes of the twelve experimental conditions, which included approximately 58 
observations each. Research at the national level and a large-sized sample would help 
further evaluate the strength of my results.  
Nevertheless, my findings with respect to candidate evaluation are consistent with 
those reported by Dore Cabral (1995) twenty years ago based on the aforementioned 
national survey on marital preferences (Chapter 3). That survey concluded that 
Dominicans were more anti-Haitian than they were anti-black. My findings also jibe with 
the electoral history of the Dominican Republic. As Howard (2001, 59) points out, “the 
Dominican Republic has had more negro or mulatto presidents than any other country in 
the western hemisphere,” which suggests that Dominican voters do not consistently 
oppose black candidates for higher political offices.  
My results suggest that national origin can be a more salient electoral cleavage 
than ethnoracial identity and may help redirect ethnoracial cleavages. In migrant-
recipient countries in the region, where candidates often identify with hyphenated 
national identities, voters may focus on the national origin of candidates more than on 









The low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in Latin America is 
surprising. Ethnoracial voting behavior would seem most probable in ethnoracially 
diverse societies, especially in highly stratified ones such as those found in Latin 
America. In these societies, members of subordinate ethnoracial groups have incentives 
to protest their marginalization by voting for parties or candidates that propose to defend 
the interests of their ethnoracial group and make other types of ethnoracial appeals. 
 There are few ethnoracial entrepreneurs and voters in the region, however. 
Candidates have largely eschewed ethnoracial-based appeals and voters on the whole 
have declined to vote for them when they have made those appeals. This is true even in 
countries where the state is making efforts to increase the representation of Afro-
descendants.  
This dissertation provides an argument for why ethnoracial identity is of low 
salience in elections in Latin America, especially in Afro-Latin America. I have argued 
that the degree of ethnoracial group identity also shapes electoral behavior. The 
combination of high levels of stratification and low degrees of ethnoracial group 
consolidation will typically lead to outcomes in which ethnoracial identity is not salient 
in elections. 
 Stratification generates conditions of ethnoracial prejudice and unequal 
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distribution of resources. Where ethnoracial boundaries are porous and ethnoracial 
identity is fluid, ethnoracial stratification may actually incentivize individuals to opt for 
ethnoracial “exit.” That is, individuals may choose to identify with more privileged 
ethnoracial categories rather than with marginalized ethnoracial categories. I suggested 
that incentives to “exit” reduce the possibility that individuals will “voice” ethnoracial 
grievances and decrease the likelihood that ethnoracial entrepreneurs activate ethnoracial 
cleavages in elections. If individuals have no possibility of exiting their ethnoracial 
group, however, they may respond to prejudice and inequalities by exercising voice. That 
is, they may organize politically and struggle for greater ethnoracial inclusion. 
My argument provides leverage to understand the low salience of ethnoracial 
identity in elections in Latin America, in particular. Throughout most of the region, 
ethnoracial boundaries are permeable and ethnoracial identity is situational. Most 
individuals hold relatively weak loyalties to ethnoracial categories, except in a few rural 
and regionally isolated communities. Moreover, Latin America is highly stratified along 
ethnoracial lines. Afro-descendants and indigenous communities are disproportionately 
poor, less educated, and subject to discrimination. 
 The confluence of inchoate ethnoracial group identities and ethnoracial 
stratification explains the low salience of ethnoracial cleavages in elections in the 
Dominican Republic. As I argued in Chapter 2, high rates of intermixing, structural 
conditions during the colonial period, and a mix of inclusive and exclusionary nation-
building policies impeded the consolidation of ethnoracial group identity in the DR. 
Rather than pay allegiance to any single ethnoracial category, individuals in the 
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Dominican Republic identify with multiple and overlapping ethnoracial categories. 
Nation-building policies, moreover, have elevated the salience of national origin over 
ethnoracial identification.  
 As Chapter 3 showed, the Dominican Republic is socioeconomically stratified by 
ethnoracial identity. Existing public opinion data and my own data show that “black” 
Dominicans tend to lag behind “white” Dominicans with respect to various 
socioeconomic indicators and access to social services. The data also show that black 
Dominicans tend to be subject to higher levels of prejudice and that Dominicans across 
all ethnoracial categories acknowledge as much.  
I argued that in the absence of robust ethnoracial affinities, Dominicans have 
managed stratification and prejudice by making use of their ethnoracial ambiguity. As I 
showed, dark-skinned individuals have tended to identify with hybrid or lighter 
ethnoracial categories, such as indio, rather than with dark-skinned categories, such as 
negro (black) or moreno (brown). For dark-skinned individuals, reclassification has 
helped them to avoid being placed at the bottom of the pigmentocracy alongside Haitian 
migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent. 
 As a result, ethnoracial appeals and voting behavior have been largely absent 
from elections in spite of high levels of ethnoracial stratification and prejudice. As 
Chapter 3 showed, Dominicans, including light-skinned Dominicans, have frequently 
voted across ethnoracial lines. They have elected numerous Afro-descendant legislators 
and some of those legislators have represented provinces where individuals tend be 
lighter-skinned. Dominicans have also elected Afro-descendant presidents. In the case of 
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the most recently elected Afro-descendant president, I show that he drew similar support 
from provinces and municipalities where lighter-skinned individuals tend to be more 
prevalent as he did from provinces and municipalities where darker-skinned individuals 
tend to be more prevalent.  
I also presented evidence that politicians have not typically appealed to 
ethnoracial identity in electoral campaigns. And when they have, as in the 1994 and 1996 
elections, they have mostly used such appeals in combination with appeals to national 
origin. Moreover, ethno-national appeals cannot by themselves explain the 1994 and 
1996 electoral results.  
 In order to explore the extent to which Dominicans use ethnoracial considerations 
at the ballot box in a more rigorous fashion, I carried out a survey-experiment on a 
representative sample of the province of Santo Domingo. Overall, the bivariate and 
multivariate results presented in Chapter 4 lend support to my arguments. Contrary to the 
predictions of group-specific approaches, most participants did not significantly support 
candidates whose skin color or ethnoracial identity matched their own, except for self-
identified whites.  
Moreover, my results partially supported the predictions of the colorism thesis. 
Participants did give white candidates significantly higher scores on most questions than 
they gave other candidates, but they did not give black candidates significantly lower 
scores than they gave mixed candidates—except on attractiveness. As I suggested in 
Chapter 4, these findings are consistent with my focus group data and with my argument. 
The same logic that leads individuals to lighten their ethnoracial identification also leads 
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them to evaluate white candidates most favorably. Just as stratification reinforces a 
preference for whiteness and white candidates, inchoate ethnoracial group identity 
encourages the practice of colorism. 
Lastly, my results did not support the predictions of the racial democracy thesis 
since participants did express greater support for white candidates with regard to some 
questions and they rated the candidates’ attractiveness along a pigmentocratic hierarchy. 
The results also showed that national origin was a more salient consideration for 
candidate evaluation than ethnoracial cleavages. Participants gave candidates assigned 
the Haitian treatments significantly lower scores than the control group. This was 
especially true when candidates were explicitly identified as Dominico-Haitian. The 
ethnoracial identity of participants did not have a significant effect on their willingness to 
vote for Dominico-Haitian candidates. The results also showed that participants were far 
more likely to oppose candidates of Haitian descent than they were to oppose black 
candidates. Focus group research and the more than fifty semi-formal interviews that I 
conducted with political elites lend support to these results.  
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
My findings have broader implications for longstanding debates in the study of 
race and ethnicity. First, they help to situate the debate over the extent to which 
ethnoracial identity structures social organization in Latin America in a different 
theoretical terrain, namely ethnoracial voting. Moreover, my findings carve middle 
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ground in this debate.73 They suggest that race and ethnicity do structure some 
dimensions of social organization, including the distribution of resources, access to 
institutions, and the valorization of phenotypes, as one camp argues. But my findings also 
suggest that race and ethnicity do not necessarily structure other dimensions of social 
organization, such as electoral behavior, as another camp argues. Individuals may be 
subordinated by ethnoracialized structures and institutions but may not respond by 
engaging in ethnoracial politics.  
The Dominican Republic is not exceptional in this regard. Evidence from 
experimental studies on electoral behavior has found that ethnoracial identity does not 
always play an important role in electoral behavior even in societies that are otherwise 
structured by ethnoracial identity. Dunning (2009) found that the race of the candidate 
had no significant impact on candidate evaluation in Brazil.74 In the case of Mali, 
Dunning and Harrison (2010) found that ties along lines of “cousinage” (a crosscutting 
informal institution based on shared surnames) weakened the association between 
ethnicity and vote choice. 75 
 Recent studies suggest that the link between race and electoral behavior may be 
weakening even in the United States. A study by Smith (2014), for example, argues that 
                                                 
73 See Bonilla-Silva (1997); Loveman (1999) 
74 Findings on ethnoracial identity and candidate evaluation in Brazil are contradictory, however. In a 
survey conducted in São Paolo in 2006, Mitchell (2009) found evidence that self-identified dark-skinned 
respondents were more likely to support black candidates. In a more recent survey-experiment in Brazil, 
Aguilar-Pariente and colleagues (2015) reached mixed conclusions. They found that whereas self-identified 
white and brown participants’ support for candidates of their same race was contingent on the size of the 
ballot, self-identified black participants preferred candidates of their same race irrespective of the size of 
the ballot. 
75 See Battle and Seely (2010) Ishiyama (2010) for survey-based studies that find little evidence of ethnic 
voting in Africa. 
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increased black migration to the United States is diluting black political identity and 
black voting behavior.76 Although black migrants and black Americans arguably occupy 
the same position in the U.S. ethnoracial paradigm (Bonilla-Silva 2006), ethnoracial 
identity does not appear to similarly structure their electoral behavior. 
These findings, as well as my own, suggest that individuals in ethnoracially 
stratified societies may not always activate ethnoracial identities in elections. As 
Brubaker (2004, 13) has argued, individuals may experience the world, including the 
political world, in non-ethnoracial terms. This dissertation attempts to provide an 
explanation for why many individuals in Latin America do not experience the electoral 
world in ethnoracial terms. As I have argued, this is in large part due to the combination 
of permeable ethnoracial boundaries and acute stratification. 
Second, my argument contributes to the literatures on mestizaje and social 
movements in Latin America. It suggests that subaltern sectors may also use 
mestizaje/mulatez to their advantage. The race and ethnicity literature on Latin America 
has privileged studying the ways in which elites employ mestizaje/mulatez. They have 
argued persuasively that elites utilize mestizaje to create a false sense of national 
homogeneity and social equality. This in turn helps to demobilize subordinate groups 
along ethnoracial lines (Sawyer 2006; Telles and Flores 2013; Hernández 2013). I show, 
however, that subaltern groups have also exploited the ethnic fluidity created by 
intermixing. They have done so to reclassify their way out of marginalization. Wimmer 
                                                 
76 Also see Rogers (2006) for a discussion on black migration and pan-black political identity. 
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(2008, 988) refers to this type of strategy as repositioning, whereby individuals “shift 
sides” rather than contest the ethnoracial hierarchy. 
Scott’s (1985) argument about the ways in which peasants use “everyday forms of 
resistance” to defy authority when they cannot revolt help us understand the conditions 
under which minority populations in Latin America are likely to use reclassification 
strategies. Reclassification may be more likely to occur in the region where states have 
not adopted multicultural citizenship regimes. Where states have adopted multicultural 
regimes, such as in Colombia and Nicaragua, minority populations have exploited 
political openings and mobilized against stratification (Paschel 2010). As others have 
suggested, populations with consolidated ethnoracial group identities have been 
especially able to mobilize (Hooker 2005).  
Where states have not adopted multicultural regimes, however, minority 
populations have had few political openings to mobilize against stratification. In these 
circumstances, I argue that individuals may resort to reclassification strategies as a way to 
manage stratification. Reclassification, like similar “weapons of the weak,” is an 
attractive strategy because it: “requires little or no coordination or planning; often 
represents a form of individual self-help; and typically avoids any direct symbolic 
confrontation with authority or with elite norms” (Scott 1985, 29). It would appear to be 
an especially attractive strategy in Latin America because individuals activate multiple 
identifications. 
Conceptualizing re-classification as a “form of commonplace resistance” (Scott, 
1985, 29) enriches our understanding of the varied ways in which minority groups in 
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Latin America challenge stratification. The literature on race in Latin America has 
typically privileged collective social movements and has focused on the institutional and 
structural conditions that either facilitate or inhibit their emergence.77 This emphasis, 
however, has overlooked less organized and less contentious forms of minority resistance 
in the region. Studying reclassification strategies helps to expand the universe of cases of 
minority resistance beyond social movements.   
Of course, reclassification does not always represent a form of minority 
resistance. Individuals that employ a strategy of “exit” by identifying with lighter 
ethnoracial categories may reproduce the very stratified structures that they seek to 
withdraw from by keeping ethnoracial group identity inchoate. Successful Afro-
descendant movements in rural and isolated areas of Central America, for example, have 
benefited tremendously from consolidating a black ethnoracial group identity and from 
exercising voice.  
Third, my findings have implications for the debate between Constructivism and 
Primordialism. Namely, they suggest that constructivist and primordial approaches 
together provide greater leverage to understanding ethnoracial identity in societies where 
ethnoracial identity and national origin are entwined than either approach on its own. 
This is true despite the fact that the two approaches make very different assumptions 
about the extent to which ethnoracial identities endure and are stable once formed (Hale 
2004).  
                                                 
77  See Hanchard (1994); Yashar (1998); Hooker (2005); Van Cott (2002); Paschel and Sawyer (2008); and 
Paschel (2010).  
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Constructivism or Instrumentalism, for example, can shed light on the strategy of 
ethnoracial exit that I highlight. Subdominant individuals in the Dominican Republic 
indeed are able to change their ethnoracial identification. As I suggest, they identify with 
dominant categories, which is feasible given permeable ethnoracial boundaries, in order 
to avoid further socioeconomic marginalization. This strategy is consistent with the logic 
of instrumentalism in Constructivism.  
But Primordialism can also help make sense of ethnoracial identification in the 
Dominican Republic. Individuals with visible African attributes in the Dominican 
Republic face greater constraints in identifying with more dominant ethnoracial 
categories.78 There is evidence that skin-color predicts ethnoracial identity in the 
Dominican Republic, though not as strongly as in other countries in the region (Telles 
and Paschel 2013). Moreover, I have shown that ethnoracial stratification and race-based 
prejudice are deeply entrenched in the Dominican Republic. Dominico-Haitians, in 
particular, bear the brunt of stratification and prejudice and are more likely to have a 
constrained ethnoracial exit. For Dominico-Haitians, ethnoracial identity formation may 
indeed be singular, stable and enduring, as Primordialists contend. 
COMPARATIVE APPLICATIONS 
 
 Although ethnoracial stratification is widespread in Latin America and ethnoracial 
identities are often inchoate, the case of the Dominican Republic is unique in some ways. 
Historically fractious relations with neighboring Haiti and anti-Haitianism have shaped 
                                                 
78 See Chandra (2006) for a discussion on visible attributes. 
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ethnoracial boundary-making in the Dominican Republic. This boundary-making 
dynamic has not been commonplace between neighbors in the region. The Dominican 
Republic is the only country in the Americas that gained its independence from a black 
republic and that shares an island with that same country. This has led to a distinct 
understanding of blackness that is closely associated with Haitians and Haitian 
descendants (Candelario 2007; Simmons 2009; Telles and Bailey 2013). 
Although anti-Haitianism makes the Dominican Republic a special case, it also 
has broader applications. Anti-Haitianism has many parallels in countries where 
immigrants are viewed negatively because of their darker phenotypes and lower levels of 
education and where ethnoracial identity and nationalism are interwoven. In the Americas 
alone, parallel contemporary examples include the following: Haitian migrants in the 
Bahamas and in Turks and Caicos; Dominican migrants in Puerto Rico; Mexican, 
Caribbean and Central American migrants in the United States; Central American 
migrants in Mexico; Nicaraguan migrants in Costa Rica; and migrants from the Andes in 
the Southern Cone.  
These and other parallel examples help illustrate that nationalism, in response to 
immigration, can harden ethnoracial boundaries in some cases and soften ethnoracial 
boundaries in others. The effect of nationalism on ethnoracial boundaries perhaps hinges 
on the strength or weakness of boundaries predating immigration flows. Nationalism may 
be more likely to harden ethnoracial boundaries where early processes of nation-building 
produced strong ethnoracial boundaries. In cases like the United States and South Africa, 
nationalism prevents immigrant groups from upsetting rigid and established ethnoracial 
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orders. Marx (1998) argues that elites in the United States and South Africa subordinated 
their black populations to quell intra-white conflict and ensure national unity. Elites 
constructed systems of racial domination, he suggests, as a way to make nations.  
 By contrast, nationalism may be more likely to soften ethnoracial boundaries 
where processes of nation-building produced weak ethnoracial boundaries. In the case of 
the Dominican Republic, I have argued that intense and early patterns of intermixing, 
structural conditions during the colonial period, and a mix of inclusive and exclusionary 
policies of nation-building led to permeable ethnoracial boundaries and to a fluid 
ethnoracial order.  In cases like the Dominican Republic and much of Latin America, 
nationalism prevents immigrant groups from putting in place foreign racial orders and 
from consolidating ethnoracial identities and creating rigid ethnoracial orders. Afro-
descendants in Latin America may especially support nationalist efforts because they 
benefit most from weak ethnoracial boundaries. As I have argued, weak ethnoracial 
boundaries provide Afro-descendants an ethnoracial exit to manage stratification.  
The varying effect of nationalism on ethnoracial boundaries that I describe has 
implications for theories of ethnoracial politics. Ethnoracial identities appear to be least 
salient and national origin appears to be most salient for electoral behavior in societies 
with soft or permeable ethnoracial boundaries. In these societies, national origin may help 
to redirect or counteract ethnoracial cleavages in elections. In migrant-recipient countries 
in Latin America, where candidates identify with hyphenated national identities, voters 
may focus on the national origin of candidates more so than on a shared ethnoracial 
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identity or programmatic position. Future studies would do well to pay greater attention 










 2006-2010 COD  
Ángel Acosta Féliz (PRD) 
Antonio Bernabel Colón (PRD) 
Máximo Castro (PRD) 
Demóstenes Martínez (PLD) 
Magda Rodríguez Azcona (PLD) 
Santiago Rodríguez Peña (PLD) 
Julio César Valentín (PLD) 
 2010-2016 COD 
Carlos Borromeo Terrero (PRD) 
Máximo Castro (PRSC) 
Antonio Bernabel Colón (PRD) 
Altagracia Gonzáles (PLD) 
José Gabriel Jáquez (PRD) 
Francísco Matos (PLD) 
Demóstenes Martínez (PLD) 
María Martínez (PRD) 
Magda Rodríguez Azcona (PLD) 
Francisco Santos Sosa (PRD) 
Table 1A: Afro-Descendant Legislators Elected to the 2006-2010 and 2010-2016 
Chamber of Deputies from the Province of Santiago 
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Sources: AmericasBarometer, 2004-2012 







Province AB2004 AB2006 AB2008 AB2010 AB2012 
Duarte 10.2 15.9 21.7 17.6 21.1 
Espaillat 16.6 12.8 40 7.14 17.4 
La Vega 23.3 40 32 13.2 36.6 
Montecristi 11.9 15.1 20 2.44 - 
Monseñor Nouel 15.3 21.2 19.4 12 - 
Peravia 7.52 14.6 18.9 15.1 25 
Puerto Plata 10.3 10.5 14.5 15.1 4.17 
Salcedo/Hnas. Mirabal 12.8 8.33 11.7 12.5 12.5 
Santiago 11.4 17.4 22.5 16.1 26.2 
Santiago Rodríguez 15.6 16.6 41.6 16.6 - 
% of Self-Identified 
Whites in the National 
Population 
9.85 12.7 13.9 9.58 12.5 
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Sources: AmericasBarometer, 2004-2012 










Province AB2004 AB2006 AB2008 AB2010 AB2012 
El Seibo 17.5 12.5 27.2 8.33 25 
Hato Mayor 11.4 7.14 25 16.6 - 
La Romana 23.4 26.8 31.4 10.8 20.8 
Monte Plata 18.3 34 37 15.7 22.9 
San Cristobal 17 21.6 32.8 22.5 19.5 
Samaná 20.3 - 25.8 13 13 
San Pedro de Macorís 8.33 21.1 32.4 20 28.8 
Santo Domingo 16 25.6 22.5 14.8 22.6 
% of Self-Identified 
Blacks in the National 
Population 
9.58 19.9 17.8 10.1 15.6 
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 Indicator 2010 DR Census 2011 Survey-Experiment 
Population 
Density 
Urban 87.7 66.4 
Rural 12.2 33.5 
    
Gender 
Female 50.9 68.2 
Male 49 31.7 
    
Home Flooring 
Dirt / Wood 2.55 1.44 
Cement 57.8 55.78 
Mosaic / Ceramic 36.1 31.65 
Granite / Marble 4.14 10.98 
    
Schooling 
≥ Pre-School 9.36 3.18 
≥ Elementary 41 29.7 
≥ High School 31.4 34.1 
≥ College 18 32.9 
    
Age 
18-39 33.2 55.8 
40-64 21.1 37.4 
65-79 3.53 6.07 
≥ 80 0.93 0.58 
Note: Figures represent percentages. 
Table 4A: Descriptive Statistics of the Survey-Experiment Sample and the DR 2010 
Census of Santo Domingo Across Different Indicators
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Appendix B  
INTERVIEWS 
 
Acevedo, Rafael. President, Gallup Dominicana. Santo Domingo. 4 Mar. 2011.  
 
Adame, Sonia. Former Deputy Director, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes 
(SJRM). Santo Domingo. 8 Mar. 2011. 
 
Andújar, Carlos. Anthropologist, Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo (UASD). 
Santo Domingo. 22 Feb. 2011. 
 
Báez Evertsz, Frank. Sociologist and Head Researcher, Immigrant National Survey 
(ENI). Santo Domingo. 16 Mar. 2011. 
 
Brea, Ramonina. Director, The University Center for Political and Social Studies 
(CUEPS) at the Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra (PUCMM). Santo 
Domingo. 21 Feb. 2011. 
 
Cabreja, Javier. Former Director, Participación Ciudadana. Santo Domingo. 18 Mar. 
2011. 
 
Cañete, Rosa. Regional Director, Oxfam International. Santo Domingo. 24 Feb. 2011. 
 
Castillo, Pelegrín. Secretary of Energy and Mines. Santo Domingo. 4 Apr. 2011. 
 
De Camps, Hatuey. President, Partido Revolucionario Social Demócrata (PRSD). Santo 
Domingo. 12 Mar. 2011. 
 
Deive, Carlos Esteban. Historian. Santo Domingo. 18 Feb. 2011. 
 
Díaz, Juan Bolívar. Columnist, Periódico Hoy; Former Director of Press, Teleantillas. 
Santo Domingo. 24 Feb. 2011.  
 
Estrella, Eduardo. President, Dominicanos por el Cambio (DxC). Santo Domingo. 23 
Mar. 2011. 
 
Ferrán, Fernando. Vice President, Grupo Vicini. Santo Domingo. 11 Apr. 2011. 
 
Franco, Franklin. Former Professor, Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo (UASD). 




Heliger, Eli. Columnist, Diario Libre. Santo Domingo. 11 Feb. 2011. 
 
Henríquez Gratereaux, Federico. Columnist, Periódico Hoy. Santo Domingo. 18 Apr. 
2011. 
 
Isa, Pavel. Research Coordinator, Observatorio Dominicano de Comercio Internacional 
(ODCI). Santo Domingo. 14 Feb. 2011. 
 
Jiménez, Manuel. Congressman, Santo Domingo (PLD). Santo Domingo. 25 Mar. 2011. 
 
Lizardo, Cristina. Senator and President of the Senate (PLD). Santo Domingo. 6 Apr. 
2011. 
 
Lora, Huchi. Producer, Digo:TV and Telesistema. Santo Domingo. 28 Mar. 2011. 
 
Lozano, Wilfredo. Director, Center for Research and Social Studies (CIES) at the 
Universidad Iberoamericana (UNIBE). Santo Domingo. 28 Feb. 2011. 
 
Mateo, Andrés L. Dean of General Studies, Universidad APEC. Santo Domingo. 7 Apr. 
2011. 
 
Melo, Hamlet. Congressman, La Altagracia (PLD). Santo Domingo. 12 Apr. 2011. 
 
Mercedes, Ayacx. Deputy Director for Special Programs, Ministry of the Presidency. 
Santo Domingo. 11 Mar. 2011. 
 
Mejía, Manuel. Former Deputy Director, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales-
República Dominicana (FLACSO-RD). Santo Domingo. 9 Feb. 2011. 
 
Mella, Pablo. Instituto Filosófico Centro Bonó. Santo Domingo. 23 Feb. 2011. 
 
Moya Pons, Frank. President, Dominican Academy of History. Santo Domingo. 17 Mar. 
2011. 
 
Núñez, Manuel. Director of Social Sciences, Universidad APEC. Santo Domingo. 23 
Feb. 2011. 
 
Pagán, Lilian. President, ASISA Research Group. Santo Domingo. 16 Mar. 2011. 
 
Paulino, Alejandro. Deputy Director, National Archives. Santo Domingo. 1 Mar. 2011. 
 
Peña Guaba, José Francisco. President, Bloque Institucional Social Demócrata (BIS). 
Santo Domingo. 21 Mar. 2011 
 187 
 
Pierre, Sonia. Former Director, Movimiento de Mujeres Dominico-Haitianas. Santo 
Domingo. 18 Apr. 2011. 
 
Pol Emil, Antonio. Councilman (APD); Former Director, Centro Cultural Dominico 
Haitiano. Santo Domingo. 22 Mar. 2011. 
 
Puig, Max. President, Alianza por la Democrácia (APD). Santo Domingo. 19 Mar. 2011.  
 
Sanz, Flor. Director of Overseas Voting, Junta Central Electoral (JCE). Santo Domingo. 
22 Feb. 2011. 
 
Serrano, Mario. Former Director, Centro Bonó. Santo Domingo. 15 Mar. 2011. 
 
Silié, Ruben. Ambassador of the Dominican Republic to the Republic of Haiti. Santo 
Domingo. 26 Mar. 2011. 
 
Solano, Darío. Director, Fundación Afrocimarrón. Santo Domingo. 12 Apr. 2011. 
 
Tavárez Mirabal, Minou. Congresswoman, Distrito Nacional; President of Opción 
Democrática (OD). Santo Domingo. 29 Mar. 2011. 
 
Tejada Holguín, Ramón. Director, Information Analysis and Strategic Programming at 
the Ministry of the Presidency. Santo Domingo. 17 Feb. 2011. 
 
Tolentino Dipp, Hugo. Historian and Congressman, Distrito Nacional (PRM). Santo 
Domingo. 15 Mar. 2011. 
 
Toribio, Rafaél. Director, Center for Governability and Social Management (CEGES) at 
the Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo (INTEC). Santo Domingo. 10 Mar. 2011. 
 
Trinidad, Malvil. Executive Director, Centro de Investigación y Promoción Social 
(CIPROS). Santo Domingo. 8 Apr. 2011. 
 
Valdez, Guadalupe. Congresswoman, National (APD). Santo Domingo. 28 Mar. 2011.  
 
Valentín, Julio César. Senator, Santiago (PLD). Santo Domingo. 23 Mar. 2011. 
 
Vargas, Tahira. Social Anthropologist and Columnist at Acento.com.do. Santo Domingo. 
16 Mar. 2011. 
 
Vásquez, Pastor. Minister Counselor at the Embassy of the Dominican Republic in Port-
au-Prince, Haiti. Santo Domingo. 16 Feb. 2011. 
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Vicens Bello, Marisol. Partner, Headrick Rizik Alvarez & Fernández. Santo Domingo. 11 
Mar. 2011. 
 
Villamán, Marcos. Provost, Instituto Global de Altos Estudios en Ciencias Sociales at the 
Fundación Global Democracia y Desarrollo (FUNGLODE). Santo Domingo. 10 Mar. 
2011. 
 
Wooding, Bridget. Director, Observatorio Migrantes del Caribe (OBMICA). Santo 
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